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Dr. P. CHENNA REDDY, M.A., Ph.D.

Director, Oriental Research Institute.

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EDITORIAL

As the readers of this *S.V. University Oriental Journal* already know, this Institute was brought under the management of S.V. University on the 1st of November 1956 from that of T. T. Devasthanams. During the period of transition due to the change of management, the Volume I of this Journal was printed and published only in 1958. On account of frequent changes in the Editorship of the Journal, some of the subsequent numbers also could not be issued at regular intervals. Volume VII of 1964 was released only in the beginning of 1968 and Vol. VIII of 1965 the press copy of which was ready even at the time when Volume VII was given to the press i.e., by the middle of 1967 is released only now due to unforeseen circumstances.

Vigorous efforts are made from the middle of this year in all possible ways to see that the arrear volumes – Volumes IX, X and XI of 1966, 1967 and 1968 respectively – are brought out in the nearest possible future. Accordingly appeals have been despatched to about one hundred reputed indologists in all parts of the country to contribute their valuable articles in English or Sanskrit to *S.V. University Oriental Journal.* I am happy to announce it now that I received scores of learned articles from various scholars sufficient to make two more volumes. And letters from many more Indologists are received with a promise to send their articles very soon. Volume IX of 1966 is already in the press and Volume X of 1967 too will follow without any delay as the press copy of that volume also is ready. I am now confident that I can bring the publication of the *S.V. University Oriental Journal* upto-date before the end of December 1969 by issuing Volumes XI and XII also by that time. I express my heartfelt thanks to the learned scholars who have readily responded to my appeal either by already despatching their articles or by promising to despatch them in the near future.

It is not out of place to mention here that one of my learned colleagues Sri N. Subramania Sastri, the Curator of the Manuscripts Library attached to the Institute, retired from service on the afternoon of 15th November 1968. On account of his retirement in a very short time after I took charge as the Director of this Institute i.e., on 10th July 1968, I am deprived of a helping hand in the day to day adminisrtation of the Institute at the time when it was most needed.

Sri Subramania Sastri has been associated with this Institute in various capacities for the past 26 years and as the Curator of the

Manuscripts Library from July 1944. I feel proud enough to acknowledge here the fact that Sri Sastri discharged his duties throughout the period of his service to the best satisfaction of the Director and the S.V. University authorities on one side and the learned public on the other. Though the loss to the Institute as well as to me in the form of retirement of Sri Subramania Sastri is irrecoverable, it is to my consolation that an equally efficient and qualified colleague of mine Sri K.S. Ramamurti, Assistant Editor of this Journal is put in additional charge of the Manuscripts Library.

TIRUPATI,
Dt. 30—12—1968.

J. CHENNA REDDY,
EDITOR.

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TEXTS AND STUDIES

नारायणभट्टपादविरचितम् अपाणिनीयप्रामाण्यसाधनम्

Edited with Introduction, English Translation and Notes by

Prof. E.R. Sreekrishna Sarma

1

N. SUBRAMANIA SASTRI

A NOTE ON THE INDOLOGICAL RESEARCHES OF ALBIRUNI

AlBiruni was one of the greatest scholars of mediaeval Islam and certainly the most original and profound. He was equally well versed in mathematical, astronomical and natural sciences and also distinguished himself as a historian, geographer and linguist. He was an impartial observer of customs and creeds. He was born of an Iranian family in A.D. 973.

The amount of original researches in Indology embodied in the work *India* by AlBiruni was immense. It is interesting to have to observe that even as a profound student of Arabic and Persian literature, AlBiruni must have been introduced to the Hindu *vidyas*, because, as is well known, a considerable portion of Arabic texts were made up of translation from Sanskrit texts in the eighth and nineth centuries.[1]

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1. The *Pañcatantra* was first translated into Persian. From Persian it was rendered into Arabic as *Kalila* and *Dimna*. The medical work of Caraka likewise passed through a Persian version into Arabic. Practically all the other versions of Hindu texts were made direct from the original.

The astronomical (mathematical) works of Brahma Gupta, namely the *Brahmasiddhānta* (called *Sindhind* in Arabic) and *Khaṇḍa-khādyaka* (Arkand) were translated into Arabic by Alfazari and Yakub Ibn Tarik during the reign of Mansur (A.D. 754–774).

Under Harun Alrashid (A.D. 786–808) the ministers, belonging as they did to Barmak family, were Buddhists converted to Islam. It was under their auspices that Hindu scholars were invited to Bagdad and Sanskrit works on medicine, pharmacology, toxicology, philosophy, astrology and other subjects were translated into Arabic.

At home in Khiva, AlBiruni was in a position to study the *Brahmasiddhānta*, *Khaṇḍa-khādyaka*, *Caraka-saṃhitā* and *Pañcatantra* in Arabic versions. An Arabic translation of Vitteśvara's *Karaṇasāra* could likewise be used by him. There were in existence also certain Arabic treatises on Astronomy and chronology in which the knowledge of Hindu mathematics was implied.

While in India (A.D. 1017–30) he wrote his work on India in which addition to his special subjects, namely mathematics and astronomy, philosophy, literature, general culture, etc., are introduced. The sub-title of the book is "*An accurate description of all categories of Hindu thought, as well those which are admissible as those which must be rejected.*" Besides, during the same period he produced a number of independent treatises. These are being enumerated below :

1. A treatise on the determination of *nakṣatras* or lunar stations.
2. The *Khayal-alkusufaini* in which among other things the theory of *Yoga* is described.
3. The Arabic *Khaṇḍa-Khādyaka*, more or less similar in contents to No. 2.
4. A book in which the *Karaṇas* are described.
5. A treatise on the various systems of numerations in use among different nations including the Indian.
6. The key of Astronomy.
7. Treatises on the methods for the calculation of longitude.
8. Two works of Varāhamihira were translated into Arabic by AlBiruni. The one was the *Bṛhat-saṃhitā* and the other the *Laghujātaka*.

At this time the son of Dhanya or Dhanin was the Director of the Hospital at Bagdad. A Hindu physician named Kaṅka was also practicing there. Atri's work on drinkables was introduced to the people. Vedavyāsa's work on wisdom or philosophy, allied perhaps to Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta* philosophy, was likewise to be found among the Sanskrit texts known in the Saracen capital. This may have had some part in the formation of Arabian Sufism. A *Jātaka* by Satyavarman perhaps belonged also to the Indian literature imported into the Saracen Empire under Harun. The Buddhist story, adapted in Christian literature under the title of *Joasaph and Barlaam*, as well, as some of the fables, of Buddhaghoṣa relating to cunning of women were also rendered available in Arabic during this period.

Treatises on *Sarpavidyā* (science of snakes), on *Viṣavidyā* (science of poison), auguring, talismans, veterinary art, sex-lore, logic, ethics, politics, war and general philosophy are known to have been translated by Saracens. The Moslem authors wrote also commentaries, adaptations and summaries etc., of Hindu books. (For the translations from Sanskrit works, into Arabic from A.D. 750 to 850 Sachau: *AlBiruni's India* vol. I, pp. xxviii to xxxv),

Among philosophical works, he is responsible for the translation of Kapila's *Sāṃkhya* and Patañjali's treatise on *Yoga* as well as of the *Bhagavadgita*. A sanskrit treatise on loathsome diseases owes its Arabic rendering to him.

Translations from the *Viṣṇudharmottara-purāṇa*, *Vāyu-purāṇa*, *Matsya-purāṇa* and *Āditya-purāṇa* are to be found in AlBiruni's work on India.

As for the works on astronomy, mathematics etc., his book exhibits knowlege of (1) Brahmagupta's *Puliśa-Siddhānta*, *Brahma-siddhānta*, *Khaṇḍa-khādyaka*, and *Uttara-khaṇḍa-khādyaka*, of which the first three were translated by himself into Arabic, (2) Balabhadra's commentary on the *Khaṇḍa-khādyaka*, (3) Varāhamihira's *Pañca-siddhānta-tīkā* and *Bṛhaj-jātakam* in addition to the two other works translated by himself, (4) Utpala's commentary on the *Bṛhat-saṃhitā*, (5) a book by Ārya Bhaṭṭa II, (6) Vitteśvara's *Karaṇasāra*; (7) Vijayanandin's *Karaṇa-tilaka*, (8) *Śrīpala*; (9) Book of the Ṛṣi Bhuvanakośa, (10) Book of Bhattila (11) Book of Durlabha, (12) Book of Jīvasarman (13) Book of Samaya, (14) Book of Auliatta, (15) Mahādeva Candrabīja's *Sarvadhara*, (16) and a calender from Kashmir. Among other Hindu books that went to the making of AlBiruni's *India* may be mentioned (1) Haribhaṭa's Dictionary, (2) a treatise on the medicine of elephants, (3) *Mahābhārata* (4) *Rāmāyaṇa*; (5) Manu's *Dharma-śāstra*, and last but not least (6) the *Gītā*.

Previous to the composition of the work on India, AlBiruni had translated two Sanskrit works into Arabic, as he says in the preface (Vol. I, p. 8), one about the origin and a description of all created beings called *Sāṃkhya* and another about the emancipation of the soul from the fetters of the body called *Patañjali*. According to this eleventh century Moslem 'Indologist', "these two books contain most of the elements of the belief of the Hindus". He hoped that the work on *India* would 'enable the reader to dispense with these two earlier ones, with other books of the same kind'.

AlBiruni was convinced that 'mis-representation' (vol. I. p. 5) was 'much in fashion among those who undertake the task of giving an account of religious and philosophical systems from which they slightly differ and to which they are entirely opposed'. While examining the manner in which he classifies the 'misreporters' and liars about other nations we are easily reminded of another great Moslem scholar, Abul Fazil, who nearly six centuries later, analysed the causes of intolerance and prejudices of races against one another. It is interesting that two of

the greatest intellectuals of the Moslem world were inspired by the self-same ideal, namely the love of truth as well as desire to rescue the Moslem conception about Hindu culture from hearsay as well as second-hand information.

In regard to Hindu religion and philosophy, AlBiruni makes it a point to distinguish between the educated and the uneducated classes. This distinction is with him eternal. In the case of the Arabs and Greeks also he observes that the ideas of men and women differ according as they are cultivated or not.

"It is well-known" says he "that the popular mind leans towards sensible world and has an aversion to the world of abstract thought which is only understood by the highly educated people, of whom in every time and every place there are only few". He is therefore, not surprised that among the Hindus 'idols are erected only for the uneducated lowclass people of little understanding and that the Hindu never made an idol of any supernatural being, much less of God (vol. I, p. 122). In the sixteenth century (A.D. 1598) Abul Fazil also took the same liberal view about Hindu images[2].

AlBiruni describes the 'educated people' among the Hindus as calling God *Īśvara* i.e. as self-sufficing and beneficent who gives without receiving. They consider the unity of God as Absolute (vol. I, p. 31). Then passing from the ideas of the educated people among the Hindus to those of the common people he observes, "that they present a great variety and that some of them are simply abominable".

But AlBîruni is faithful to Koranic gospel of 'speaking the truth even if it were against yourself' (*sura*, 4, 134). It is therefore quite in keeping with his love of truth to admit at once that "similar errors also occur in other religions. Nay, even in Islam we must decidedly disapprove, e.g. of the anthropomorphic doctrines, the teaching of the

2. It is interesting that at the very threshold of his study on Hindu culture, even in the introduction, Abul Fazil makes the readers acquainted with his fundamental conclusion, namely, that the Hindus are not polytheist but are worshippers of God and only one God.

This conclusion he poses against popular tradition of his times to the effect that the Hindus are polytheist. He repeats his conclusion at the commencement of the lengthy section and remarks that the Hindus are no mere idolators, 'as the ignorant suppose'. The Hindu explanation of image-worship is reproduced by himself as his own conviction, namely, that the images are designed simply to prevent the thoughts of the people from wandering while at prayer.

Jabriyya sect, the prohibition of the the discussion of religious topics and such like".

The comparative method is a remarkable trait of AlBiruni's logic. His logic is unchallengable in theory and fruitful in practice. This manifests itself not only in the discussion of the questions relating to the conflicts arising from the diversity of faiths but also in the manner in which he deals with arts and sciences of the Hindus. At important points he turns to the Greeks and places Hindu achievements by the side of those of former. In astronomy, he finds analogy with Ptolemy and remembers the Persian, Egyptian and Greek philosophers.

AlBiruni has made it a point to collect together all the good things that may be said about the people whom he wants to raise in the estimation of his coreligionist. He speaks of the painful researches undertaken in order to arrive at the truth about the Hindus, their sciences, philosophy and religions. We have noted that the Hindu culture that was assimilated by AlBiruni was presented by him to his readers in the perspective of Greek thought. It is very noteworthy that the manner in which we moderns try to institute parallels or identities between the Hindu and the Greek idealogies can be traced back to this Moslem scientist and philosopher of the eleventh century. The references to Greek culture constitute the general perspective, so to say, of his researches in 'Indology'. In his work on *India*, the Moslems found Socrates, Plato, Proclus, Aristotle, Apollonius of Tyana, Porphyry, Ptolemy rubbing shoulders with authors of the *Sāṃkhya*, *Yoga*, the *Gita* and other systems.[3] Nor this all. His comparative method served to bring in the Hindu ideas into the *milieu* of Zoroastrian, Christian, Jewish and Sufi sources.

Arabic culture was in those days the connecting link between Asia and Europe. AlBiruni was thus functioning in Moslem Asia and beyond, indeed in the entire Christian world, in much the same manner as his great Chinese predecessors of the seventh century Yuan Chwang and Itsing, in China and Japan, so far as the propagation of Hindu culture is concerned. This Moslem mathematician of Khiva is an important landmark and agent in the establishment of Hindu culture. One noteworthy feature to be noted consists in the fact that while his masters of the Ghazni House were laying the foundation of a Moslem *Rāj* in India, his scientific and philosophical researches in Hindu culture contributing to the Hinduisation of the Moslem world in exactly the same friendly

3. *Albiruni's India*, (vol. I, p. xlii).

spirit as had been shown by the Barmark ministry and others during the days of good Harum Alrashid.

It is interesting to note that both AlBiruni and Abul Fazil in attempting to be 'objective' narrators of a 'simple historic record of facts', both have exhibited definite pro-Hindu leanings, although, of course, AlBiruni's propaganda in favour of the Hindu achievements does not verge on the almost hundred percent identification of Abul Fazil, with the fortunes of his Hindu countrymen. AlBiruni's *India* not only preserves the Hindu tradition by describing Sanskrit literature and Hindu philosophical ideas, but is a document of the most profound assimilation of Hindu culture and Hindu achievements in science and arts by a philosophically minded Mussalman. Perhaps from Megasthanes to Nivedita, the Hindu culture has never been highly spoken of in such a dignified manner by any non-Hindu, (except Abul Fazil [4]), as has been done by

4. Abul Fazil was one of the most distinguished scholars of his age (16th cen. A.D.) in India. His numerous works include, Persian translation of *Mahābhārata, Rāmāyaṇa*, of Bible and many other works. His fame as an author rests upon the monumental work *Akbar-nāma*,(a History of Akbar) in Persian language and compiled in three volumes. (Published in British India). The third volume *Ain-i-Akbari* contains detailed information on Indian civilization and culture, history, geography, social and religious life. A glance at the table of contents of the *Ain-i-Akbari* exhibit its rough similarity in formal features with Hindu *Nītiśāstras* such as *Śukra-nīti, Kāmandakīya-nīti, Manu-nīti* etc. The contents are in short as follows :—

I. The House-hold, the Treasury, the Mint, the method of separating the silver from the gold, Illuminations, the kitchen, the Days of Abstinence, writing and printing, the Arsenal, Elephants, Horses, Cow-stables, Camels, Buildings, Building-materials etc.

II. The Army, the Civil services, Salaries, Donations, Feasts, Regulations regarding education, Regulations regarding marriages, the admiralty.

III. The Eras (Hindu and others), Revenues, measurements, the Executive, the Judiciary, the Rates of Revenues.

IV. The twelve subabs or provinces, the Assessment of land.

V. A Description of Hindustan, the Character of the Hindus, Their Astronomy and Geography, the Nine Philosophies, the Eighteen *Vidyās*, the Eighteen *Purāṇas*, the Eighteen *Smṛtis*, Music, *Rājanīti* (politics), *Vyavahāra* (law), Festivals etc.

VI. Moral sentences, Epigrams, Rules of Wisdom emanating from the Emperor etc. In the preface to the Book which is given over to Hindu civilisation Abul Fazil enables us to see something of his miner springs of action. The 'love of his native country,' Hindustan, is referred to by himself in so many words as one of the motives impelling him to write this History. We are also told that desire to remove the strife and animosity between the diverse races of India

AlBiruni in his *India*. As one of the early pioneers in Indology, this Moslem scholar of the eleventh century deserves his rightful place in the history of comparative religion and philosophy and in science and literature.

(Hindus and Moslems) is also an urge in this literary endeavour. He wants to function as a bridge between the two great religions to be a peace-maker. The ambition of establishing peace and unanimity is a burning passion with him. Abul Fazil's ideals are definite and precise. It is the moral and social philosophy that concerns him the most. History, geography, economics, statistics, biography, the personality of Akbar are to him but the peges on which to hang his moralisings, ideals and spiritual propaganda. Abul Fazil was indeed a student of ethics, spirituality, life's mission and so forth. He was a philosopher.

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2

J.B. BHATTACHARYA

VĀCASPATI MIŚRA'S MISINTERPRETATION OF THE SĀṂKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION

Vācaspati Miśra's commentary on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* is a standard work on the *Sāṃkhya* system of thought. This commentary is very widely read. We notice more than a dozen of subcommentaries, written on it, by the great savants of Sanskrit learning all over India during the last century. Vācaspati's *Tattva-kaumudī* takes the shine out of the earlier commentaries such as the *Bhāṣya* of Gauḍapāda, the *Yuktidipikā* etc. If a mis-statement creeps in a standard work on any system of thought, it will surely mislead its posteriror generations for ever. Hence, if any body finds out a mistake in such a work or even suspects a mistake, it should be his obligatory duty to communicate his observations to others so that the matter under dispute may be squarely discussed by all scholars and the truth may be brought to light.

The definition of *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*, the means of valid direct knowledge, given in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* is as follows: *prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam*. The first compound word constitutes the definition and the second signifies the object defined. The compound word in question consists of two components namely *prativiṣaya* and *adhyavasāya*. The word *adhyavasāya* is synonymous with *niścaya*. Its english equivalent word is determination or ascertainment. In the 23rd *kārikā* it has been stated that the characteristic property or mode of intellect is *adhyavasāya*. Intellect is the first evolute of the Primordial Matter, *causa sui* of the universe. It is unconscious according to the Samkhyists. Intellect and all other material objects are unconscious.[1]

1. त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि । व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानम् ।

Sāṃkhyatattava-kaumudī (STK), *kārikā*, 11.

Therefore, *adhyavasāya*, the characteristic property or mode of intellect, is unconscious. From the above remarks it logically follows that *adhyavasāya* is nothing but a well defined image of an object. This image is not due to the passive reception of an external object. It is due to the co-operation of other organs, namely, the external cognitive sense-organs and inner organs such as *manas* and *ahaṅkāra*.[2] The mode of intellect is only illuminated by the individual transcendental consciousness. This mode is attributed to the individual soul as its property. The mode of intellect appears to us to be conscious. Such transcednental illusion takes place owing to the reflection of the soul in the mode of intellect. The *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* clearly states that all other organs present the material worked up by them to the intellect since it is the intellect that completely accomplishes the experience of an individual soul with regard to all experienceable objects.

Now let us interpret the first component *prativiṣayam*. The early commentators such as Gauḍapāda, Māṭhara and Śaṅkara do not take note of sense-object-contact. They have not clearly mentioned it. In the *Yuktidīpikā* we find a clear mention of sense-object-contact.[3] Vācaspati in his *Tattva-kaumudī* says: *viṣayam viṣayam prati varttate iti prativiṣayam indriyam. vṛttiśca sannikarṣaḥ. arthasannikṛṣṭam indriyam ityarthaḥ.*[4] Vācaspati follows his prdecessor Rājā, the author of the *Yuktidīpikā*, in the interpretation of the term *prativiṣayādhyavasāya*. It has been stated in the *Yuktidīdikā* that *upāttaviṣayāṇām indriyāṇām vṛttyupanipāti sattvodrekād arajastamaskam yat prakāśarūpam tad dṛṣṭam pratyakṣam ityarthaḥ*[5]. Vācaspati's sentence runs thus: *upāttaviṣayāṇām indriyāṇā vṛttau satyāṃ buddhestamo' bhibhave sati yaḥ sāttvasamudrekaḥ so' dhyavasāya iti vṛttir iti jñānam iti cākhyāyate idam tāvat pramāṇam*[6]. This definition of perception is

2. सान्तःकरणबुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।
तस्मात् त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥
एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।
कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्याऽर्थं प्रकाश्यबुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥

Sāṃkhya-kārikā, 35-36.

3. प्रतिग्रहणं सन्निकर्षार्थम् (p. 42, l., 20) and विषयं विषयं प्रति वर्तत इति प्रतिविषयम् । किंतत्? इन्द्रियम् । *Yuktidīpikā* (YD), p. 40, l., 8.

4. STK. kā. 5.

5. YD. p. 4.

6. STK. Cal. ed. p. 31.

too narrow to include introspection in perception. Rājā in his *Yuktidīpikā* raises this point and tries to solve it, availing himself of the intricacies of the Sanskrit Grammer. Vācaspati remains silent on this point. Śaṅkara in his *Jayamaṅgalā* implicitly follows this line of explanation but no where maks an explicit statement.

It will not be out of place if mention is made in this connection of a few discomfitures of the ancient teachers of the *Sāṃkhya* school. The celebrated teacher Vārṣagaṇa holds that perception is the function of external sense-organs e.g., ear etc.[7] Gauḍapāda and Māṭhara do not contradict the view of Vāraṣagaṇa. Their explanation of perception gives room for various interpretations and does not clearly indicate that *adhyavasāya* is the faculty of the intellect. So these two writers may be taken as subscribing to the view of Vārṣagaṇa[8]. H.T. COLEBROOKE translates the passage of Gauḍapāda thus: "*dṛṣṭa*, 'seen', or *pratyakṣa*, 'perception', is application or exertion of the senses in regard to their several objects, as of the ear, and the rest, to sound, etc.[9]". Māṭhara in his *Vṛtti* writes thus: *viṣayam viṣayam prati yo 'dhyavasāyo netrādīnām indriyāṇām pañcānām rūpādiṣu pañcasu, tat pratykṣam pratipattirūpam dṛṣṭākhyam*[10]. Perceptual knowledge called *dṛṣṭa* is the ascertainment of the five external sense-organs, namely, eyes etc., in regard to the corresponding five kinds of objects namely, colour etc. From the above two statements one is tempted to believe that according to Gauḍapāda and Māṭhara the perceptual knowledge is sensuous, since they do not clearly state that the *adhyavasāya* in question is the mode of the intellect and that the faculty of the sense-organs constitutes the remote condition of such ascertainment.

Now, what is the exact form of this *adhyavasāya?* When we perceive an object do we know it in the form that this is such and such? Or, do we know it in the form that I know it as such and such? This is the most important question which has not been squarely discussed in the standard works on the *Sāṃkhya* system. Let us discuss the problem with reference to the standard works recognised by this school of thought.

Before discussing the problem at a considerable length we shall refer also to the views of the ancient philosophers of India so that the

7. YD. p. 35, ll., 18 & 19.

8. प्रति विषयेषु श्रोत्रादीनां शब्दादि विषयेषु अध्यवसायो दृष्टं प्रत्यक्षम् ।
Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya. kā. 5,

9. *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* with *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya*, p. 30, Theosophical Society Publication, Bombay.

10. *Māṭharavṛtti*, ā.kç

actual background of the ancient Indian logic will be clear to us. In the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* the true perceptual knowledge is determinate. The fourth *sūtra* of *Nyāyadarśana* clearly states that perceptual knowledge is determinate *(vyavasāyātmakam)*[11]. This is one of several predicates of perceptual knowledge. The indeterminate perception in the modern sense is unknown to the ancient logicians. If we pay our attention to the remarks of Vācaspati Miśra as made in the *Nyāyavārttika-tātparyatīkā*, our hypothesis will be proved up to the hilt. He frankly admits his innovation when he says:

trilocanagurūnnītamārgānugamanonmukhaiḥ ।
tathāmānam yathāvastu vyākhyātam idam īdṛśam ॥

Kaṇāda, in the first *Āhnika* (section) of the eighth chapter of his work refers to the various types of perception. The *sūtras* beginning from the 4th point to the different types of perceptual knowledge. All of them are illustration of perceptual judgments. No where a clear indication of indeterminate perception is found. Kaṇāda classifies knowledge under two heads *vidyā* and *avidyā*. *Saṃśaya* (doubt) is comprised within *avidyā;* so *vidyā* must be other than *saṃśaya*. The problem of indeterminate perception is conspicuous by its absence. In the *Yogasūtra* the definition of *pratyakṣa* is not given. In the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* perception has been defined as *sāmānya viśeṣātmano 'rthasya viśeṣāvadhāraṇapradhānā vṛttiḥ pramāṇam; phalam aviśiṣṭaḥ pauruṣeyaś cittavṛttibodhaḥ*.[12] The mode of the intellect which emphatically determines the particular element of an external object consisting of particular and universal elements is the means of perception. The resultant perceptual knowledge is the illuminated mode which is ascribed to the soul. There is no formal difference between the illuminated and non-illuminated states of the mode. PURNACHANDRA VEDANTA CUNCU holds that the form of the mode in question will be like this: *ghaṭam aham jānāmi, ghaṭajñānavān aham* etc. I shall quote a few lines from his remarks in Bengali. He says *sāṃkhya-śāstre cittavṛttirūpa pramāṇa nyāyaśāstrer vyavasāya-sthāniya; ye viṣaye pātañjala O sāṃkhyera matabheda nai, pramājñāne ātmā, cittavṛtti O viṣaya samastai ñāta haya*[13]. He clearly states that the means of true knowledge according to the *Sāṃkhya* system is the mode of the intellect. It corresponds to the determinate perception of the *Nyāya* school. The true perceptual knowledge of the *Sāṃkhya* School is equivalent to the introspection of determinate perception of the *Nyāya* school. A piece of true knowledge reveals the Self, the mode of the intellect and the corresponding object. The true perceptual knowledge is expressed in the form 'I know this jar'

11. *Nyāyadarśana*, I. 1.4.
12. *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtra*, 1.7.
13. *Pātañjaladarśana*, p. 23.

or 'I have the knowledge of a jar'. He states that there is no difference of opinion between *Sāṃkhya* and *Pātañjala* so far as the nature of true knowledge is concerned. The learned scholar rightly describes the form of ture knowledge. But he wrongly describes the form of the mode of intellect, the source of true knowledge, since he has not been able to rise above the influence of the *Nyāya* views. There is no difference in form between *pramā* and *pramāṇa*. The mode of intellect, being illuminated, is called *pramā* but when it is not illuminated it is known as *pramāṇa*. But the illuminated mode is ascribed to the soul owing to the influence of the transcendental illusion arising from the reflection of the soul in the mode of intellect. Vijñānabhikṣu in his *Yogavārttika* commits a mistake in describing the forms of perception and percept. The text of *Yogavārttika* runs thus: *ayaṃ ghaṭa ityākārā bimbarūpā vṛttiḥ karaṇam; tasyā eva vṛtteś caitanye pratibimbanāt caitanyam apyayam ghaṭa ityākāram iva sadbodhākhyam phalam bhavatīti nātra viśeṣaḥ.*[14] He explains self-consciousness thus: *buddheś cicchāyāpattiś ca aham ityādirūpas cito bhānārtham eveṣyate buddhyāroham vinā sākṣat svabhāne karmakartṛ-virodhāt.*[15] Vijñānabhikṣu draws a distinction between the awareness of the mode of the intellect which assumes the form of an object and the awareness of self. The commentator of the *Yogasūtra* makes a very short definition of *pramāṇa*. He uses the adjective *aviśiṣṭa* to describe the resultant form of perceptual consciousness. But this very short statement admits of various interpretations. He gives no illustrations. The only thing which he clearly shows is that *citta* goes out through the passage of a sense-organ comes into contact with an external object and assumes its form. He selects the word *citta* in preference to the term *buddhi*. But why? The sub-commentators are all silent in discussing the question whether *ahaṃkāra* and *manas* co-operate in the formation of the image of an object or not. If they do, what is the actual form of their contribution. If they do not, why are they designated by the term 'inner organ'? Does *citta* in every case go out in order to cognize an external object? Do we smell the sweet fragrance of a rose lying at a distance? Does our intellect go out to tuch a remote object or to taste a fruit beyond the range of our tongue? Thus the statement of the commentator requires a thorough examination. The author of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* states the same thing in a more cautious and precise manner. There is no difference between the intended definition of the *Bhāṣyakāra* and the actual one of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*. But all the subcommentators pay close attention to the letter of the commentator and try to follow it and accept assumptions. The *citta* becomes united only with the scent of a rose by means of the nose but not with

14. *Yogavārttika*, p. 24

15. ibid. p. 25

the rose, the substratum of the scent in question. The scent is identified, distinguished and connected with the rose, its substratum. How is it done and when? Moreover, it is related to 'I'. How is it done? 'I smell this scent' is experienced by all. Prior to the actual experience 'I smell such and such scent' all the elements of this experience are subconsciously arranged by the two inner organs namely *ahaṃkāra* (egotism) and *manas* (organ for constructing an image). If the 'I' had been the reflected image of the soul as Vijñānabhikṣu conjectures, the soul would have been the object of our intellect and thus have lost its character of being the exclusive subject. Moreover the two judgements 'this is scent' and 'I smell' should have remained unrelated for ever. *Ahaṃkāra* and *manas* should have also been discarded, as intellect does everything and they have no function to discharge. Again, if 'this is a jar' is the form of the mode of intellect, when it is illuminated, how do we get the extra forms 'I' and 'know' and why is the form 'I am this jar' not experienced? Moreover, the Philosophers of the *Yoga* school are realists, why are not both the object and its image simultaneously experienced by us? Vācaspati Miśra defines *adhyavasāya* as such faculty of the intellect as determines a definite course of action to be adopted when it becomes as it were endowed with reason owing to the proximity of transcendental consciousness[16]. Īśvara Kṛṣṇa uses the term *adhyavasāya* in a generic sense. He applies another term to denote the faculty of *ahaṃkāra*, e.g., *abhimāna* and a third term to denote the faculty of *manas*, e.g., *saṃkalpa*. Vācaspati discovers the three specific senses of *adhyavasāya* and thinks that the two distinct terms are used to denote the two specific senses of *adhyavasāya*. 'This is a jar' is the function of *manas* and 'I know that this is a jar' is the function of *ahaṃkāra*. 'I should take this jar' is the function of the intellect. In the above three cases there in an element of ascertainment. The modes of *manas* and *ahaṃkāra* are never illuminated by the proximity of transcendental consciousness. The mode of intellect is only illuminated. Vācaspati, being anxious to bring about a compromise between the *Nyāya* theory and *Sāṃkhya* theory of perception, has twisted the meaning of the term *adhyavasāya*. He does not pay attention to the defects of his interpretation, having adapted himself to the line of thinking of the Naiyāyikas. He, being a confirmed Naiyāyika, becomes inattentive to the tradition of the Sāṃkhyas. He does never give a clear exposition of his theory of perception in a comprehensive manner. He only makes stray remarks here and there.

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16. तत्र योऽयं कर्तव्यमिति विनिश्चयश्चितिसन्निधानादापन्नचैतन्याया बुद्धेः सोऽध्यवसायः बुद्धेरसाधारणो व्यापारः ।

STK. kā. 23.

Let us discuss one by one the different points which he has simply touched. They are as follows :

(i) The definition of perception has not been thoroughly examined. He does not show how it is applicable to the introspection of inner phenomena e.g., pleasure, pain, etc. He does not mention the sense-object-contact in the case of such introspection. *Manas*, being the evolute of the intellect, is less subtle than the intellect *exhypothesi*. Hence, how can it have an access to the modes of intellect? This is a problem which invites discussion. The mode of the intellect is illuminated by the reflection of the spirit. The awareness of the mode is direct. It is the culminating point of the ascertaining process of the intellect. There is no difference between the illumination of perceptual knowledge, that of the inferential knowledge and that of the verbal knowledge. These illuminations are all direct. Thus they are all alike. Under which division of true knowledge these illuminations come? Vācaspati and all other *Sāṃkhya* teachers are conspicuous by their silence.

(ii) Vācaspati introduces two fold vision of perception into *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate) and *savikalpaka* (determinate). He quotes verses from the *Śloka-vārttika* of Kumārila in support of his interpretation[17]. He forgets his own definition of perception. Is indeterminate perception an ascertainment in any sense? It is non-discriminating. It is a simple apprehension of a particular object without distinguishing its universal element from the particular one. Whatever else may be the nature of this apprehension it is not marked by the stamp of the certainty that characterizes our intellect. Therefore, the definition of perception of this school is not applicable to indeterminate perception of another school of thought. Vācaspati is a great critic of the Buddhists. He, having much regard and admiration for Kumārila, overlooks the fundamental difference between the nature of consciousness and the mode of intellect. According to Kumārila, consciousness is presentative. According to Sāṃkhyas the mode of intellect is representative. The sense-organ is united only with one of the five sensible objects. Vācaspati does not explain how this indefinite image is formed. The term *ālocana* of the *Sāṃkhya* logic does not denote the meaning which is conveyed by the term *ālocana*, used by Praśastapāda and Kumārila. Vācaspati has explained the term *ālocana*, without noticing the difference in the senses of the term *ālocana*. He states that it conveys the apprehension of an undifferentiated real

17. Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*, Chapter on *Pratyakṣa*, verses 112 & 120.

concrete object[18]. He forgets two things at the time of offering this new explanation, namely, (a) the only sensible objects with which the cognitive sense-organs are united are colour, taste, odour, touch and sound. These five are the exclusive objects of the five cognitive sense-organs. Only one of them is the object of one such organ. (b) The faculty of sense-organ is never illuminated by the Spirit. Gauḍapāda, Māṭhara and Śaṅkara are mistaken to hold that the five sense-organs, namely, eyes, ears, nose, tongue and touch respectively grasp form or colour, sound, smell, taste and touch to the exclusion of other objects[19]. Vijñānabhikṣu in his *Pravacana-bhāṣya* holds that the term *ālocana* denotes two-fold - sense - perception—indeterminate and determinate[20]. He unwittingly reiterates the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and *Bhāṭṭa* views. Rājā in his *Yuktidīpikā* conclusively proves that sense-organs have no consciousness. The objects of consciousness are indefinite whereas the objects of sense-organs are definite. The objects of consciousness are eternally related to consciousness. This relation transcends time limit. The relation of the sense faculty to its object obeys time limit. Sense organ is related to an object only when it exists in the present time. Moreover, an object which has been sensed will never be recalled in memory if the particular sense-organ be lost or defunct. The sense-organs do not reveal external objects, like a lamp since one of them should be superfluous since those who produce the same effect do not simultaneously effectuate. Moreover if it is held that the internal organ is directly aware of such objects as are revealed by the sense-organs, the assumption of an inner organ is to be discarded. After much consideration he concludes that *grahaṇa*, the faculty of a

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18. बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां सम्मुग्धवस्तुदर्शनमालोचनमुक्तम् । SKT. kā. 28.

19. मात्राशब्दो विशेषार्थः ..... तथा चक्षू रूपमात्रे न रसादिषु ..... तद्यथा चक्षुषो रूपं त्वचः स्पर्शः । *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya*, kā. 28.

एकैकस्य प्रतीन्द्रियं स्वविषयग्रहण सामर्थ्यमेव । *Māṭharavṛtti*, kā. 28.

शब्दादिषु इत्यादि । आदिशब्देन शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाः । तेषु यथाक्रमं पञ्चानां श्रोत्रादीनां आलोचनामात्रं वृत्तिरिष्यते सांख्याचार्यैः । श्रोत्रादीनि हि विषयस्य प्रकाशनमात्रं कुर्वन्ति, निश्चयं तु बुद्धिः । *Jayamaṅgalā*, kā. 28.

20. तथा च निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकरूपं द्विविधमपि ऐन्द्रियकं ज्ञानं आलोचनासंज्ञमिति लब्धम् । *Pravacana-bhāṣya*. kā. 32.

sense organ is the assumption of the form of an object with which the sense organ is united[21]. He further adds that the intellect determines an object following up a sense image. The so called indeterminate perception has no place in the *Sāṃkhya* theory of perception.

Now, a problem arises. This problem has escaped the notice of all thinkers of the *Sāṃkhya* school. The different sense-organs come in contact with the different properties of an object. An orange enters the field of sense-organs. The eyes come in contact with its colour, the tactile organ with its touch, the nose with its smell, the tongue with its taste and so on. Each sense-organ has its own report. The analytical pictures of the sense properties are drawn by the cognitive organs. A complete image of an orange cannot be constructed by the sense-organs. If a concrete object is at all perceived, an exact image of the real object is to be constructed out of the materials supplied by the sense organs. A new element is also to be furnished so that all the missing elements may not mar the picture of a real orange. Thus, *manas* has been defined as *saṃkalpakam*. *Manas* is neither explicative nor discriminative. It does not interpret a vague image. It creates an image. It creates the perfect image of an object, transmits it to the ego and after its relation to ego places the complex image before the intellect for the final determination. The other modes of intellect such as pleasure, pain, desire, volition etc., are related to *manas* at first. An image of them is constructed by *manas*. It is referred to as ego. The related complex image is placed before the intellect. Then the image takes the final shape, being determined by the intellect. Vācaspati inadvertently ascribes the powers of synthesising and interpreting which belong to the soul of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and *Bhāṭṭa* schools to *manas*. He thinks that *manas* distinguishes the universal from the individual and the substance from quality, action etc., and asserts the predicate of the subject. A judgement of perception is framed by *manas*. It is a synthetic judgement of perception. Such a judgement is possible in case of presentative consciousness. It is a case of discovery. The real character of an object may be gradually discovered by an intellegent knower. But an interpretation through an image is unthinkable. Transcendental consciousness which illuminates only the particular modes of intellect does neither compare nor interpret. The faculty of *manas* does also remain unilluminated by the Spirit.

PANDITA PANCANANA TARAKARATNA in his sub-commentary *Pūrṇimā* on the *Tattva-kaumudī* has raised this point in a different manner. But

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21. विषयसमर्पकात् तद्रूप्यापत्तिरिन्द्रियवृत्तिग्रहणम् । YD. p. 122.

he tries his best to lend his mighty support to the hypothesis of Vācaspati. He follows Udayana in his interpretation and holds that the intellect in the wider sense is a higher unity which underlies *manas*, *ahaṃkāra* and intellect in the narrow sense. The term intellect is applicable to *manas*, *ahaṃkāra* and *buddhi* alike. The faculties of these three inner organs are illuminated by the Spirit.[22]

This subcommentary attires the *Sāṃkhya* theory with the dress of *Nyāya* logic without examining whether it misfits or not. 'This is a jar' is the mode of *manas*. 'I know that this is a jar' is the mode of the intellect. These two modes are illuminated as they say. But why is not the intermediate mode of *ahaṃkāra* which is prior to the mode of the intellect illuminated? What is the form of the mode of *ahaṃkāra*? If *buddhi* is identical with *ahaṃkāra* and *manas*, then why does the 36th *kārikā* draw a distinction between *buddhi* and other inner organs and outer organs? Why does the 35th *kārikā* state that *buddhi* plays the most important role in knowing objects? Most of the commentators or subcommentators forget that material consciousness is representative.

(iv) The most important problem of realism has not been discussed by Vācaspati and his followers. The mode of the intellect is only illuminated by the Spirit. All other modes remain unknown for ever. The mode, catching the reflection of the Spirit, appears to be consciousness. An appearance is not reality. An object is never illuminated by the Spirit. The mode of intellect containing the image of an object is illuminated. Therefore, an object remains unknown and unknowable. Vācaspati holds that an object is perceived. It is distinct from an image. It is a public property. The *kārikā* also emphatically states that an object is directly perceived by many knowers. But the problem as to how an external object is directly perceived remains unsolved. Even if it is admitted that such an object is perceived, do we perceive an object and are we aware of its image at the same time? Vācaspati and his followers are misteriously silent here.

In fine, I invite the attention of the learned scholars to the following observations:—

(1) *Sāṃkhya* epistemology is fundamentally different from that of the Naiyāyikas. According to the Samkhyists consciousness is representative whereas the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Bhāṭṭas hold that consciousness is presentative. Hence the Samkhyists stand close to the Buddhists in this aspect of consciousness. Moreover,

22. *Pūrṇimā*, pp. 33 & 34.

according to the Samkhyists, empirical consciousness is a mere appearance of real consciousness. It does not reveal objects. It is material by its essence and therefore it does not illuminate its object. Transcendental consciousness is really unchanging illumination. It admits of no varying degrees of illumination. It is constant by nature.

(2) This epistemology exercises its influence upon the theory of perception. The theory of perception mainly discusses the cognitive aspect. It does not take into consideration its relation to affective and conative aspects. The Naiyāyikas and others are more or less pragmatists in ascertaining the value of perception. They evaluate perception in the practical world. Hence they are eager to find out the different stages of perception. The four stages of perception have been pointed out by them namely, (1) the *ālocana* stage i.e., a simple apprehension of an undifferentiated real object, (2) the stage of the determination of the object, (3) the relation of the object to self-consciousness, (4) the bearing of such self-consciousness upon volition through the feeling of pleasure or of pain or the neutral feeling of indifference. Praśastapāda is the pioneer of this theoy. Vācaspati, following Kumārila and Trilocana, imports this hypothesis to the *Sāṃkhya* school of thought and twists the meaning of the definition of perception as given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. He forgets the *Sāṃkhya* tradition and the peculiar epistemology of the school.

Let us now describe the operation of the machineries of the knowing process from the *Sāṃkhya* point of view. The material knowing process is really image producing process. The image like any other material object is unconsciousness. The final image which is constructed by the intellect is only illuminated by transcendental consciousness. The other images which are produced by the other internal organs and cognitive sense-organs, remain unknown for ever. The two internal organs render valuable assistance to the intellect in order to shape the final image. The external cognitive sense-organ play a subordinate part in this task. This final image is well-defined. It consists of three parts namely, the empirical self, knowing process and an object. All these images are drawn up in a single image. This image is called *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*. When it is illuminated by transcendental consciousness it is called *pratykṣa-pramā*. Thus there is no material difference between *pramāṇa* and *pramā*. Thus, the Samkhyists stand close to the Buddhists. This *pramā* is attributed to transcendental consciousness. In this respect, they differ from the Buddhists. Moreover, the image is unconscious, whereas an image, according to the Buddhists, is self-conscious. The assumption of transcendental consciousness has been discarded by the Buddhist system. The Samkhyists profess direct

realism. But they cannot substantiate their claim by logical arguments since transcendental consciousness does not reveal an object and an image even when illuminated appears only to be conscious. They may be classed under critical realist like Sautrāntikas. The intellect fulfills its mission of producing an image by ascribing it to transcendental consciousness. Thus, the Samkhyists attach the greatest importance to the cognitive value. Thus, the *Sāṃkhya* tradition is widely different from that of the Naiyāyikas. Therefore, Vācaspati Miśra is wrong.

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V. KAMESWARA RAO

TWO VIJAYANAGARA TEMPLES AT PENUKONDA *

Penukonda is the headquarters of a taluk of that name in the Anantapur district of Andhra Pradesh. It can be reached by bus from Hindupur, twenty four miles distant, and from Dharmavaram about the same distance. The place is also connected by rail and the Penukonda railway station is on the Guntakal - Bangalore section of the Southern Railway.

The place is referred to as Ghanagiri or Ghanādri in the Vijayanagara inscriptions.[1] It was the second capital of the Vijayanagara empire. The place is famous for its hill fortress which was constructed in A D. 1354 during the reign of Bukka I,[2] and later improved during the time of Kṛṣṇarāya.[3] There are two temples in the fort, one dedicated to Śiva and the other to Rāma, standing side by side to the north of the palace known as the *Gagana Mahal*.[4]

It is not possible to determine the exact date of construction of these temples because there is no inscriptional evidence. It may however be inferred from a few stylistic features that these temples belong to the early Vijayanagara period.[5]

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* I visited and studied these temples in December, 1964.

1. MER. 331 of 1901.
2. MER. 339 of 1901. Epigraphica Indica, VI, p. 327.
3. K.A. Nilakantha Sastri and Dr. N. Venkataramanayya: *Further Sources of Vijayanagara History*, pp. 99-101.
4. Originally there seem to have been several temples at this place, but most of them came to be ruined.
5. These two temples have only three members on the axis. Pillars with *yāḷi* bracket, *prākāra* and *gopura* which are distinct features of the 16th century Vijayanagara temples are conspicuous by their absence in these two temples.

The Rāma Temple:

This temple is oriented to east (Fig. 1). The approach to the temple is through a *dvāra* with a *maṇṭapa* of two pillars on either side of it. The corbels of these pillars are in the *Cōḷa* style.[6] The temple consists of the *garbha-gṛha, antarāḷa* in two sections, *mukha-maṇṭapa* and a *maṇṭapa* added recently before it. The *garbha-gṛha, antarāḷa* and *mukha-maṇṭapa* stand on a high *adhiṣṭhāna* containing from bottom upwards—*upāna, paṭṭa, padma,* broad *paṭṭa, gaḷa,* fluted moulding, another *gaḷa* cut into compartments and cornice decorated with *siṃha-lalāṭa* gables. The outerside of the walls of the *garbha-gṛha* is decorated with a narrow projection containing pilaster, *śālā-koṣṭha* and pilaster, narrow recess containing a *kumbha-pañjara,* broad projection containing a pilaster, *śālā-koṣṭha* and pilaster, narrow recess containing *kumbha-pañjara* and narrow projection containing pilaster, *śālā-koṣṭha* and pilaster. The exterior of each of the two side walls of the *antarāḷa* is decorated from west to east with pilaster, pilaster surmounted by a *citra-toraṇa* topped by a *siṃha-lalāṭa* (Fig. 2), projection with pilaster, *śālā-koṣṭha* and pilaster, recess containing a pilaster surmounted by a *citra-toraṇa* topped by a *siṃha-lalāṭa,* pilaster, recess with two pilasters, niche surmounted by a solid semi-circular *makara-toraṇa* with a *siṃha-lalāṭa* at its top and pilaster. The south wall of the *mukha-maṇṭapa* is decorated from west to east with pilaster, niche surmounted by a solid semi-circular *makara-toraṇa* with a *siṃha-lalāṭa* at its top, pilaster, niche surmounted by a semi-circular *makara-toraṇa* topped by *siṃha-lalāṭa,* two pilasters, niche and pilaster. The pilasters have Vijayanagara corbels. The north wall of the *mukha-maṇṭapa* has similar decorations. The cornice above the walls is slightly projecting and contains *siṃha-lalāṭa* gables with human heads and figures in dance poses inside. There is a row of *makaras* above the cornice. The *vimāna* is of brick and plastered all over and contains a single *tala* consisting of *kūṭa,* two *pañjaras, śālā,* two *pañjaras* and *kūṭa.* Above this *tala* is the *phalaka* on which there are four *kūṭas,* one in each of the four corners. There is a deity figure moulded out of brick and plaster in the four directions on the *gaḷa.* The *śikhara* is round and belongs to the *vesara* order.

The *mukha-maṇṭapa* contains four pillars in the centre with corresponding pilasters in each of the four walls. The pillars resemble the lathe turned pillars of the *Kākatīya* and *Hoyasala* styles and have the Vijayanagara corbels. The *maṇṭapa* has entrances in the south and north. There are two *antarāḷas* one behind the other. There are *dvāra-*

6. The pillars in the *maṇṭapa* on either side of pathway before the first *gōpura* of the Lepākṣi temple also contain *Cōḷa* corbels.

pālakas on either side of the entrances of the *antarāḷas*. The *garbha-gṛha* houses beautiful stone images of Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa and Sītā.

The Śiva Temple:

This temple stands to the north of the Rāma temple in the open without any enclosure (Fig. 3). It faces the east and consists of the *garbha-gṛha* and *antarāḷa* in two compartments inside a *pradakṣiṇa* and *mukha-maṇṭapa*. There is a stone Nandi on a *vedi* in front of the temple. The *pradakṣiṇa* is fifty feet east-west and forty feet north-south. The *mukha-maṇṭapa* is fifty feet square. The *adhiṣṭhāna* below the *pradakṣiṇa* walls is partly buried in the ground. The only visible members from bottom upwards are - broad *paṭṭa*, *padma*, *gaḷa*, round moulding with ribbon cuttings, another *gaḷa* cut into compartments by short pilasters and cornice decorated with *siṃha-lalāṭa* gables containig human heads inside. The south wall (Fig. 3) is decorated from west to east with - two pilasters niche surmounted by a semi-circular *makara-toraṇa* topped by a *siṃha-lalāta*, pilaster, *kumbha-pañjara*, pilaster, *śālā-koṣṭha*, pilaster, *kumbha-pañjara*, pilaster, niche surmounted by a semi-circular *makara-toraṇa* topped by a *siṃha-lalāṭa* and two pilasters. The north wall is similarly decorated. Each of the walls of *mukha-maṇṭapa* is decorated with three pilasters, pilaster surmounted by a solid semi-circular *toraṇa* topped by *siṃha-lalāṭa*, pilaster, *śālā-koṣṭha*, two pilasters, *śālā-koṣṭha*, pilaster, pilaster surmounted by a semi-circular *makaratoraṇa* topped by a *siṃha-lalāṭa* (Fig. 4) and two pilasters. The cornice above the walls is slightly projecting and contains *siṃha-lalāṭa* gables with human heads inside. There is a row of *makaras* above the cornice. The *garbha-gṛha* and *antarāḷa*, which are situated inside the *pradakṣiṇa*, stand on a high *adhiṣṭhāna*. The north and south walls of the *garbha-gṛha* and *antarāḷa* are decorated from west to east with projection containing two pilasters, recess with *kumbha-pañjara*, projection with pilaster, *śālā-koṣṭha* containing an image, pilaster, recess with *kumbha-pañjara*, projection with two pilasters, recess with pilaster, *śālā-koṣṭha* and pilaster. The *śālā-koṣṭha* in the back wall of the *garbha-gṛha* is empty. The *śālā-koṣṭhas* in the south wall of the *garbha-gṛha* and *antarāḷa* contain the images of Dakṣiṇā-mūrti and Vīrabhadra and those in the north wall of the *garbha-gṛha* and *antarāḷa* contain the icons of Brahmā, Durgā and Kumāra. The wall on either side of the entrance of the first section of the *antarāḷa* contains pilaster, *śālā-koṣṭha* and pilaster. The *śālā-koṣṭha* on the wall to the left of entrance contains an icon of Bhairava. The cornice above the walls is moulded and contains *siṃha-lalāṭa* gables with human heads inside. The *vimāna* above the *garbha-gṛha* consists of a single *tala* with *kūṭa*, *pañjara* diminished *śālā*, *pañjara* and *kūṭa*. There are Nandis in the four corners on the *phalaka*. The *gaḷa* above contains a deity i figure

moulded out of brick and plaster in each cardinal direction. The *śikhara* is round and belongs to the *Vesara* order.

The *mukha-maṇṭapa* has three entrances. The verticals on either side of the entrance in the east contain the Vijayanagara emblem. There is a *dvārapālaka* on either side of the entrance. The lintel contains the figure of Gajalakṣmī. In the interior there is a stone Nandi in the centre facing the *garbha-gṛha*. There are four rows of pillars in the *mukha-maṇṭapa*. Each pillar has a single pillaret projecting with a seated lion at the base of the pillaret. These pillars have Vijayanagara corbels. The south, west and north wings of the *pradakṣiṇa* contain five, four and five pillars respectively. These pillars have the roll corbels. The *antarāla* is in two narrow compartments. The *garbha-gṛha* contains a *liṅga* on a *vedi*.

SCULPTURE AND ICONOGRAPHY

The following interesting sculptures and icons found in the two temples described above deserve notice.

Sculptures in the Rāma temple

Trivikrama

This is on the north wall of the *garbha-gṛha*. Standing with the right leg firmly planted on the ground and the left raised to the level of the forehead, the God has four hands. He holds *cakra and śaṅkha* in the two upper hands and keeps the lower right in *abhaya* and the lower left in *varada*. He wears *kirīṭa-makuṭa*, *graiveyakas*, *yajñopavīta*, and *pūrṇoruka*. Brahmā stands before Viṣṇu catching his uplifted foot with his lower left hand and washing it with water flowing from a *kamaṇḍalu* held in his lower right hand. Brahmā has three heads with *kirīṭa-makuṭas*. His upper right and upper left hands hold *akṣamāla* and *kamaṇḍalu* respectively. He is adorned with *patrakuṇḍalas*, *graiveyakas*, *yajñopavīta*, *cannavīra* and *pūrṇoruka*.[7]

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7. The *Śilparatna* requires that the image of Trivikrama should be sculptured as standing on the left leg, the right being stretched out for taking the measuring strides. (Hind. Ico. I-1, p. 167). In this example the leg position is vice versa. Among published examples one Trivikrama sculpture from Nagalapuram shows the God standing with the right leg firmly planted on the ground and the left leg uplifted. He has four hands, the two upper hands holding *śaṅka* and *cakra*. The lower right hand is kept in the *varada* pose while the lower left is stretched parallel to the uplifted leg. (ibid., Fig. 2, Pl. LII.)

Saptatādabhanjana

This is on the north wall of the *mukha-maṇṭapa*. Rāma stands i *samabhaṅga* and shoots an arrow at the seven palmyra trees which are in a line. Two male figures are standing behind him. Hanumān and Sugrīva stand behind the two male figures.

Varāha

This is on the south wall of the *garbha-gṛha*. The deity is seated on a *pīṭha* in *vīrāsana* and has four hands. The upper right hand held up supports Bhūdevī represented with a halo. The upper left hand holds *śaṅkha*, the lower right is in *abhaya*, and the lower left hand holds *gada*. A female figure stands before the God[8].

Varāha and Hiraṇyakṣa Fighting

This is on the outerside of the south wall of the *garbha-gṛha*. The God with the body of a man and the face of a boar has four hands and is standing. He holds *cakra* and *śaṅkha* in the two upper hands and catches the right hand of the demon with his lower left hand and is hitting the latter with a *gada* which is held in his lower right hand. The God's face is turned towards left. Hiraṇyākṣa who is to be found to the left of the God is in the attitude of running away. He holds shield in the right hand and sword in the left.

Durgā

This is on the south wall of the *antarāḷa*. The Devī is seated on a *pīṭha* with her right leg hanging and the left folded and resting on the seat. There are two lions at the bottom one on either side of the *pīṭha*. The Devī has eight hands, the upper right hands holding *cakra*, arrow and *khaḍga* and the upper left hands holding *śaṅkha*, bow and shield. She keeps her lower right hand in *abhaya* and holds *gada* in her lower left hand. She is decorated with *karaṇḍa-makuṭa*, *ratna-kuṇḍalas*, *graiveyakas kucabandha*, girdle and *pūrṇoruka* A woman stands to the right with her hands in *añjali*. To the left is another woman standing holding up a vessel with her two hands.[9]

8. The *Śilparatna* requires that Bhūmidevī should be carried either on the tusk or on the left elbow of Varāha. In this example Bhūmidevī is being supported with the upper right hand of the God. (Hind. Ico. I-1, p. 133).

9. According to the *Supabhedāgama* Durgā of the eight handed variety should carry *śaṅkha*, *cakra*, *śūla*, *dhanus*, *bāṇa*, *khaḍga*, *kheṭa* and *pāśa*. (Hind. Ico. I-2, pp. 341-342). In this example the contents in six out of the eight hands conform to the requirements.

SCULPTURES IN THE ŚIVA TEMPLE

Kālārimūrti: This sculpture is found on the outerside of the *mukhamaṇṭapa* and is depicted in two stages. In the first stage Mārkaṇḍeya is shown embracing the *Śiva liṅga* set up on a *vedi*. Yama stands behind Mārkaṇḍeya and has two hands. He holds *gada* in his left hand and throws the *pāśa* with his right hand around the body of Mārkaṇḍeya. In the second stage Yama is represented as fallen down. Śiva stands with his left leg placed on the ground and the right uplifted in the act of kicking Yama on his chest. Śiva has four hands but the contents are worn out.[10]

Tripurāntakamūrti

This sculpture is found on the west wall of the *pradakṣiṇa*. Śiva stands on a chariot with his right leg slightly bent and planted in the middle of the chariot, and the left leg slightly raised and resting on a part of the chariot. He has two hands, the right hand is in the act of picking out the arrow from the quiver while the left hand holds the bow. On the right shoulder is a quiver of arrows. Brahmā drives the chariot.

Brahmā-Worshipped by a Devī

This sculpture is found on the outerside of the north wall of the enclosure. Brahmā is seated on a *pīṭha* in *vīrāsana* with his left leg hanging below the seat while the right one bent and rested across the left thigh. He has three faces and four hands. The upper right and upper left hands hold *akṣamālā* and *kamaṇḍalu* respectively. The lower right hand is stretched and kept on the right knee. While the lower left hand is in *kaṭakahasta*. On the heads are *kirīṭa-makuṭas*. The Devī is standing before him in *dvibhaṅga* and has four hands. She holds *akṣamālā* in the upper right hand, *kamaṇḍalu* in the upper left, and keeps the two lower hands in *añjali*. She wears *karaṇḍa-makuṭa* on the head, *patrakuṇḍalas*, *graiveyakas* and *pūrṇoruka*.

Brahmā-Worshipping Śiva Liṅga

This sculpture is also found on the outerside of the north wall of the enclosure. There is a *liṅga* in a *pānavaṭṭa* in the centre. Brahmā

10. The *Kāmikāgama* requires that Yama should be represented as fallen down and Śiva should be shown in the act of kicking Yama with his right leg while the left one is placed on the ground, It also lays down that Śiva should have four hands (Hind. Ico. II-1, pp. 159-160). The example described here tallies in general with these requirements.

is standing to the left while to the right is a male figure. Brahmā has three heads with *kirīṭa-makuṭas* and four hands. The upper right and upper left hands hold *akṣamāla* and *kamaṇḍalu* respectively. He places flower on the *liṅga* with the lower right hand and keeps the lower left hanging. Brahmā wears *patrakuṇḍalas*, *graiveyakas* and *pūrṇoruka*. The male figure standing to the right of the *liṅga* catches the *pānavaṭṭa* with his left hand and is placing a garland on the *liṅga* with his right hand.

Vṛsabhārūdhamūrti

This sculpture is found on the outerside of the north wall of the enclosure. Śiva and Pārvatī are seated on a bull. Brahmā is standing in front of the bull while at the back is a dwarf standing and holding an umbrella. Śiva has four hands and holds *paraśu* in the upper right hand and *mṛga* in the upper left. He keeps the lower right hand in *abhaya* and the lower left hanging. He wears *kirīta-makuṭa*, *graiveyakas*, *yajñopavīta* and *pūrṇoruka*. The Devī is seated at the back of the God holding flower in the right hand and passing the left hand round the back of the God. Devī wears *karaṇḍa-makuṭa*, *graiveyakas* and *pūrṇoruka*. Brahmā is standing in *dvibhaṅga* in front of the bull and has three heads with *kirīṭa-makuṭas* and four hands. He keeps the upper right hand in *cinmudra*, holds *kamaṇḍalu* in the upper left hand and keeps the two lower hands in *añjali*. He wears *graiveyakas* and *pūrṇoruka*.

ICONOGRAPHY

The *śālā-koṣṭhas* in the outerside of the walls of *garbha-gṛha* and *antarāla* of the Śiva temple contain the following stone images.

Vyākhyāna Dakṣiṇāmūrti

The God is seated under a tree with his right leg hanging and resting on Apasmāra and the left bent and its knee on the right thigh. There is a sage on either side at the bottom. The god has three eyes and four hands. He holds *triśūla* in the upper right hand, *nāga* in the upper left, keeps the lower right hand in *cinmudra* and holds a book in the lower left hand. He has *jaṭā-makuṭa* with a few stray *jaṭas* flowing down on to the shoulders. He wears *makara* and *cakrakuṇḍalas*, *graiveyakas*, *yajñopavīta* and *pūrṇoruka*.[11]

11. The *Aṃśumadbhedāgama* and *Kāmikāgama* lay down that Dakṣiṇāmūrti should be accompanied by seven ṛṣis. (Hind. Ico. II-1, p. 276). In this example only two ṛṣis are seen with the God. Among published examples, one image at Srisailam is depicted as having four hands, the upper hands holding *akṣamālā* and *kalaśa*, the lower right held in *jñānamudra*, and the lower left in *varada*. (Dr. M Rama Rao - *The Temples of Śrīśailam*, JAHRS. vol. XXVI p. 123).

Vīrabhadra

The God stands in *dvibhaṅga* and has four hands. He holds arrow in the upper right hand, bow in the upper left, sword in the lower right and *kheṭa* in the lower left hand. He wears *kirīṭamakuṭa, graiveyakas, ratnakuṇḍalas, yajñopavīta, cannavīra, kapālamālā* reaching below the knees and *pūrṇoruka*. Dakṣa with a goat's head stands to bottom right with hands in *añjali*.[12]

Bhairava

The God stands in *samabhaṅga* before a dog and has four hands. He carries *ḍamaru* in the upper right hand, *pāśa* in the upper left, *triśūla* in the lower right and *kapāla* in the lower left hand. He wears *jaṭā-makuṭa* surrounded by flame, *patrakuṇḍalas, graiveyakas, yajñopavīta, cannavīra*, garland of skulls and *pūrṇoruka*. He has three eyes and a terrific appearance.[13]

Kumāra

This God with a single face, four hands and three eyes stands before a peacock. He holds *vajra* in the upper right hand *ṭaṅka* in the upper left, keeps the lower right in *abhaya* and the lower left at *kaṭi*. He wears *kiriṭa-makuṭa, patrakuṇḍalas, keyūras, graiveyakas, cannavīra*, girdle, *pūrṇoruka* and *mañjiras*.[14]

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12. The prescription in the *Śrītatvanidhi* that there should be the figure of Bhadrakālī by the side of the figure of Vīrabhadra is not adhered to in this example. The contents in the hands of the Vīrabhadra image agree with the requirements laid down in the *Kāraṇāgama*. (Hind. Ico. II, pp. 186, 187).

13. This image comes under the *Vaṭuka Bhairava* class of the image of Bhairava. *Rūpamaṇḍana* lays down that Vaṭuka Bhairava image should have eight arms in six of which are to be the *khaṭvāṅga, pāśa, śūla, ḍamaru, kapāla*, and a snake, while one of the remaining hands should carry a piece of flesh and the other should be held in the *abhaya* pose. By the side of this Bhairava there should be a dog of the same colour as that of its master. (Hind. Ico. I-1, p. 177). In this example the God has only four hands. The prescription in the *Vaṭuka-bhairavakalpa* that Bhairava should carry in his hands the *śūla, pāśa ḍamaru* and *kapāla* is adhered to in this example, though the requirement that he should be riding upon a dog is ignored. (ibid., p. 178).

14. The *Śilpa* texts require that a four handed image of Kumāra should hold *akṣa-mālā* and *kamaṇḍalu* or *śakti* and *kamaṇḍalu* while the two other hands are kept in *abhaya* and *kaṭyavalambita* poses. (Hind. Ico. II-2, pp. 425-426). In this example the contents and hand poses are against the requirements of the texs.

Brahma

Standing in *samabhaṅga* this three headed deity has four hands, the upper right holding *akṣamālā* and the upper left holding *kamaṇḍalu*. He keeps the lower right hand in *abhaya* and the lower left in *varada*. He wears *kirīta-makuṭa*, *yajñopavīta*, *graiveyakas*, *cannavīra* and *pūrṇoruka*.[15]

Durga

The Devī stands in *samabhaṅga* on the head of a buffaloe and has four hands. She holds *cakra* and *śaṅkha* in the two upperhands, keeps the lower right in *abhaya* and the lower left at *kaṭi*. She was *karaṇḍa-makuṭa*, *ratnakuṇḍalas*, girdle with *siṃha-lalāṭa*, buckle and *pūrṇoruka*. She has fierce tusks protruding to the sides.[16]

ARCHITECTURAL FEATURES

The two temples described above contain some important architectural features. In the case of the Śiva temple the *garbha-gṛha* and *antarāla* are surrounded by a *pradakṣiṇa* whereas the Rāma temple does not contain a *pradakṣiṇa*. In the Siva temple we find two varieties of pillar corbels. The corbels of the pillars in the *mukha-maṇṭapa* contain four arms in the four sides with the fully developed *boḍigai* hanging on their underside. The corbles of the pillars in the *pradakṣiṇa* have the roll and leaf at either end.[17] The outerside of the walls of the *pradakṣiṇa* in

15. Among published examples, an image at Kumbakonam has three heads, stands in *samabhaṅga* and has four hands, three of which are similar to this image but the lower left hand is kept at *kaṭi*. (K.A.N. Sastri: *The Coḷas*, PLXVIII, Fig.43).

16. Durgā of the four handed variety should carry *cakra* and *śaṅkha* in the two upper hands, keeping the lower right in *abhaya* and the lower left in *kaṭaka* poses, (Hind. Ico. 1-2, 341). In this example the position and contents of all the other hands excepting in the case of the lower left hand tally with the requirements. Among the published examples a sculpture at Draksharama has *śaṅkha* and *cakra* in the two upper hands while the lower right is in *abhaya* and the lower left in *kaṭyav lambita*. (Dr. M. Rama Rao : *The Bhīmēśvara Temple of Drākṣārāma* JAHRS, XXIV).

17. The same type of corbels are found in some *Kākatīya* and Vijayanagara temples. The pilasters on the outerside of the walls of the Tripurāntakeśvara temple at Tripurantakam, and those on the outerside of the *mukha-maṇṭapa* of the Mallikārjuna temple, ailam contain Seisimilar type of corbels. The pials on either side of passage in the *gopura* of the Padmāvatī temple, Tiruchānur (Chittoor District Andhra Pradesh) contain pillars with similar corbels. The Tripurāntakeśvara temple of Tripurantakam was re-constructed by the *Kākatīya* king Gaṇapatideva in A.D. 1255 (MER. 171 of 1905). The *mukha-maṇṭapa* of the Srisailam temple was constructed by Harihara II in A.D. 1405. The *gopura* of the Tiruchanur temple belongs to the Sixteenth century A.D. as known from its architectural features.

the Śiva temple is decorated with pilasters, niches surmounted by semi-circular *makara-toraṇas* topped by *siṃha-lalāṭas*, and *śālā-kōṣṭhas*. The combination of niche surmounted by semi-circular *makara-toraṇa* and *śālā-kōṣṭha* found here is noteworthy. The outerside of the *pradakṣiṇa* walls of the Śiva temple and the outerside of the walls of the Rāma temple contain pilasters surmounted by semi-circular *makara-toraṇas* topped by *siṃhalalāṭas*.[18] Pilaster surmounted by a *citra-toraṇa* with a *siṃha-lalāṭa* at its top found on the outerside of the wall of the *mukha-maṇṭapa* of the Śiva temple is another important feature.

Pilaster surmounted by a semi-circular *citra-toraṇa* with a *siṃha-lalāṭa* above is found on the north wall of the Varadarāja temple at Hangala (on the Mysore-Ooty Road), belonging the tenth century A.D. "The *garbha-gṛha* and *sukanāsi* have worn out octagonal cornices on their basement and their outer walls are decorated with a number of niches and canopied pilasters. But the tops of these canopies have generally horse-shoe-shaped domes with interesting floral and other ornamental dasigns and definitely horse-shoe-shaped inset spaces"[19]

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18. On the outerside of the walls of the Maṇikaṇṭhesvara temple and the Kāśī-viśveśvara shrine at Kalahasti there are pilasters surmounted by *makara-toraṇas*. In some cases in these examples the plumes of the *makara* stop at the *phalaka* of the pilaster while in others they hang down to the sides. The Maṇi-kaṇṭhisvara temple at Kalahasti was built by a *Cōḷa* king, Tribhuvana cakra-vartin Vīrarājēndra Coḷadeva in A.D. 1074 (MER. 197 of 1906). So this feature which is found in the *Cāḷa* style survived into the Vijayanagara architecture with slight changes.

19. Annual Report of the Mysore Archaeological Department for the year 1937, p.p. 17, 18, pl. III, fig. 3.

GLOSSARY

Adhiṣṭhāna	...	...	Base.
Antarāḷa	...	...	Ante-chamber.
Garbha-gṛha	...	...	Sanctum.
Mukha-maṇṭapa	...	...	Hall before the Antarāḷa
Pradakṣiṇa	...	...	Ambulatory.
Śālā-kōṣṭha	...	...	Niche with the top like a śālā.
Vimāna	...	...	Tower rising above the sanctum.
Akṣa-mālā	...	...	Rosary of beads.
Cannavīra	...	...	An ornament hung round the neck by a string so as to lie over the chest.
Graiveyaka	...	...	Neck ornament.
Pūrṇoruka	...	...	Trousess.
Samabhaṅga	...	...	Body with no bends.
Vīrāsana	...	...	Sitting with the left leg bent at the knee and resting on the seat and the right leg hanging.
	...	...	
Yajñopavīta	...	...	Sacred thread.

4

V. ANJANEYA SARMA

THE ŚABDA-BRAHMAN AND THE PRASTHĀNA-TRAYA

That word, thought and object are interrelated and inseparable is evident in our experience. For the knowledge of the one is not possible without the knowledge of the other. To know either of them is to know all of them and their knowledge is one single cognitive unit pertaining to an entity of which the word, the thought (or meaning) and the object are but three significations. Difference between them does exist in empirical usage *(vyavahāra)*. There are three idealistic philosophies in India which have studied these three aspects from the absolutist point of view. The Buddhists hold that an object is not independent of its knowledge[1]. But in the final analysis the nature of both is *śūnya*. The Advaita philosophers maintain that the knowledge alone matters and it is the ultimate reality, the object being a mere appearance, *anirvacanīya*.[2] There is another school of philosophers i.e., the Grammarians who believe in the word *(śabda-tattva)* as the ultimate principle[3]. The word is for the Grammarian what Brahman is for the Advaitin. Hence it is called the *Śabda-brahman*. The most notable champion of this

1. Dignāga as quoted by Kamalaśīla on the *Tattvasaṅgraha* (Gaekwad's Oriental Series), vol. 1, p. 582:

   यदन्तर्ज्ञेयरूपं तु बहिर्वदवभासते ।
   सोऽर्थो विज्ञानरूपत्वात् तत्प्रत्ययतयाऽपि च ॥

2. *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya* (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 476) p. 186:

   विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तं पुनरिदं विश्वं सदसद्भ्यां विलक्षणं ब्रह्मवादिनः संगिरन्ते ।

3. *Vākyapadīya*, (Kashi Sanskrit Series, 124) I. 1:

   अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।
   विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥

theory is Bhartṛhari, whose followers like Puṇyarāja have even tried to fit this theory in the framework of the Advaita technique[4]. They are not totally unjustified in doing so, because of the striking similarities between the two systems. The ultimate reality is one for both; it is immanent and transcendental as well. The whole process of creation in the form of the universe is based on this principle. And realization of this is the sole aim of life. But differences between these two are of vital importance. The *Śabda-brahman* is the cause of the creation by virtue of its numerous powers like *kālaśakti*, its creation and its powers being real unlike the *avidyā* in *Advaita*. Nevertheless, Bhartṛhari has no hesitation to say that ultimate reality is one[5]. And the means of getting at that is also the *śabda* and *Vedas* and especially the *praṇava*[6]. As the other constituents of the *prasthāna-traya* of the *Vedānta* philosophy, i.e., the *Brahma-sūtras* and the *Bhagavad-Gītā* are based on the *śrutis*, we have every reason to evaluate the philosophy of the *Śabda-tattva* from the standpoint of the *prasthāna-traya*. The purpose of the present paper is restricted to discussing the desirability of the ultimate reality being called *śabda* alone. Does the authority of the three-fold testimony sanction it ? Which of the two systems, the *Śabda-brama-vāda* and *Advaita*, reflects the spirit of the *śrutis* ? An attempt is made here to study these questions without interfering with the sound logic of Bhartṛhari's philosophy. For he himself admits that reason should not go against the *śrutis*[7].

Bhartṛhari calls the *Śabda-brahman akṣara* and equates it with the *praṇava*; the upanishadic passages like '*aśabdam asparśam*' (*Kaṭhopaniṣad*, III–15), which describe the supreme principle as beyond words, according to this theory, mean that the supreme is beyond any *articulate speech*. Similarly the *śrutis* distinguishing the *Para-brahman* or the

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4. Gaurinath Sastri: *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, pp. 13 and 14

5. *Vākyapadīya*, I. 2: एकमेव यदाम्नातं ....

6. ibid., I. 9:

   सत्या विशुद्धिस्तत्रोक्ता विद्यैवैकपदागमा ।
   युक्ता प्रणवरूपेण सर्ववादाविरोधिनी ॥

7. ibid., I. 136:

   वेदशास्त्राविरोधी च तर्कश्चक्षुरपश्यताम् ॥

   The word *apaśyatām* is significant. Reasoning on the lines of scriptures helps only those who are ignorant, and not those who have had intuition of the supreme word which he indicates by expressions like *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī* being grosser forms of the word-experience. Other expressions are *pratibhā* and *sphoṭa* (internal one).

higher from the *Śabda-brahman* or the lower also are taken to support the Grammarian's doctorine, for the *śabda* is equated with *Para-brahman* by him[8].

Even some of the maxims in the *Brahma-sūtra* apparently support the Grammarian's view of the ultimate reality[9]. So does the *Bhagavad-Gitā*.[10]

But the Advaitin would interpret the same passages in support of his doctrine of *Para-brahman*. Thus the word *akṣara* is taken to mean indestructible or eternal in the etymological sense and not letter (or word) in the popular sense; and the *Para-brahman* is *akṣara* or eternal. The *śrutis* '*aśabdam*', '*avāg amanāḥ*' (Bṛ. Ā. Up. III-viii-8), *avākī* (Ch. Up. III-xiv-2 and 4) and the like mean only the *Para-brahman* since it is beyond speech, beyond mind. Further the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* says that the word is *bhautika* or material (VI-v-3, 4 : *tejomayī vāk*). Though some *Upaniṣads* identify the supreme reality with the *praṇava*, it is only

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8: *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* I-i-4 & 5 : द्वे विद्ये....परा चैवापरा च....अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते । Of the ten chief *Upaniṣads*, the *Īśāvāsya* does not discuss the problem of word at all; the *Kena* and *Aitareya* exclusively deny the identy of word with the Absolute. The remaining seven state both the identity and the difference.

Of the hundred and two minor *Upaniṣads* the titles of about half a dozen include the words like *nāda* or *bindu* which bear upon the *śabda-tattva*. About eight of them state both the identity and the difference between the word and the Absolute. Not less than thirty positively accept the identity while about twenty two deny it. The *Maitrāyaṇīya* (VI-22), *Tripuratāpanī* (V-17), *Brahmabindu* (IV-16), and *Yogaśikhā* (III-2), mention *Śabda-brahman*. The *Haṃsa* (2), *Yogaśikhā* (III-3, 4, 5, VI-48), *Yogakuṇḍalī* (II-18, 19), *Paramahaṃsaparivrājaka*, *Akṣamālā*, *Annapūrṇā* (V-86, 89) mention the technical words like *parā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī* of the Śabda-brahma philosophy. See *Iśādyaṣṭottaraśatopaniṣads*, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1925.

9. I.iii-10 : अक्षरमम्बरान्तधृतेः ।

I-iii-28 : शब्द इति चेन्नातः प्रभवात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम् ।

And commenting on these the Advaitins have refuted the Grammarian's theory of *śabda*-whereby it is evident that these maxims could also refer to that theory (See the *Śāṅkara-bhāṣya* and Appayyadīkṣita's *Nyāyarakṣāmaṇī* on the above *sutrās*).

10. We find the phrase *śabda-brahman* mentioned in VI-44, whatever the meaning given by different commentators.

Also see VIII-11 and 13 ओमित्येकाक्षरं ब्रह्म and 21; X-34; XI-18 & 38; XII-3.

a symbol of it and the actual experience lies beyond the contemplation of the *praṇava*[11] which is only a means to the former and which ceases to continue in the realm of Absolute experience, because it is *mithyā*. Supposing there is a sharp gap or void between the experience of the Absolute and this means, the means when adopted to the extreme prepares the aspirant to take a sudden leap into the Absolute across the void or to receive a sudden burst of the Absolute even as *satori* in the Zen Buddhism[12]. And the usefulness of the means of contemplation stops with this. That is why the Absolute is said to transcend description, contemplation and everything that an aspirant can put forth through his efforts. This must be the import of those *śrutis* that speak of Brahman as beyond words and which seem to contradict those passages which equate Brahman with the word, i.e., *praṇava*. If one follows the latter, as the Grammarian would do, one finds that the contemplation of *praṇava* is almost the only means which is an unbroken journey to the Absolute because both the means and the end are of verbal nature; there is no room to suppose the existence of any void in between the means and the end. It is that the *sādhaka* who passes from the means to the end passes only from the limited to the unlimited experience of the same reality. And according to the Grammarian, the means would be as real as the end.

In fact, these are matters of individual experience, rather than of logic. May be it is the conviction of the Grammarian resulting from his

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11. The most emphatic of all *śrutis* that speak of the identity of the Supreme with the *praṇava* is the *Māṇḍukyopaniṣad* beginning with ओमित्येतदक्षरमिदं सर्वम् । Śaṅkara in his commentary seems to admit in unequivocol terms this identity : ....सर्वोऽपि वाक्प्रपञ्चः ओंकार एव; स च आत्मस्वरूपमेव । But he later proceeds to clarify that the *śruti* means identity between the expression (*abhidhāna*) and the expressed (*abhidheya*), and that the purpose of the identification is to get at the Brahman that is different from both : एकत्वप्रतिपत्तेश्च प्रयोजनं अभिधाना-भिधेययोरेकेनैव प्रयत्नेन युगपत्प्रविलापयन् तद्विलक्षणं ब्रह्म प्रतिपद्येतेति ॥ Further : सर्वं यदुक्तमोंकारमात्रमिति तदेतद् ब्रह्म; तच्च ब्रह्म परोक्षाभिहितं प्रत्यक्षतो विशेषेण निर्दिशति-अयमात्मा ब्रह्मेति ॥ And according to Advaita, Brahman is only indicated (*lakṣya*) by word and not expressed (*vācya*). It means that even *praṇava* being a word is not in fact identical with Brahman, but symbolic of it.

12. Hubert Benoit: *The Supreme Doctrine*, pp. 5 & 115: "*Satori* comes to us unexpectedly when we have exhausted all the resources of our being". This gap is called great doubt. See p. 88. *Upaniṣads* also speak of such a suddenness: तद्धास्य विजज्ञौ, Ch. Up: VI-xvi-3, etc.

intuition of the word that prompts him to describe the reality as word even at the transcendental level. But for those whose predilections are for Advaita feel that according to the *prasthāna-traya*, the *Śabda-brahman* is not the Absolute, as is evidenced also by the commentators of Bhartṛhari who have interpreted his philosophy in terms of Advaita. Bhartṛhari himself seems to indicate that the means to attain the Absolute falls within the range of the *mithyā*[13]. It is also suggested by some that Bhartṛhari's view on the nature of the world is *ābhāsa-vāda*.[14] From all these, it follows Bhartṛhari is not against the Advaita theory.[15] Yet it would be an important study if various texts in the *prasthāna-traya* referring to the two types of *Brahman*, *para* and *apara* and to their difference and identity are examined in detail in their own context.

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13. *Vākyapadīya* II-240: असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते ॥ If the *śabba* be the means, it would also be *mithyā*. Śaṅkara also admits that while the means is *mithyā*, the effect produced by it is real. See his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* II-i-14 beginning with कथं त्वसत्येन वेदान्तवाक्येन सत्यस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वस्य प्रतिपत्तिः upto न चेयमुपगतिरनर्थिका भ्रान्तिरेवेति शक्यंवक्तुं; अविद्या-निवृत्तिफलदर्शनात् ।

14. *The Philosophy of* Word and Meaning, p. 64, stanza VI-I-119:
शब्देष्वेवाश्रिता शक्तिर्विश्वस्यास्य निबन्धिनी ।
यन्नेत्रः प्रतिभात्मायं भेदरूपो विवर्तते ॥ is cited to indicate the concept of *ābhāsa*.

15. Bhaṭṭoji. himself a grammarian, has the following observation made on Bhartṛhari in the *Śabdakaustubha* (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 6), p. 12:
तदेवं वराटिकान्वेषणाय प्रवृत्तश्चिन्तामणिं लब्धवानितिं वासिष्ठरामायणोक्ताभाण-कन्यायेन शब्दविचाराय प्रवृत्तस्सन् प्रसङ्गादद्वैते औपनिषदे ब्रह्मण्यपि व्युत्पाद्यता-मित्यभिप्रायेण भगवान् भर्तृहरिर्विवर्तवादादिकमपि प्रसङ्गाद् व्युदपादयत् ।
This he concludes after quoting Bhartṛhari himself on the two views on *sphoṭa*:
शास्त्रेषु प्रक्रियाभेदैरविद्यैवोपवर्ण्यते and समारम्भस्तु भावानामनादिब्रह्म शाश्वतम् ।
The latter line indicates Bhartṛhari's opinion in which the fundamentals of Advaita are taken for granted. His doctrine does not militate against them. But from the other direction, Śaṅkara is also said to have admitted *sphoṭa* which is sentient in spite of his criticism of it in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. See Anantakrishna Sastri: Sanskrit Introduction to *Vyākhyas* on the *Brahmasiddhi* (Madras Government Oriental Series No. CLXI) pp. 21 and 22.

5

C. B. RAWAT

MORPHOLOGY OF HINDI PRONOUN

The pronominal forms of Hindi present many problems of structural analysis. The problems are mostly due to some formal irregularities exhibited by them. The historical process of evolution is partly responsible for such irregularities. The older inflectional forms, otherwise lost, linger in this area of Hindi grammar. The genetive-case-ending which is the sign of the inflectional stage of linguistic evolution, appears in certain forms. With an exception of relative forms of pronouns that also function as adjectives, the gender distinction has altogether disappeared.

In the present paper, an attempt is made to give as clear and concise an exposition as possible of Hindi pronouns. A special stress has been laid on the structural aspects of the problem at hand. Historical tracings or derivations and dialectic variations have been left out. Positively speaking the paper deals with the simple and compund pronominal forms of standard Hindi, occuring in different morphological and syntactical contexts.

The paper has been divided into five sections. The first section deals with the formal suffixes used in pronominal formations. The bases of the pronouns come in the second part. Thirdly the morphophonemics has been discussed. Then follows the section on compound and longer forms. Finally, the special usages have been given.

List of abbreviations and symbols used:
N=number morphemes; GN=gender-number morphemes; Nom.=nominative; Ag.=agent case; gen.=genitive case; rel.=relative case;

corr.-correlative; Acc.D.=Accusative-dative case; Sg.=singular number; pl.=plural number; inter.=interrogative; F=Feminine gender; Masc.= marsculine gender; PP=post position (kārak). PB=pronominal bases I=first person; II=second person; III=third person; //=phonemic writing; [ ] phonetic writing; { } =morphological writing; ::= juncture; C= eonsonant; V=vowels; ϕ=zero; $\rightarrow$=leads to; ɔ=low mid. back round vowel; ∞ = nasal.

1. **Suffixes**

The functional suffixes always follow the PB. According to the distribution, these suffixes may be divided into two classes: (1) suffixes which occupy the first position after the PB and (2) suffixes which come after the first positional suffixes.

1.1. The satellites of the first class again fall into two sub-classes. The first sub-class consists of the suffixes that stop the possibility of further inflection. The others can admit of other suffixes after them for further inflection. In traditional terminology the first group may be called as nominative suffixes and the second, of the oblique ones.

The situation for the first group may be symbolised as PB+suffix+ /::/ and for the second as PB+suffix+suffix+/::/ or /::/ PP.

1.11. The morphemes of the first sub-class are as under

Sg.	Pl.	PB.
{-h}	{-e}	III. PB.
{-ɔn} ∞ /-o/	{ ϕ }	Rel., corr., or inter. PB.
{-a :}	×	non personal inter.

These suffixes indicate the number of the form and enable the PB to be used nominatively in the situation :: ——— :: verb.

1.12 The second sub-class consists of there morphemes: /-s/[1]Sg., {-n }Pl., { -e } Sg. and {-a :} Pl. The first set (/-s/ and {-n}) occurs with the III PB, in the situations :: PB ——— :: PP. or :: PB ———suffix (Acc.D.). The second set({-e} and {-a :}) comes with the I and II, in the situation :: PB ——— suffix (gen.).

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1. /-s/ is a morphophenemic variation of the nom. Sg. {-h}

1.13 The above two sub-classes have two dimensional function, namely the indication of number, and preparation of the PB to be used nominatively and obliquely. There is still a sub-class which has the morphemes that, apart from indicating the number, enables I and II PB to be used nominatively as well as before /::ne/ 'the Ag.' this factor distinguishes this class from the above two. These morphemes occur in following two situations:-

(a) :: PB ———————— :: verb

(b) :: PB ———————— / :: ne / 'the case of agent' [2]

These morphemes are $\{-\tilde{\varepsilon}-\}$ I Sg., and $\{-u:\}$ II Sg. For the rest of the cases the I PB and II PB take other oblique morphemes. All these three sub-classes, according to their constant function of indicating number, may be denoted by N. Three extra functions may be indicated by putting the sub-class Nos., under N. Thus we have N= n_1, n_2, n_3. The resultant forms may be symbolized in this way: (a) I, II PB+n_3 and (b) III and other PBs+n_1 or n_2.

The suffixes at this level give us a nice linguistic contrast between I, II PB on the one hand and III and other PBs on the other. It may be also noted that the morphemes of n_3 sub-class is only Sg. The plural suffixes with I and II PB is not directly appended to the base.

1.2 Morphemes coming after the resultant forms –

It has been seen that the n_1 after the PB closes the door for further inflection. n_2 and n_3 admit some suffixes to follow them.

1.21 Suffixes after I and II PB+n_3

1.211 Plural $\{-m\}$ -N3 consists of $\{-\tilde{\varepsilon}\}$ I Sg. and $\{u:\}$ II Sg. out of these two $\{-\tilde{\varepsilon}\}$ is altogether dropped in further inflection. Before $\{-m\}$ Pl., $\{-u:\}$ remains at its place but $\{\tilde{\varepsilon}\}$ disappears; leaving behind a zero. Thus we have the forms:

(a) I PB+/ϕ/ + $\{-m\}$ Pl.

(b) II PB + $\{u:\}$ + $\{m\}$ Pl.

2. About this case, Kellog has remarked "strictly speaking -ne is the English 'by' but in rendering into English idiom, it will be found necessary to translate the case of the agent precisely as the nominative". (*A Grammar of the Hindi Language*, (2nd ed.) p. 101.

With this {-m} pl. the I and II PB can come in every situation - nominative or oblique. These situations are:

(a)	I, II PB+/-u:/ or /ϕ/+{-m}Pl.	before{-a:} another Pl.
(b)	,,	before {-e} Acc.D.
(c)	,,	before :: verb-(nom.)
(d)	,,	before :: PP (oblique)

Thus {-m} is a 'mixed morpheme', having a vide range of distribution and, is pregnant with the possibilities of further inflection. Here only /a/ keeps the possibility of further inflection alive. The Gen. suffix comes after {a:} i.e., at the fourth place from the PB.

1.212 Sg. {-jh-}

The case with the I PB with n_3 is quite different. Before the genitive suffix, n_3 is dropped in favour of a zero it being necessary for the sake of its symmetry with the plural Gen. In this case another Sg. suffix {-e-} is added to I and II PB which qualifies these PB to occur before the Gen. suffix. Again, the n_3 suffixes can only bring the PB (I and II) before / :: ne / Ag. For the rest of PPs another oblique Sg. suffix {-jh-} is necessarily added to the PB. Here also {-ε̃} gives way to the power of analogy and is substituted by {-u:} Sg. II. with {-jh-} after {u:}, the PB can occur in all the remaining oblique situations i.e., before /::/ PP

The following table gives the summary of these situations:

(a)	I, II PB+/ϕ/Sg. + {-e-}	before genitive
(b)	,, + {-ũ:-} + {-jh-}	before :: PP (except / :: ne /)
(c)	,, ,, ,,	before {-e} Acc.D.

Thus {-jh-} has rather a limited number of situations in comparision with the {-m}, but this is also having possibility of further inflection.

Then the suffixes which come at the third place from PB come. These are {-r-}Gen., and {-e}Acc.D. The Gen. {-r-} takes NG (= {a:}masc. Sg. {-e} masc. Pl. and {-i:} F.) The Gen. {-r-}

comes at the fourth place in I and II PB plural formations and in that case NG takes the fifth position.

1.213 *Summary*:– This all may be summarized as below :

	II place	III place	IV place	V place
I and II PB + N_3 →	→ — × →	{ -e- } Sg. →		
			{ -r- } Gen. →	NG
	→ { -jh- } →	— { -e } Acc.D.		
		— :: PP (except/ne/)		
	→ { -m- } →	→ { -e } Acc.D.		
		→ { -a : - } pl. →		
			{ -r- } → NG	
		→ :: verb		
		→ :: PP		

1.22 Suffixes after III and other PB + n_2

The n_2 suffixes are /-s/ and {-n} They can lead to the suffixes of the second or third place from the base :

III PB +	— / -s / Sg. →	→ { -e } Acc.D.	
		→ :: PP	
	— { -n } Pl. →	→ { -e } Acc.D	
		→ { -∞ } ——→	/::ne/ Ag.
		→ :: PP (other than /-ne /)	

The further inflection after / - s / is quite simple. $\{-n\}$ takes another morpheme $\{\overset{\infty}{C}\}$ oblique pl., to be used before / :: ne / Ag.

The other PBs (inter., rel., etc.) are slightly different from the III PB. This difference is found at the n_1 level. At this level the other PBs are prefixed to the III PBs $\left(= \{-i-\} \text{ proximate} \right)$. Thus whatever comes at the first place after III PB will come at the second place after the other PBs other suffixes are also shifted the same way;

$$\text{other PBs} + \{-i-\} \rightarrow \begin{cases} - / - s / \rightarrow \text{same as III PB} \\ - \{-n-\} \text{ same as III PB} \end{cases}$$

Here $\{-i-\}$ is a proximate morpheme. The rest of the inflectiona process remains unchanged.

The interrogative PB has a special set of morphemes. These are either interrogative morphemes or indefinite ones. The interrogative morphemes are of two types : personal $\{-o\} = / \supset n /$ and non-personal $\{-a:\}$. The first has been dealt with, as it comes directly after th l base. Non-personal occurs at the second place from the base. The intervening morpheme is $\{-i-\}$ proximate. The indefinite morphemes are also personal $\{-i:\}$ and non-personal $\{-ch\}$. They also occur at the second place from the base, intervening morpheme being $\{-o-\}$ These special combinations of interrogative and indefinite forms may be shown as:

$$\text{Inter. PB} + \begin{cases} \rightarrow \{-o-\} \rightarrow \begin{cases} \rightarrow \{-i:\} \\ \rightarrow \{-ch\} \end{cases} \\ \rightarrow \{-i-\} \rightarrow \{-a:\} \end{cases}$$

1.23 *Substitution.*

Two relational morphemes { - e } Acc.D. and { -r- } Gen., can be substituted by analytical case markers : { -e } ⟶ / :: ko / or / :: ke lie / 'to'. This substitution is possible in the forms, but this is optional.

The Gen. { -r- } compulsorily occurs with the I and II PBs, / :: / while it is compulsorily substituted by / :: k - / + NG : { -r- } + NG ⟶ / :: K / + NG. This irregularity is due to the struggle between old and new forms. Analytical forms represent the new trends.

1.3 *Special suffixes.*

This set occurs with the relfexive PB. The genitive morpheme {- r -} is substituted by { - n - } : {- r -} + NG ⟶ {- n -} + NG. In nominative case, there is no suffix, but a stylish one { - n - } which makes the PB to come in ::————:: verb. The oblique suffix is { - e } which qualifies the PB to occur before :: PP. This form with { -e- } can come after any pronoun to convey the sense of 'own'.

The reflexive PB also has the morpheme { - ʌ s } which gives some pronominal forms (see 2.3).

2. Pronominal bases.

The bases always occur before the morphemes discussed in the section 1., of the present paper. The pronominal bases have three canonical forms : / C /. / V / and / VC /.

2.1 */ C / PBs-*

/ m - /, / t - /, / k - /, / - j - / and / - s / come in this class. These morphemes also have two sub-classes : / - m - / and / t - /. I and II respectively are the bases with pure pronominal function. They have no other function in other grammatical formations. The rest of the morphemes of / C / class, / k - / inter. / j - / relative, and / s - / correlative, show the same relationships in other formations also.[3]

3. /jʌ-ha:/ 'wherever' /kʌ-ha:/ 'where', /j-ʌb/ / 'when ever', /k-ʌb/ 'when etc., are the examples.

2.11 *Pure /C/ PBs.*

The I and II PBs have got the same inflectional system. There is one point of contrast between { m - } I and { t - } II . { t - } remains constant in all the formations while { m - } has an allomorph before the Pl. { -.m }.[4]

2.12 *Other /C/ PBs.*

The relative PB { j - } and corr. { s - } on one hand and inter. { k - } on the other have a contrasting situation. { j - } and { s - } occur in a complex sentence, starting the principal and subordinate clauses respectively. The situation may be symbolised like this :

{ j - o }——— | ↑ { s - o }———‖ ↓[5]

In this situation { k - } cannot occur.

2.121 */j-/ and /s-/.*

These two bases have got the contrasting point. /j-/ remains constant in all the formations, while { s - } has got another morphologically conditioned allomorph in oblique formations or it is substituted by /V/ PB. These particles are also used in compound formations. Plural forms are indicated by repitition.

2.122 */k-/.*

This base morpheme has a two-way function: it acts as interrogative as well as indefinite morpheme. In interrogative formation it takes either personal morpheme /-o/ or non-personal one /-a:/. Thus we have /k-ɔn/ 'who' and /k-i-a:/ 'what'.

Indefinite form emerges with indef. morpheme { -i: } 'personal' or { -ch } non-personal. Thus we have /k-o-i:/ 'somebody' and /k-u-ch/ 'something'.

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4. See section 3.

5. /↑/ denotes rising tone and /↓/ the falling one. / | /denotes shorter pause and / ‖ / denotes longer one.

It also has the repetitive plural morpheme.[6]

2.2 */V/Pbs.*

{ i - } proximate and { u - } 'remote' come in this class. These are not pure PBs. In other than pronominal forms also they indicate proximity and remoteness.[7] At the same time, the oblique forms of these bases, / i - s / and / i - n /, /u - s / and / u - n / may be prefixed by the rel. { j - } and corr. { s - } and inter. { k - } This is the main point of contrast which distinguishes / V / PBs from /C/PBs.

2.3 */VC/ : Reflexive.*

The nominative form of it is / a : p /. This is not very much in use. At the first place from the base comes { - n - }. After this occurs oblique { - e } which qualifies this base to come before :: PP. / ʌ p ʌ - ne - :: ko / 'Acc. / D.,' / ʌ p ʌ - ne :: se / 'ablative;'. / ʌ p ʌ - n - a : / 'Genitive'; /ʌ p ʌ - ne - mẽ ʌ p ʌ r / 'locative'; / ʌ p ʌ - n :: ne / 'case of agent'. The oblique form / ʌ p ʌ - ne / can also be used to give the sense of 'own' as in / m ɛ̃ - ʌ p ʌ - ne - gh ʌ r - g ʌ ya : / 'I went to my own house'; and /v ʌ h - ʌ p ʌ - me - gh ʌ r - g ʌ ya : / 'he went to his own house;

When suffixed with / - ʌ s /, it gives the sense of 'selves', in English, as we see in /ve - a : p - ʌ s - mẽ - bole / 'they said among themselves' etc. Similarly this form gives the meaning of 'ourselves 'yourselves' etc.

The forms /ʌ p ʌ - ne / and / ʌ p ʌ - nɔ̃/ are used substantially also, as in the expression / ve :: ʌ p ʌ - ne - hɛ̃ :: / 'they are my people', / v ʌ h :: ʌ p ʌ - n - ɔ̃ :: ke :: pa : s :: g ʌ ya : :: / 'he went to his own people'.

3. Morphophonemics.

Both the formative suffixes and the PBs undergo certain changes in various phonemic and morphological contexts.

6. These repetitive forms are dealt with in the section 4 of this paper.

7. / i-hã :/ 'here'=[y ʌ -hã :], / u-hã : /=[v ʌ -hã :] 'these', / i-t ʌ n-a : / 'this much', / u-t ʌ -na :/ 'that much' / u-dh ʌ r / 'that side'. These are the examples of other grammatical classes.

3.1 Changes in the suffixes.

3,11 *Number suffixes:* (with I and IIPB).

{ – ɛ̃ } – (Sg. with I PB) = / – ɛ̃ /, / – u /, / ϕ /.

/ ɛ̃ / occurs before / :: / as in / m – ɛ̃ – :: g ʌ – ya :/ 'I went'; / – u / occurs before /– jh /, oblique Sg. after an analogy with the II form action / t – u – jh /, as in / m-u – jh – e / 'to me'. / ϕ / occurs in genitive formation as in / m – e – r – a : / 'mine' (= /m – ϕ– e – r – a : /).

{–u :} — (Sg. with II PB) = / u : /, / – u /, / – ϕ /.

/ u : / occurs before / :: / as in / t – u : :: g ʌ – ya: / 'you went'. The allomorph / – u / occurs before other morphemes, as in / t – u – m / 'you', / t – u – jh – e / 'to you'. / ϕ / occurs in genitvie formations as in / t – θ – e – r a : / 'yours'.

{–m} —(Pl. with I and II PB) = / – m /, / mh – /, / – ʌm /.

/ – m / occurs before / :: / as in / t – u – m :: K – o / 'to you' The allomorph / – mh / occurs after a CV before any other morphemes as in / t – u – mh – ẽ / 'to you' or / t – u – mh – a : – r – a : / 'yours'. / – ʌm/ occurs after / h – / I PB (allomorph) as in / h – ʌ m / 'we'.

Number Suffixes with other PBs :

{–h} –(Sg. with III PB)=/–h/, /–S/

/–h/ occurs after /iʌ–/ 'proximate' and /uʌ–/ 'remote' as in /iʌ–h/ 'this', /uʌ–h/ 'he'. Phonetically these forms are [yʌh] and [vʌh] III nominative.

/–s/ occurs after /i–/ and /u–/ as in /i–s–e/ 'to this' and /u–s–e/ 'to him.'

{–n} – (Pl. with III PB) = /–n/, /–nh/ (oblique Pl.)

/ – n/ occurs before /:: / as in [i – n :: ko/ 'to these' or /u – n :: ko/ 'to them'.

/–nh/ occurs before {–e} Acc.D. as in /i–nh–ẽ/ to these' or / u – nh – ẽ / 'to them'.

{–o} – (Sg. with rel., corr., and inter. PBs) = /–o/ /ɔn=/, /–u/.

/–o/ occurs before V-suffix as in /k–o–i:/ 'some one' or after {j–} rel. PB or {s–} corr. PB before / :: / as in /j –o/ 'who ever'.

/ɔn/ occurs with inter. {k –} before / :: / as in /k–ɔn/ 'who'.

/–u/ occurs before non-personal indefinite { –ch– } as in /k-u-ch/ 'something.'

3.12 *The Genitive suffix :*

{-r-} does not change acccording to the phonemic circumstances. It has one morphologically conditioned allomorph which comes with the reflexive pronoun. The situation for the use of this allomorph is the same as of {-r-} i.e., PB – NG. Only difference between {r –} and / – n/ is that, {-r-} takes number morpheme / – e – / Sg. or / – a – / Pl before it while / – n – / does not take any.

3.13. *The Acc. D. suffix.*

{-e} = / - e / , / - ẽ /

In non-nasal circumstances, / - e / occurs, as in / t – u – jh – e / 'to you' when it is used after a nasal consonant, it gets nasailed, as in

/ h – ʌm – ẽ / 'to us' or / t – u – mh – ẽ / 'to you' or / i – nh – ẽ / 'to these'

Changes in the PB :

(a) { m –} – (I PB) = / m – / , / h – /

With Sg. suffix {-ɛ̃} occurs the first allomorph /m-/, /h-/ occurs with the Pl. suffix {-m} as in /h-ʌm/ 'we'. In some of the prominent dialects of Hindi, this duality is not found. The base is only /h-/ which has /hũ:/ or /h-ɔ̃/ 'I' and /h-ʌm/ 'we.' At present /m-/ and /h-/ are in free variation in Braj Bhasha.

(b) {i-}-(III PB)=/iʌ-/, /i-/ (proximate)

/iʌ-/ occurs before {-h} nom. Sg. as in /iʌ-h/ =[yʌh] 'this' and /i-/ is used before /-s/ obl. Sg. as in /i-s-e/ 'to this'.

(c) {u-}-(III PB)=/uʌ-/, (remote). It has the same distribution as {i-}. The resultant forms are /uʌ-h/ =[vʌh] 'he/that' and /u-s-e/ 'to them'.

(d) {s-}-(correlative)=/s-/, /t-/

/s-/ is used in nominative case before /-o/ as in /s-o/ 'that'. In oblique case /t-/ is used as in /t-i-s::ko/ 'to him.'

(e) {a:p}=/a:p/, /ʌp/ (reflexive).

/a:p/ is used nominatively =::———::, when any suffix follows this PB, /ʌp-/ occurs as in /ʌp-ʌn-a:/ 'my own.'

4. Compoud pronouns :

One pronominal base is combined with the other to give another set of form to denote special meanings. Either the nominative forms come together or the oblique ones. The suffixes are added to the each member, and PPs come after the second member.

4.1 ***Nom. + noun.***

The I and II person PBs do not belong to this process. The rel., corr. and inter. PBs occur in compound forms :

/j-o/+/k-o-i-/ indef.	'whoever'
/j-o/+/k-u-ch/	'whatever'

Sometimes these PBs in compound forms are separated by an additional word /-nʌ/ denoting a negative sense and we have the forms:

/k-o-i: ::nʌ::k-o-i:/	'someone or the other'
/k-u-ch::nʌ::k-u-ch/	'a little or some what or something or the other'.

4.2. *Oblique + oblique*

The above forms may be oblique also i.e., come before -/::/PP as

/j-i-s::t-i-s::k-a:/	'whose so ever'
/j-i-s::k-i-s-i::k-o:/	'whom so ever'
/k-i-s-i::nʌ::k-i-s-i::ko/	'to some one or other'

4.3. The pronouns may be combined with other words also. These special words act as PB's. They may precede or follow the main PBs.

4.31. /ɔr/+PB-

/ɔr/ 'and, or something, or more' acts as pronoun in this form. The PB which comes in this combination is of inter, or indefinite group. We may have the following examples:

/ɔr::k-u-ch/	'something else'
/ɔr::k-o-i:/	'someone else'
/ɔr::k-ɔn/	'who else?'
/ɔr::k-i-a:/	'what else?'

The last two examples also denote a reply of strong affirmation. Sometimes the word /ɔr/ may come after PB also as in /k-o-i::ɔr/ 'some other' and /k-u-ch::ɔr/ 'some more'.

4.32 /sʌb-/ 'all' or /hʌr-/ 'every'+PB.

These words are also used with inter. or indefinite PB. The examples are: /sʌb::k-o-i:/ 'every one' (Pl. sense); /sʌb::k-u-ch/ 'everything or all'. In such examples the word/sʌb/ can be substituted by /hʌr-/ to give a Sg. sense.

4.33 PB+/sa:/ or /bʌhut-/ 'much'.

The word {sa:} originally means 'like' but in this particular form this also gives the sense of choice as in /k-ɔn::sa:/ 'what like'.

The masc Pl. and F. forms of the same may be/k-ɔn :: se/and/k-ɔn :: si:/. The word / sa : may also be combined with rel. PB as in / jɔn-sa :/ etc.

There are other idiomatic compound formations also as we get in bʌhut :: k-u-ch / 'much' / k-ya : ::kuch /, etc , which are not discussed here.

4.4 *Other longer forms*

4.41 *Emphatic forms* are formed by adding / hi:-/ or its allomorphs to the PBs. The examples are / tu : :: hi :/ 'you, and you alone', / mɛ̃ :: hi :/ 'I, and I alone', / hʌm-ĩ :/ 'we, and we alone', / k-u-ch :: hi :/ 'only a little'.

4.42 *Repetitive forms*

Repetition either has the inflectional value or idiomatic use. It indicates the Pl. or intensive as in / koi :: k-o-i :/ 'some bodies' and k-i-s-i : :: k-i-s-i :/ 'oblique'. In / kɔn :: kɔn / and / jo :: jo / also the sense of plurality is given.

We also have some idiomatic, longer, repetitive forms as / tu: :: tu: :: mɛ̃ :: mɛ̃/ 'a wordy fight'. The discussion of such forms are beyond the scope of the present paper.

5. *Special usages*

5.1 The correlative / s-/ may be substituted by the III PB (remote), {u-}. The inflectional system remains intact in this additional situation for {u-}.

5.2 Both /k-o-i:/and / k-u-ch/ (indefinite forms) may be used substantively as well as adjectively and for both persons and things. When used substantively, / k-o-i :/ refers to person only and /k-u-ch / to things only. Adjectively used, they denote both persons and things. As an adjective /k-u-ch / conveys a partitive sense.

5.3 / k-ɔn / is also used both substantively and adjectively, in both the nom. and obli. cases. When it is used substantively, it refers to persons only.

5.4 *Honorific forms*

The Pl. suffixes have a social function also to perform. The Pl-pronominal forms may denote honorific Sg. also. Thus some ambiguity

comes in. In order to avoid this ambiguity about the number of the forms, the word / log / is added to the Pl. pronominal forms as in / h∧m :: log / 'we (people') Pl., / t-u-m :: log / 'you' (Pl.) etc. The oblique Pl. suffix $\left\{\begin{matrix}\sim\\ \text{-ɔ}\end{matrix}\right\}$, in this case, is added to / log / as in / h∧m-log-ɔ̃ :: ko / 'to us' (Pl.) etc.

To show honour, the II Pl. is substituted by / a:p / 'honorific you'. This special honorific PB. remains unchanged in all the situations. It comes only in the situation :: —— :: PP or verb.

The Pl. of / a:p / also is made by adding the word / log / to it, as in / a:p-log / 'you (honorific) people'.

V. YASODA DEVI

UDAYAGIRI

Robert Sewell stated in 1882 thus, 'Udayagiri must be considered as one of the most important military centres on the East Coast, and there are not wanting indications to show that before very long, its complete history may be successfully worked out.'[1] It still remains a prophesy. In contrast with Udayagiri in Bhopal, a repositary of Gupta art and Udayagiri in Orissa, which with Khaṇḍagiri is a monument of Kaliṅga art, Udayagiri in Āndhradeśa is doubly significant, not merely as a strategic military base of the Rāyas, but a pilgrim centre with temples exemplifying Pallava, Coḷa and Vijayanagara styles of art and architecture. According to tradition,[2] Udayagiri possessed three hundred and sixty temples, of which nearly a hundred alone are supposed to exist now. In this respect, Udayagiri stands comparison with Kāñcīpuram in the south. In its possession of the temple of Veṅkaṭeśvara on the hill and Alamelumaṅgāpuram at a distance of seven miles from it, Udayagiri compares favourably with Tirumala and Tiruchanur.

Udayagiri and Udayapura of the early Cāḷukya records, and Udayādri, Udayaśaila, Udayācala, Aruṇādri and Aruṇagiri of the inscriptions and literature of the Rāyas was included in the kingdoms of the Pallavas, the Cāḷukyas, the Telugu Pallavas and the Telugu Cōḷas. Subsequently with the foundation of the Empire of Vijayanagara, synchronising with the expansion of the kingdom of the Reḍḍis with capital at Koṇḍavīḍu, Śailapura and Acalapura of inscriptions, the northern half of the Nellore district fell to the Reḍḍis while the southern half acknowledged the sway of the Rāyas. Just as the Raichur Doab had been the bone of

1. *List of Antiquarian Remains in Madras Presidency*, vol. I, p. 141.
2. *Nellore District Manual*, p. 426.

contention between the Rāyas and the Bahmany Sultans since the inception of the kingdom of the latter, Udayagiri on the eastern frontier of the Vijayanagara Empire and the Reḍḍi kingdom, happened to be the coveted possession of both the powers. Consequent on continuous warfare between the two powers, Udayagiri was acquired by the Rāyas and lost to the Reḍḍis for ever. Subsequent to the decline of the Reḍḍis of Koṇḍaviḍu by the end of the first quarter of the fifteenth century and of Rajahmundry by the middle of that century, the entire coastal Āndhra passed under the Rāyas; but at every step the Rāyas had to measure swords with the Gajapatis of Orissa and it was in this struggle between the two major powers of South India that Udayagiri, the capital of Udayagirirājya, the eastern most frontier viceroyalty of the Rāyas, and the southern most outpost of the Gajapatis, rises by far into significance. It served as the military base of the Rāyas for pouncing upon the possessions of the Gajapatis. The charge of Udayagirirājya was always entrusted to princes of royal blood, of the Rāyas and the Gajapatis. With the disintegration of the empire of Vijayanagara, the Āndhra came under the Kutubshahis for a while and subsequently Udayagiri became a Jāgīr under the Nawab of Arcot and in the 19th century, it came under the British and parts of the Rājya came to be absorbed in the Kāḷahasti Zamīndāri.[3]

II

Udayagiri, at present the headquarters of the Taluk bearing that name, lies at a distance of 52 miles from Nellore. It is also called Koṇḍāyapālem. The hill is quite isolated being 8 miles from the main chain of the Eastern Ghauts and 3079′ above sea level and the ascent is about 5 miles long. The finest hill fort on it is of considerable historical importance. Tradition[4] has it that it was originally built by Lāṅgulya Gajapati who thereby building Bārakhilla strengthened the place. The position was a very strong and commanding one. There were thirteen fortresses, eight on the hill and five below. Nine-tenths of the hill is inaccessible due to vertical precipices and the path to the upper fort is a marvell of engineering skill. Mīrjumla further strengthened the fort and built the Pattikoṇḍa fort. On the top of the 'Droog' is a mosque built by Mīrjumla and two Persian epigraphs[5] on it refer to the laying out of a garden on the hill in the reign of Abdulla Kutubshah of Gōlkoṇḍa. The builder of the mosque, as the epigraph says, pulled down a Hindu temple for the purpose.

3. *Imperial Gazatteer of India* – Provincial Series-Madras (1908), p. 361.
4. R. Sewell, *Antiquities* I, p. 141.
5. Nell. Ins. III. *Udayagiri* 26, 27.

There is a reservoir called Yēnugulaguṇṭa apparently where elephants drank water in the hey-day of Udayagirirājya. The walls which once encircled the town have almost entirely disappeared but much of the fortifications in the vicinity to the west still remain. Inside the walls are the remains of temples, tombs and palaces. As part of the hill is so percipitious to be inaccessible, the cliffs in some places being nearly a thousand feet high, that every path up was commanded by lines of defences. The top of the Udayagiri hill is a rugged plateau borne aloft upon immense red cliffs and un-assailable except at one or two points. Probably the red cliffs gave the names Aruṇagiri, i,e., the Red hill and Udayagiri, i.e., the hill of the rising sun, thus rendered most appropriate.

In the day of its glorious past, Udayagiri teemed with buildings and fortifications. The town below is supplied with fresh water by an open channel from springs on the hill. The temples of Gopālakṛṣṇa, Kaśiviśvanātha and Veṅkaṭeśvara on the hill, Vallabharāya at the foot of the hill and Raṅganāyaka and Nallagoṇḍa Śrīlakṣmīnṛsiṃhasvāmi in the village – are all in Udayagiri. Most of these are in ruins now and the Nellore District manual has recorded that "the stones of these old pagodas have in recent times been used largely for demarcation purposes."[6]

III

Recorded tradition[7] records that the territorial divisions of Āndhradeśa were formed in the eleventh century A.D. by Karikāla cōḷa also mentioned as Kulōttuṅga cōḷa and Rājēndracōḷa (A.D. 1063-1112) aptly implying Rājendra Kulōttuṅga I (A.D. 1070–1118) and Karikāla was his ancester in the 3rd century A.D. According to this division, Udayagirisīma was one among the fourteen sīmas in Koṇḍavīṭirājya comprising of 2048 villages, and consisted of 80 villages. There is another tradition[8] recorded that the division of the sīmas in Koṇḍavīḍusīma was made in the time of Gōparāju Rāmanna, minister of Gaṇapati of the Kākatīyas (A.D. 1198–1260). In this list, Udayagiri ranks as the fifth. This was apparently a revision of the divisions then in vogue. These references indicate the inclusion of the Udayagiri region in the Telugu Cōḷa and Telugu Pallava kingdoms under the Cōḷa aegis, and in the Kāyastha kingdom extending from Panugal in the west to Mārjavāḍi or even Kaivāramkōṭa[9] in the south under the regime of the Kākatīyas, the entire coastal Āndhra falling within its range.

6. p. 427.
7. *Koṇḍavīṭidaṇḍakavile in Koṇḍavīṭisāmrājyamu* by M.G. Sarma (1935), p. 15.
8. ibid., p. 155.
9. 573 of 1909: Ins. Mad. Pres. II, Gu. 500.

The earliest epigraphical reference to Udayagiri is in an Eastern Cāḷukya inscription mentioning it as Udayapura. Udayagiri as such with sffix *sthala* is mentioned in a record[10] (A.D. 1377) from Guruvājīpet. By A.D. 1390-91, Udayagirirājya[11] included Pūṅgināḍu in which was Addaṅkirāṣṭra. Udayagirirājya finds place in a record from Veṅkaṭāpuram (A. D 1426-27) in the reign of Vīrapratāpadēvarāya.[12] A Bōya king of Udayagiridurgam is mentioned in another record.[13] By A.D. 1436 Udayagirirājya included Pākanāḍu, for the donated village Tiruvīḍu was located in the bed of the tank of Karakili on the northern bank of the Pināki (Pennēru) Pākanāḍu.[14] Thus by this date, the Udayagirirājya comprised of Pūṅgināḍu in the north to Pākanāḍu in the south corresponding to modern Nellore district and parts of Guntur district. By A.D. 1468 Pottapināḍu came into Udayagirirājya as attested by a record of the time of Sāḷuva Narasiṃha at Tirumala.[15] Another record gives[16] the location of Cumbum in Udayagirirājya and another at Rāmeśvaram[17] (Proddatur taluq), of Mulikināḍu in Gaṇḍikōṭasīma in Udayagirirājya. Thus by A.D. 1470 Udayagirirājya embraced Pottapināḍu and Mulikināḍu, parts of Cuddapah and Kurnool districts, besides Pākanāḍu and Pūṅgināḍu. Possibly Udayagirirājya was at its largest extent in this period when the Sāḷuvas were in the ascendant.

Udayagirirājya slowly loses its control over its marches and gradually becomes circumscribed in its limits. By A.D. 1489 it came under the Gajapatis as attested by the title Pākanāṭicōḷa mahāmaṇḍalēśvara[18] of Puruṣottama aptly implying that Pākanāḍu under a branch of the Telugu Cōḷas, was lost to the Rāyas of Vijayanagara. It remained with the Gajapatis until Kṛṣṇarāya wrested it in A.D. 1514 during his eastern conquest. Records of Kṛṣṇarāya and Acyutarāya show that Udayagirirājya retained its former limits – grants being made in Pākanāḍu, Nellūrusīma and Pūṅgināḍu. According to a record of[19] A.D. 1536 it comprised of Udayagiri, Nellore, Koraṭūr, Gaṇḍavaram, Duvvūr, Ātukūr, Jaladaṅki, Koḍavalūr, Allūr, Kovvēru, Prabhākarapaṭnam, Kṛṣṇarāyapaṭnam, Sariyapalle. Rāpūr, Kandukūr, Podile,

10. Ins. Mad. Pres. II, Nell. 369; Nell. Ins. II. KG. 10.
11. C.P. of 1906-7; Nell. Ins. I. C.P. 1.
12. Nell. Ins. III, U. 46.
13. ibid., U. 45.
14. ibid., I, C.P 2.
15. *T.T.D. Inscriptions*, vol. II (1933), No. 35.
16. 2 of 1908: Ins. Mad. Pres. II. Kurnool. 21.
17. *Koṇḍavīṭisāmrājyamu*, p. 155.
18. Mack. Mss. 15-4-41 Ms. p. 58; *Koṇḍavīṭisāmrājyamu*, p. 95.
19. Nell. Ins. III, U. 21; II, KG. 10.

Kanigiri and Kegipa villages. Apparently each one of these constituted the chief town of a division or sīma as, records mention Udayagirisīma, Nellūrusīma, Prabhākarapaṭnaṃsīma, Sariyapallisīma, Rāpūrusīma Kandukūrusīma, Podilesīma, Kanigirisīma, Kanakagiri-Polacerlasīma and Kanigiri-Polacarla-Musuṇḍūrisīma and so forth. The bounds of Udayagirirājya were Koṇḍavīḍurājya in the north and Candragirirājya in the south. After A.D. 1661 when Udayagirirājya came under the Kutub Shahis, and consequently integrated into the Koṇḍavīḍu sarkār, epigraphical references to Udayagirirājya are none. Subsequently a bulk of its territory was included in the Nellore district.

Rājya was the biggest territorial division and the largest unit of administration in the empire of Vijayanagara. As such, Udayagirirājya was the foremost viceroyalty in the empire, some of the others being Koṇḍavīḍurājya, Candragirirājya, Guttirājya and Śrīśailarājya. Nāḍus were subdivisions in Rājya and Pūṅgināḍu and Addaṅkirāṣṭra in the north, Pākanāḍu and Veṅganāḍu in the south, Pottapināḍu, Mulikināḍu and Bōyavihāradēśa in the west were included in Udayagirirājya. Apparently Rāṣṭra was a smaller division included in a Nāḍu, e.g., Addaṅkirāṣṭra in Pūṅgināḍusīma[20] was a subdivision in Rāṣṭra or Nāḍu. Obviously, several sīmas constituted a Nāḍu and several Nāḍus constituted a Rājya. But neither the Rājyas, nor the Nāḍus or Rāṣṭras are uniform in extent, e.g., Addaṅkirāṣṭra in Kanigiri-Polacerla[21] – Musuṇḍūrisīma, Pūṅgināḍu and Mulikināḍu in Gaṇḍikōṭasīma. Dēśa is synonymous with sīma. There were divisions comprising two and even three sīmas e.g., Kanagiri-Polacerlasīma, Kanagiri-Polacerla-Musuṇḍūrisīma. Sthala or nēla is a lesser division than sīma and was limited to the area round about a particular place or fort e.g., Udayagiristhala[22] or nēla; Udayagiridurga[23] connotes the same meaning. Grāma or village was the smallest territorial unit and several villages constituted a sthala and so many sthalas formed a sīma.

The nucleus of Udayagirirājya is now the Udayagiri taluk covering an area of 877 sq. miles. The western part of the taluk is hilly and hence the soil is stony and sterile towards the hills and becomes more fertile towards the east.[24] The Mannēru and its affluents Pillapēru drain the northern part and the Bogyēru with its affluents the southern part of the taluk. The beds of these streams are so low that they do not facilitate direct irrigation.

20. ibid., I. C. P. 1; C. P. 1 of 1906–7.
21. *Rāmeśvaram* inscription cited on p. 155 of *Koṇḍavīṭisāmrājyamu.*
22. Nell. Ins. II, KG. 10; III, U. 23.
23. ibid., Ins. III, U. 22, 28, 29. 40, 45.
24. *Imperial Gazatteer of India* – Provincial series Madras I, p. 361.

IV

As for the political history, the geographical bearing of Udayagiri implies its inclusion in the Sātavāhana Empire and subsequently in the Cāḷukyan Empire of Vēṅgi (7th to the 11th centuries). Thereafter, Udayagiri constituted the core of the power of the Telugu Pallavas of Nellore (A.D. 1050-1300) whose sway reached parts of Chingelput and Cuddapah districts. The Pallava capitals were Cōḍāpuram, Kāñcīpuram, Proddaturu Nellore and Peṇṭrāla. The sway of the earliest king Dōraparāju[25] was confined to Udayagiri area. His successor Yammarāju alias Nandivarmamahārāja was crowned at Cōḍāpuram.[26] His capital was Pōnuganṭi Māḍurēvi. In commemoration of his coronation, he granted twelve villages in Pūṅginādu - the northern most portion of Nellore district and the southernmost portion of Guntur district. His Kingdom extended into the Cuddapah district. Upto the middle of the thirteenth century, Udayagiri was under the Pallava regime. These Pallavas owed allegiance to the Velanāṇḍu Cōḷas, the southern limit of whose sway was Kalahasti.

From the Telugu Pallavas, Udayagiri passes into the hands of the Telugu Cōḷas of Nellore (A.D. 1100-1350) - the political successors or the Velanāṇḍu Cōḷas Among these, Tikka ruled from A.D. 1209 to 1248 and his son-in-law, the crown prince and successor was Allutikka (A.D. 1248-127.). Records[27] at Ayyavāripalli and Nandipāḍu record gifts for the merit of the father-in-law and son-in-law. The Telugu Cōḷas and the Kākatīyas were on friendly terms and the Kāyasthas were ruling as the feudatories of the latter. By the end of the first quarter of the fourteenth century, Udayagiri changes its masters - the Reḍḍis for the Kākatīyas. The entire coastal Āndhra was liberated by Prōlaya Vēma and Western Āndhra by the Velamas and the Rāyas of Vijayanagara. Thus Udayagiri was among the early possessions of the Reḍḍis of Koṇḍavīḍu. In their territorial aggrandisement the Reḍḍis frequently came into conflict with the Rāyas whose power was steadily expanding under Harihara I (A.D. 1336-1358) and his loyal brothers. Two records[28] at Ākumaḷḷa (Kōilkuṇṭla taluk) dated A.D. 1354 register the grant of the villages Viñjanampāḍu and Ceṅgalavāḍa in Vinukoṇḍasīma by Bukka and his minister Cikka Uḍaiyār to Pāpavināśadeva. These show that Udayagiri was lost to the Reḍḍis and became part of the Vijayanagara Empire. In fact Mahāmaṇḍaleśvara Vīraśrīśāvanna Oḍayalu, son of

25. Nell. Insc. III. U. 6.
26. ibid; Ins. Mad. Pres. II. Nell. 732.
27. ibid., III 43, U. 14.
28. Ins. Mad. Pres, II. Kurnool, 56, 58.

Kampana I was ruling Udayagirirājya, as the lord of the Eastern Ocean since A D.1347 from Udayagiri.[29] His inscriptions in the Tamil country range from his 4th to the 16th regnal year i.e., A.D. 1353-1364. In A.D. 1364 he makes gifts at Nellore.[30] His successor at Udyagirirājya was Virūpaṇṇa popularly known as Udyagiri Virūpaṇṇa, formerly governor of Āraga. A record at Guravājīpet (A.D.1377) mentions Harihara II (A.D. 1377-1404) and the chieftain in charge of the Bōya settlements in Udayagiristhala, Bukka I (A.D. 1365-77) and his son Vīrakampaṇa are mentioned in an inscription at Rāvimānidinne[31] (Udayagiri taluk). Vīrakampaṇa conquered the tracts from the Reḍḍis of Koṇḍavīḍu and was probably the successor of Virūpaṇṇa in the viceroyalty of Udayagiri.

Another record[32] at Rāvimānidinne dated A.D. 1386 mentions Devarāya, while Harihara II was the ruler in A.D. 1380. Possibly he succeeded Kampana in Udayagirirājya and ruled there during the last quarter of the fourteenth century. Apparently this was in accordance with the policy of Harihara II of replacing his cousins by his sons as governors of provinces. Rāmacandra succeeded Devarāya in the viceroyalty of Udayagiri and ruled in the name of his father i.e., Devarāya I (A.D. 1406-1422), according to the Paracūru copper plate grant[33] (A.D. 1391). In this instance, Paracūru was gifted by Devarāya during his visit in command of his father's army and its confirmation was by his son Rāmacandra subsequent to the accession of Devarāya to the throne of Vijayanagar. Hence the date is of the original grant and not of its confirmation. Devarāya I soon after his accession lost Udayagiri to the Reḍḍis which was recovered not before A.D. 1413. The crown prince Rāmacandra vanquished Firoz Shah, the Bahmany Sultan of Gulburga. The Bahmany kingdom was a sword by the side of the empire of Vijayanagara.

Udayagirirājya continued under the sway of Rāmacandra and his descendants until it was wrested from them by the Gajapatis. Rāmacandra's rule lasted from A.D. 1406 – the date of Donakoṇḍa epigraph[34] to A.D. 1417 – the date of the Dādireḍḍipalle record.[35] The lineage of Rāmacandra is described in the Tiruvīḍu grant. Rāmacandra by his queen Lakṣmīdevi had the son Parvatarāya whose son by his wife Pārvatī Devi was Devarāya Oḍaya. As Devarāya Oḍaya ruled Udayagirirājya

29. *Vijayanagar Six-centenary commemoration Volume*, p. 171.
30. Nell. Ins. II, Nell, 78; Ins. Mad. Pres. II, Nell. 550.
31. Nell. Ins. III, U. 18b.
32. ibid., U. 18c.
33. Nell. Ins. I. C.P. 1.
34. ibid., I, D. 19.
35. ibid., II, KG. 4.

from A.D. 1435 to 1444, possibly Parvatarāya's regime was from A.D. 1417, the last date for Rāmacandra, to A.D. 1435, the earliest date for Devarāya Oḍaya. No successor of Devarāya Oḍaya at Udayagiri is heard of and his last date A.D. 1446[36] synchronises with the closing years of the Reḍḍi kingdom of Rajahmundry often receiving succour from Vijayanagara against the Gajapatis. A record[37] of Devarāya II (A.D. 1426–46) at Veṅkaṭāpuram is dated A.D. 1427 referring to Bōyavīḍu in Udayagirirājya and his record dated A.D. 1448 at Pēriśeṭṭipalle[38] (Udayagiri taluq) is evidently a sign of continuity of Vijayanagara supremacy over the region.

The Bōyavīṇḍlu in Vijayanagara inscriptions apparently apply to the twelve Bōyakoṭṭams subdued by Pāṇḍuraṅga, the celebrated general of Vijayāditya III.[39] The tract occupied by the Bōya settlements is mentioned as Bōyavihāradēśa in Udayagirirājya (A.D.1409) and may be identified with the Western Taluks of the Nellore district – Kanigiri, to its south Udayagiri, and to its south Ātmakūr and the surrounding tracts. A Bōya king of Udayagiri and the death of his son in battle is mentioned in a record at Udayagiri.[40] The Bōya settlements were under the supremacy of the Viceroys of Udayagirirājya.

By the middle of the fifteenth century, a family of feudatory chieftains became the political successors of the Rāyas in Udayagirirājya. The earliest member of this family was Kaṇṭamarāja Vallabha claiming ancestry to Raghu and his father Mādhavavarma was acclaimed as the builder of the city of Bezwada. He may be placed about A.D. 1450. His son Tammarāya or Tammarāyaniṅgāru constructed two temples at Udayagiri[41] in A.D. 1461 and 1462 respectively. Between A.D. 1474 and 1477 he made gifts to Veṅkaṭēśvara at Tirumala.[42] Some of his titles were Raṇaraṅgabhairava, Mallikāvallabha, Sahakārabāndhavavāsa, and Birudaraganḍa. Thus far, these rulers were loyal to the Rāyas.

Basavarāja, son of Tammarāya ruled Udayagirirājya with capital Udayagiri for nearly half a century. He was the link between the Saṅgama and the Sāḷuva epochs and had a long and prosperous reign. Subsequently, these Pūsapāṭi rulers owed fealty to the Gajapatis and fought

36. ibid., II, Ongole 132.
37. ibid., III, U. 46.
38. ibid., III, U. 17.
39. Addaṅki inscription of Pāṇḍuraṅga, *Epigraphia Indica*, vol. XIX. No. 47.
40. Nell. Ins. III, U. 45.
41. 208 and 209 of 1892; Nell. Ins. III, U. 28, 29.
42. 755 of 1904; T.T.D. I. II, 27, 28.

battles against Sāḷuva Narasiṃha, for the Gajapatis.[43] Candalūri Gaṅgayamantri was the minister of Basavarāja and a scholar to whom were dedicated *Nācikētōpāhyānamu* and *Pañcatantramu* by poets Dagguballi Duggana and Dūbaguṇṭa Nārāyaṇa Kavi respectively.

Udayagirirājya came under the Gajapati rule definitely by the beginning of the sixteenth century. Long before - by A.D. 1455[44] the Koṇḍavīḍurājya of the Rāyas became the viceroyalty - parīkṣa of the Gajapatis under the Mahāpātras. This included Koṇḍapalli, Addaṅki, Vinukoṇḍa, Paḍaivīḍu, Trichinopoly and Candragiri, etc., by A D. 1464.[45] Gāṇadeva and his descendants were ruling here. By A.D. 1462 Udayagiri was conquered by the Gajapatis and that was the prelude to the Oḍḍian galabhai in the south. On the advice of his ministers Sāḷuva Narasiṃha decided to wrest Udayagiri from the enemy and at his behest, his general Tuḷuva Īśvaranāyaka recovered Udayagiri by A.D. 1466.[46] The Gajapatis were not inactive. By A.D. 1484 the Guṇḍlakamma was the southern boundary of Puruṣottama Gajapati's dominions and that position continued till A.D. 1489.[47] Subsequently, Puruṣottama advanced further and laid siege to Udayagiri. Narasiṃha could not raise the siege and in the ensuing battle was taken prisoner. Consequent on the treaty brought about by the diplomacy of Gaṅgayamantri, Narasiṃha purchased his release by the surrender of Udayagiri.[48] Thus Udaygiri was lost to the Rāyas and remained with the Gajapatis till Kṛṣṇandevarāya wrested it in A.D. 1514.

In the first decade of the sixteenth century, Pratāparudra Gajapati and his younger paternal uncle Tirumalarautarāya were ruling at Udayagiri Nuniz says[49] that at the time of the death Sāḷuva Narasiṃha three fortresses Rachol (Raichur), Odegarya(i.e.Udayagiri)and Conodolgi (Koṇḍavīḍu) revolted from his rule. So the capture of Udayagiri was a brilliant victory for Puruṣottama. Now Kṛṣṇarāya 'after preliminary counter against his foes'[50] and reorganisation of his army at the capital was determined on easterern conquest. In A.D. 1513 he sent an army to lay siege to Udayagiri and himself soon joined it. The siege lasted for a year and a half

43. *Prabōdhacandrōdayamu*, I. 16.
44. *Indian Antiquery*, vol. 20, p. 310; Koṇḍavīḍu plates of Gāṇadēva,
45. ibid., vol. 57, p. 238-Munnūr inscription - 51 and 92 of 1919.
46. *Sāḷuvābhyudayamu* - Sources of Vijayanagar history, p. 94; *Jaiminī Bhāratamu*, I. 45.
47. The Pōtavaram grant - E. I. XIII. pp 156-157.
48. *Sarasvatīvilāsamu* cited on p. 87, *fn.*, 68, *Gajapatis of Orissa* by R. Subramanyam; *Prabhōdha candrōdayamu*, II.1.
49. Sewell: *A Forgotten Empire*, p. 308.
50. K.A. Nilakantha Sastri; *A History of South India* (1958) 2nd edition, p. 209.

and Kṛṣṇarāya had cut many new paths up the hills to enable his soldiers to reach the walls of the impregnable fortress. Kṛṣṇarāya's record[51] on the Udayagiri hill (A D.1514–15) gives a graphic description of his capture of the citadel. It says that he encamped on the Udayagiri hill, pursued Pratāparudra Gajapati upto Koṇḍavīḍu, laid siege to Udayagiri and captured his uncle Tirumala Kāntarāya and granted lands in Nellūrusīma to Vallabharāya. A Kanerese version of the record, and anthor record reiterate the significant triumph proudly eulogised in his epigraphs[52] at Śrīśailam, Tirumala, Hampi, Kāñcīpuram, Kāḷahasti and Siṃhācalam and literature of the period. Obviously Kāntarāya or Rāghavarāya are mistakes for Rautarāya. Thus once again Udayagirirājya came with in the limits of Vijayanagara sway.

The viceroyalty of Udayagirirājya was entrusted to Rāyasam Koṇḍamarusayya, his kāryakarta, by emperor Kṛṣṇarāya. Koṇḍamarusayya was the son of Timmarusayya and several of his records ranging from A.D. 1514 to 1529 from Ātmakūr, Kandukūr, Kanigiri, Podile and Rāpūru sīmas in Udayagirirājya record his activities for the religious merit of Kṛṣṇarāya. Nuniz attests his substantial help in army and finance to Kṛṇṣarāya in the Battle of Raichur. By A.D 1532 Koṇḍamarusayya was superceded by Rāyasam Ayyapparusa at Udayagiri and himself took charge of Koṇḍavīḍurājya. In A.D. 1527 Ayyapparusa made a grant of Jillelamūḍi[53] to Narasiṃha of Siṅgarāyakoṇḍa for the merit of Kṛṣṇarāya. Probably he was the viceroy at Udayagiri till A.D. 1535, the earliest date for Bhūtanātha Rāmabhaṭlu. Rāmabhaṭlu was the viceroy of Udayagiri-durgam with Veṅkaṭādri, his deputy who donated Cēṅgallu in A.D. 1536 to the deity on Siṅgarāyakoṇḍa for the merit of Acyutarāya and Rāmabhaṭlu.[54] By A.D. 1546, Rāmabhaṭlu was the minister of Acyutarāya and his father was Bhūtanātha Brahmajōśyulu. Veṅkaṭādri figures in a record at Nallagoṇḍa (Udayagiri taluk) and his father was Rāmajōśyulu. In A.D. 1526 Ramarāju Tirumalarāju was the ruler of Udayagiri[55] and his local agent was Timmarāju Nandeyya, son of Mahāmaṇḍaleśvara Śrīrājacina-Tirumalarāju Mahārāju.

By A.D.1542 Aḷiya Rāmayadeva Mahārāja and Rāmarāju Timmayadeva Mahārāju were in joint command of Udayagirirājya in the reign of Sadāśiva[56]. Apparently this measure was calculated to strengthen the viceroyalty. For, earlier, a record[57] of A.D. 1541 refers to a fight on the

51. Nell. Ins. III, U. 90.
52. Local Records, vol. XVI, p. 428; SII. IV. 282, 283, 284, etc.
53. Nell. Ins. II, KR. 77; 209 of 1894.
54. ibid., KR 78; 210 of 1894.
55. ibid , Nell. 34–A.
56. ibid., III. U. 30; *Epigraphica Indica*, vol. 16, p. 214.
57. ibid., III. U. 35 note.

durgam – probably against the Gajapati feudatories or between the partisans of Rāmarāja and Salakarāju Pinatirumalayyadeva Mahārāju brother-in-law af Acyuta. In A.D. 1534 Pinatirumala's doorkeeper made a grant at Udayagiri.[58] After Acyuta's death in A.D. 1542, he made Veṅkaṭa I, his nephew ruler at Vijayanagara and himself became the regent. Probably, formerly he was in charge of Udayagirirājya and subsquently when he went to Vijayanagara, it was occupied by Rāmarāja's partisans.

In A.D. 1552 Mummadevacōḷa Mahārāja was ruling in a part of Udayagirirājya, during the viceroyalty of Tirumalayyadeva, under the suzerainty of Sadāśivarāya. The local governor was Baicarājayya.[59] Thus Tirumala was viceroy of Udayagirirājya from circa A.D. 1543 to 1553 for a decade.

Udayagiri was the capital of the Āravīḍu dynasty for a short period subsequent to Penugoṇḍa and prior to Candragiri. Records of Śrīraṅga I (A.D. 1572–1585) and his younger brother Veṅkaṭa II (A.D. 1585–1614) and Śrīraṅga II (A.D. 1614–29) are at Udayagiri. Śrīraṅga I was the viceroy of Udayagiri when he was appointed to the viceroyalty at Penugoṇḍa.[60] When Ali Adil Shah of Bijapur invaded Penugoṇḍa thrice between the years A D. 1573 and 1577, Śrīraṅga I saved it with the help of Kutubshah of Gōlkoṇḍa. Subsequently Kutubshah broke off alliance with Śrīraṅga and in A.D. 1578 conquered Kambam, Udayagiri, Bellaṃkoṇḍa and Koṇḍavīḍu.[61] Thus the Telugu country was lost to Vijayanagar. At that stage in A.D. 1589 Veṅkaṭa II took the offensive against the Muslims, defeated the forces of Sultan Kuli of the Kutubshahis at the Pennar, marched on Udayagiri and Koṇḍavīḍu and captured them. Once again the Telugu country came under him. Kuli Kutubshah was forced to conclude a treaty fixing the river Kṛṣṇa as the boundary between the two kingdoms.[62] Udayagiri was under Kovlānanda owing fealty to Veṅkaṭādri II[63]. Thus for a short time Udayagiri was the capital of the Empire of Vijayanagara.

In the latter half of the sixteenth century the chieftains of Kōnēṭi family held eminent positions in Udayagirirājya. Kōnēṭi Timmana (A.D. 1553), son of mahāmaṇḍalēśvara Rāmarāju Kōnēṭayya was of

58. ibid., III. U. 42.
59. ibid., II. Nell. 104.
60. Daḷavāy Agrahāram pl. of Veṅkaṭa I. E. I. XII. p. 186; XI, p. 328; XV, pp. 297, 328.
61. S.K. Aiyangar: *Sources of Vijayanagar History*, p. 240.
62. JAHRS. vol. 18, p. 190.
63. *Anonymous Chronicles-Briggs-Ferishta*, vol. III, p. 454.

Āraviḍu lineage headed by Pedakoṇḍayarāju. Tirumala I, the grandson of Rāma I was the governor of Udayagiri fort in A.D. 1543 and subsequently governed Koṇḍaviḍurājya. Raṅga II, son of Tirumala I bore the royal titles[64] about A.D. 1576. Records mention Tirumala II. A record at Koṇḍavīḍu (A.D. 1582) mentions the capture of Udayagiri fort and Veṅkaṭarāju there by a regiment of Hazarat Ibrahim Padushah. By A.D. 1598 Śrīraṅga I was at Udayagiri and conquered Koṇḍavīḍu, and Vinukoṇḍa.

In the seventeenth century, till 1643 Udayagirirājya was under Vijayanagar rule. In A.D. 1643 according to a record at Udayagiri[65]. Ghazi Ali, an officer of Kutbshah captured the fort of Udayagiri. A record[66] of A.D. 1603 says that while Veṅkaṭa II was ruling, Sattirāju Muddayadeva Mahārāja bestowed the Udayagirirājyam on Muddayadeva Mahārāja. This was obviously after the conquest of the Telugu country from the Kutubshah by Venkaṭa II. Subsequent to A.D. 1643 records of the Kutubshahis are found in Udayagirirājya. A record[67] of A.D. 1658 at Vazzāvāripālem refers to Hazarat Alam Ennasa ie Sultan Abdulla Kutubshah (A.D. 1626-1672), for the Sultans of Gōlkoṇḍa did assume Mughal titles and not to Aurangazeb. The Persian records[68] (A.D. 1662) at Udayagiri mention Sultan Abdulla Padushah or Kutubshah Abdullah, the king of kings of the Dekkan. Soon after, the rule of Vijayanagara was restored in the region. For, the Telugu country refused to pay tribute to the officers of Gōlkoṇḍa, waiting for the restoration of Vijayanagara sway. Then followed the conquest of the region by Veṅkaṭa III. Probably at this juncture the capital of Vijayanagara Empire was shifted from Udayagiri to Chandragiri, more safe and secure from the Muslim invaders. A record[69] of A.D 1663 at Vazzāvāripālem mentions a grant in this region by Mahāmaṇḍaḷēśvara Jaggarājayadēva Mahārāja, while Veṅkaṭapati III was ruling at Penugoṇḍa.

Rāvūri Basava Reḍḍi and his son Rāghava Reḍḍi, Velugoṭi Raṅgarāyaniṅgāru and his son Timmānāyaniṅgāru were the local rulers[70] in Rāpūr, Kanigiri, Polacerla-Musuṇḍūru, and Veṅkaṭagiri sīmas in Udayagirirājya and owed loyalty to tfie Rāyas of Vijayanagara. The

64. Inscription cited on p. 128 of *Koṇḍavīṭisāmrājyamu* by M.G. Sarma.
65. Nell. Ins. III. U. 39; Ins. Mad. Pres. II, Nell. 790.
66. Nell. Ins, I.A. 53.
67. ibid., III. V.23; Ins. Mad. Pres. II Nell. 822.
68. Nell Ins. III. U.26, U.27.
69. ibid., III. V.24.
70. ibid., II Kanigiri 5, 33; Kavali 49, 50.

Reḍḍis of Rāvūri family trace their ancestry to the Reḍḍis of Koṇḍavīḍu[71] and the Velugōṭi chieftains were the lineal descendants of the Velamas of Dēvarakoṇḍa and Rācakoṇḍa who shifted subsequently to Velugōḍu, which thus developed into their family name.

Tradition[72] has it that Muvvani Nāyanagāru at Udayagiri was defeated by Mīrjumla, apparently the chief minister of the Kutub Shahis and subsequently of the Mogul Emperors. The Kutubshah appointed Jūpalle Veṅkaṭarāju to be the Palegār of Udayagiri. In course of time, he refused payment of tribute and consequently he was attacked by the Nawab of Arcot and was vanquished and slain in the battle. Subsequently the Nawab of Arcot conferred the jagir of Udayagiri on Mustapha Ali Khan. Since then the region of Udayagiri was under the Muslim Jāgirdārs, the descendants of Mustapha Ali Khan. The last Jāgirdār of the time was deported to Chingleput in 1839 for treason by the East India company.[73] Thereafter the government of the Udayagiri region passed to the East India Company.

Literature and arts made remarkable progress under the patronage of the rulers of Udayagiri. In the latter part of the fourteenth century, Vennelakaṇṭi Siddhayamantri's officer and master Vallabha Cāmanāmātya[74] an officer of Devarāya, patronised Jakkana who dedicated his *Vikramārkacaritra* to him. In the fifteenth century, under the patronage of Koṇḍamarāju Vallabhayya and his son Tammarāju, Nārāyaṇakavi rendered *Pañcatantramu* into Telugu *campū-kāvya*. Duggana dedicated *Nācikētōpākhyāna* to Anantāmātya Gaṅgaya, a minister in service of these rulers. Nandi Mallayya and Ghaṇṭa Siṅgayya rendered into Telugu *Prabhanda* Kṛṣṇamiśra's drama *Prabōdhacandrōdayamu* in dedication to Gaṅgayamantri.

As for architecture, the temple of Gopālakṛṣṇa at Udayagiri was built by Tammarāja in A.D. 1460 and was endowed with a thousand *kuṇṭas* of land.[75] About this temple the Nellore District Gazatteer says,[76] 'it is an old construction belonging to the *Pallava* type with *stūpa* at the top of sanctum sanctorum; the frame work of the *stūpa* is still intact, the *prākāram* enclosed by high walls, with entrance gate are of

71. Vennalakaṇṭi Sūrana: *Viṣṇupurāṇamu*, Preface.
72. Sewell: *Antiquities* I, p 140.
73. Sir W. Hunter: *The Imperial Gazatteer of India*, Provincial Series (Madras), vol. I, p. 308.
74 Nell. Ins III. Kanigiri 40.
75. ibid., III. U. 29.
76. p. 373.

Coḷa type and indicate the existence of another temple, on which is the site of an unfinished *Kalyāṇamaṇṭapa* a peculiar type of Vijayanagar architecture. The eastern gate of this temple was begun by Kṛṣṇarāya and the image was removed to *Raṅganāyakulu* Temple at Nellore on the decline of Vijayanagar Empire. The *Raṅganāyaka* temple at Udayagiri was also of Cōḷa type with high walled compound with big corridors.' Timmarāya built a temple of Kāśīviśveśvara on the hill and endowed 2000 *kuṇṭas* for worship.[77] The *Vallabharāya* temple on the hill named Yadavarāyan Emperumān[78] after the donor, a governor under Kṛṣṇarāya. At the wish of his *guru*, Vyāsarāya Kṛṣṇarāya seized the statue of Bālakṛṣṇa from a temple at Udayagiri, mentioned as *Bāladurgam*,[79] carried it to Vijayanagar, built the *Kṛṣṇasvāmi* temple and concescrated in it and endowed it with several gifts.[80] There are several other temples at Udayagiri about which much is not known.

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77. Nell. Ins. III. U. 28.
78. *Nell. District Gazatteer*, p. 374.
79. *Jaiminī Bhāratamu* - Sources, p. 90.
80. SII. IV. 254, 255.

7

APARNA CHATTOPADHYAY

A NOTE ON MALE ORNAMENTS IN THE KATHĀSARITSĀGARA

The *Kathāsaritsāgara* (KSS) throws light on the practice of males of wearing gold and jewelled ornaments in the early medieval period. It is corroborated by contemporary evidence provided by the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* (RT), works of Kṣemendra and other sources as well as by the observation of foreign travellers like Al Bīrūnī.

In KSS we find frequent references to males as wearing ornaments. Putraka being surrounded with assassins, offered them his valuable jewelled ornaments to spare his life.[1] The bandits surrounded king Vikramāditya seeing that he wore ornaments.[2] The prince's minister went to visit a lady[3] wearing jewels. Prince Naravāhanadatta gave his dependent, garments and ornaments in addition to villages, horses and elephants.[4] In the story of Yaśodhara and Lakṣmīdhara we find that there arose from the surface of the lake a man adorned with heavenly ornaments.[5] Śrīdarśana exchanged his ornaments with Anaṅgamañjarī, whose father noticed her in male ornaments.[6] This indicates that the ornaments had different shapes and forms. The woodcutter Śubhadatta saw in a forest four *yakṣas* with heavenly ornaments and dresses.[7] A lady honoured the messengers of king Vikramāditya with ornaments.[8] We

1. KSS. IV. 42.
2. ibid. CXXIII.
3. ibid. IV. 52,
4. ibid. LIII. 78.
5. ibid. LXIII. 18.
6. ibid. LXXIII. 349, 363.
7. ibid. LVII. 27.
8. ibid. CXX.

find the wealthy merchant Bhogavarman[9] and the Vidyādhara Citrāṅgada[10] wearing ornaments. Kesaṭa a bridegroom was adorned with ornaments.[11]

The practice as noted above is in conformity with ancient Indian tradition. The Vedic Āryans[12] used to wear ornaments and the tradition continued in subsequent periods. Megasthenes refers to the love of Indians for finery and ornaments[13]. In the *Vinaya* texts, we are told that at first even monks used to wear ear-rings, eardrops, strings of beads for the neck, girdles of beads, bangles, necklaces, bracelets and rings. The only ornaments exclusively worn by women of this period are the girdle and anklet[14]. In the *Suśrutasaṃhitā*, we find the practice with males of regularly wearing ornaments. We are told that after the daily bath, ornaments are to be worn[15]. Hsüan Tsang says that among Indians the kings and great ministers wear ornaments. He mentions gem-decked caps (which most probably were jewelled diadems) bracelets and necklaces worn by men[16]. Male ornaments have been mentioned in the *Kādambarī*[17]. The practice of Indian males in the eleventh century to wear ornaments, was noticed by foreigners, such as Al Bīrūnī[18], Chau Ju-Kua, and Marco Polo[19]. In the early medieval period men in Rajasthan[20] wore ornaments and RT notices the same practice among the aristocrats[21].

In KSS we find references to diadems[22], necklance[23] and bracelets[24] worn by men of rank and tiara[25] in some instances. These are the usual male ornaments in KSS. We find necklace and bracelets[26] mentioned together which seem to be generally worn. In RT too we find bracelets

9. ibid. LIV. 168.
10. ibid. XXII. 135.
11. ibid. CXXIII. 176.
12. *The Vedtc Age*, p. 394.
13. Mc Crindle, *India as described by Megesthenes and Arrian*, p. 69.
14. *The Age of Imperial Unity*, p. 574.
15. *Suśruta* II, Ch.XXIV. 29-32.
16. S. Beal, *Chinese Accounts af the Western World*, vol. II, p. 134.
17. *Kādambarī*, English Trans. By C.M. Ridding, p. 7.
18. Sachau, vol. I, p. 181.
19. *Struggle for Empire*, pp. 486-487.
20. D. Sharma, *Early Chauhan Dynasties*, p. 263.
21, RT. VII. 881.
22. KSS. XXIV. 9; L; LIV; XLV; LV. 133.
23. ibid. XXXVI. 111; XXXIII. 211; XXVI. 234; LV; LIV.
24. ibid. XXXVI. 111; XXXIII. 211; XXVI. 234; LVII. 9-11.
25. ibid. XXIV. 219; XLV. 152.
26. ibid. XXXVI; XXXIII; XXVI.

and necklaces mentioned together[27]. In the *Kādambari* we find Śūdraka in sapphire bracelets and pearls, while his feudatories are in bracelets necklaces and diadems and have strings of pearls adorning their bosom[28]. It is worthnoting that necklaces, bracelets and diadems, usually worn by men in KSS, are mentioned by Hsüan Tsang, as the ornaments usually worn by men of rank. He also refers to the practice with Indians of piercing their ears which suggests the practice of wearing ear-rings[29]. Though necklace, bracelets and diadems are the male ornaments usually mentioned; we find male ear-rings also referred to in KSS[30]. In RT we find the practice of wearing ear-rings with the kings[31]. The ear-rings of Cakravarman are described as illuminated by the rays proceeding from his sword[32]. King Harṣa of Kasmir wore ear-rings which flashed like the reflected image of the sun[33]. Finger-rings are mentioned in KSS in connection with separation and reunion of lovers. Mūladeva while leaving his wife stealthily puts his ring on the finger of his sleeping wife[34]. It is a ring that reunites Vidūṣaka of his wife Bhadrā[35]. In RT we find rings worn by king Tārāpīḍa[36]. Rings are mentioned in connection with court intrigue and political murder in RT[37]. Al Bīrūnī refers to the practice with Indians to wear ear-rings, arm-rings and golden seal-rings on the ring-finger[38]. The males wore ornaments in medieval Gujarat[39]. In the medieval Rajasthan men used to wear *kirīṭa* set with gems, pearl-necklace, *kuṇḍala* with pearls and pairs of *keyūra* and *aṅgada*[40]. It is further corroborated by Abu Zaid[41]. Kṣemendra refers to male ornaments, *kuṇḍala*, *keyūra*, *hāra*, *aṅgada* and jewelled coronet[42]. In the *Mānasollāsa* we find the royal *purohita* wearing

27. RT. IV. 69.
28. C.M. Ridding, op. cit. pp. 7-12.
29. S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. II, p. 134.
30. KSS. XX. 303-204.
31. RT. V. 341-347; VII. 749; IV. 720; VII. 812.
    In the *Bṛhatkathāmañjarī* (III, *Guccha* I, 195) we find a king wearing glittering ear-rings.
32. ibid. V. 341-347.
33. ibid. VII. 876.
34. ibid. CXXIV. 164: स्वाङ्गुलीयमर्हं चास्याः सुप्ताया अङ्गुलौ न्यधाम् ।
35. ibid. XVIII. 361-369.
36. RT. IV. 440.
37. ibid. VII. 782-786.
38. Sachau. vol. I. ch. XVI, p. 181.
39. A.K. Majumdar, *Chalukyas of Gujarat*, p. 358.
40. *Pṛthvīrājavijaya*, II. 17-30.
41. Elliot and Dowson, vol. I, p. 11.
42. *Daśāvatāracaritam*: Buddhāvatāra, 33, 62, 68.

jewelled ear-rings and provincial governors and feudatory princes in gold ornaments[43]. The male ornaments in medieval Gujarat were bracelets, armlets, ear-rings and necklace of three strings[44].

If we go back to the earlier days, we find *karṇaśobhana* mentioned in the *Ṛgveda*, as an ornament for the ear apparently for the use of men[45], while *niṣka* and *maṇi* were meant for the adornment of the neck[46]. *Niṣka* of silver to be worn round the neck, is mentioned in the *Pañcaviṃśa-brāhmaṇa*.[47] The Rigvedic breastplate *rukma* is, however, not to be found in KSS[48] nor girdle worn by males in the Gupta period as depicted on Gupta coins.[49] In view of the references and data given above we can draw the conclusion that bracelet, diadem and necklace are the usual ornaments worn by men in the early medieval India as found in KSS.

We find garlands[50] worn by men in KSS. It is a practice as old as the Vedic age.[51] Besides garlands we find in KSS a general reference to man's decoration with flowers.[52] In RT we find kings wearing wreaths of flowers.[53] In Kālidāsa[54] we have many references to the practice of wearing flowers by men. Hsüan Tsang also mentions the practice.[55] It is corroborated by the *Kādambarī* where we find king Śūdraka and his fudatories wearing flowers in ears and flower garlands.[56] The practice can be traced from the very early days. Garlands were often worn by men desiring to appear to advantage.[57] A hymn in the *Ṛgveda* refers to Aśvins as lotus-wreathed.[58] The practice of putting on garlands after bath is also found in the Vedic literature.[59]

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43. *Mānasollāsa*, III. 1585–1589.
44. A.K. Majumdar, op. cit. p. 357.
45. RV. VIII. 78. 3.
46. *niṣka*: RV. II. 33. 10; VIII. 47. 15.
    maṇi: RV. I. 33. 8 *maṇi-grīva*: RV. I. 122. 14.
47. *The Vedic Age*, p. 459.
48. RV. I. 166. 10; IV. 10. 5; V. 53. 4; VIII. 20. 11; II. 34. 2, 8; V. 55. 1; 57. 5.
49. R.N. Saletore, *Life in Gupta Age*, p. 402.
50. KSS. XXII. 138.
51. *The Vedic Age*, pp. 394–521.
52. KSS. LXXVII. 66; XL. 2.
53. RT. III. 529.
54. *Ṛtusaṃhāra*, I. 1, 2, 4, 5, 21; II. 21.
55. S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. II, p. 134.
56. C.M. Ridding, op. cit. pp.7–12.
57. RV. IV. 38. 6; V. 53. 4.
58. RV. X. 184. 3.
59. *The Vedic Age*, p. 521.

Unguents

The practice of anointing oneself after bath with sandal-wood ointment, is found in KSS. The practice of putting it on the back is also made clear in a story.[60] Besides sandal-wood ointment, we have some references to unguents without any specific mention of the material used, being applied to the limbs by men.[61] The Buddhist literature refers to the habit of men using unguents.[62] In Kālidāsa sandal-wood ointment is prescribed for summer, sandal-wood and Kālāguru for the rainy season, saffron or paste of *priyaṅgu* to be applied to the bosom in autumn.[63] Hsüan Tsang refers to the practice with Indian males of using the sandal-wood as perfume after bath.[64] In the *Kādambarī* we find that the chest of the king was whitened with sandal unguent besprinkled with saffron ointment and his feudatories had sandal powder and saffron applied to their limbs.[65] In the early medieval period the *Abhidhānaratnamālā* refers to saffron, sandal, musk, camphor and aloes and the practice of applying these unguents to the limbs.[66] The *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* gives a complete list of unguents used in different seasons, which includes sandal, agallochum, saffron, musk, bee's wax, and fragrant oil.[67] Kṣemendra refers to the practice of using sandal-wood ointment in summer.[68]

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60. KSS. XXXVII. 5, 6, 15, 16.
61. ibid. LVII. 74; XCIV. 113, LXXVII. 66; XL. 2.
62. Louis Renou, *The Civilization in Ancient India*, p. 165.
63. *Ṛtusaṃhāra*, I. 1, 2, 4, 5, 21; II. 21; VI; 13.
64. S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. II, p. 135.
65. C.M. Ridding, op.cit., pp. 7-12.
66. *Abhidhānaratnamālā*, II. 386, 388-9.
67. *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, XIII, p. 70.
68. ग्रीष्मे हारतुषारचन्दनचयश्चीनांशुकं चन्द्रिका । *Daśāvatāracaritram:* Buddhāvatāra, 69.

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N. SUBBU REDDIAR

HIGHLIGHTS OF TAMIL CULTURAL INFLUENCE ABROAD IN THE CLASSICAL PERIOD*

The scope of this paper is restricted to the early classical period[1]. It is true that the interaction between the Tamils and the peoples in the other parts of the world has been a continuous process from the earliest historical times, but the impact of Tamil culture was profound and in certain aspects permanent only in the earlier stages of the interaction. To a certain extent, the Tamil cultural operation in the earlier stages was in virgin field over a large area. It was a way of life that carried with it spectacular novelty and appeared incredibly far in advance of the semi-primitive developments in many parts of the world. Naturally the Tamil culture had very little of opposition from a rival culture equal to itself. It was accepted, as a blessing and a boon. The Tamil culture as it was accepted by the new peoples outside left a permanent imprint on the native cultures which it subordinated and overwhelmed so that the vissicitudes of time could not wipe out the Tamil element in the cultures which underwent radical changes.[2] The Tamil culture also filled in a cultural vacuum in some of the areas which it affected.

In the post imperial Pāṇṭiyan period the Tamils had very little of their indigenous culture to share with the world. That culture itself had changed beyond all recognition and whatever influence the Tamils exerted over peoples out side India cannot be considered purely Tamil. For instance, after the British established their political influence and

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1. Saṅkam and Pre-Saṅkam period.
2. Evidences are found in the excavations and relics in Sumatra, Java, Malaya and Indo-China.

supremacy in India, a large number of the Tamils were shipped to far off countries like the West Indies, the Fiji Islands, etc., where their descendents are still to be found either with pure Tamil names or at least with a clear memory of their Tamil origin. They are Tamil, no doubt, but only in the geographical sense of their having migrated from the Tamil country. They were more correctly, organisd, possibly anglicized Tamils having very little to share with the classical Tamils, and much less with the unorganised pure Dravidians. Hence our restriction of the scope.

The earliest Tamil works extant reveal themselves as products of a mind far above parochialism and geographical narrowness of any kind.[3] The themes were local; the setting was of the immediate environment. But the authors freely traversed the entire known world mentally for securing flesh and blood to clothe their intellectual products. Whether they could be credited with any historical conciousness or not as we understand it at present, they did not fail to refer to the entire universe of their experience, both direct and vicarious. The geographical knowledge, particularly that bearing on the location of places both local and foreign, which can be gleaned from the literature of the past is nothing if not stupendous. We understand from them that right from the dawn of the literary period the Tamils had the knowledg of and contact with the entire world as it was then understood, possibly excluding the America and the Arctic and the Antartic regions. Some of the countries whose names are easily identifiable in the earliest literature are China, the Malaya, Archipelago, Ceylon and the countries of Central and Westren Asia and

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3. The *Tirukkural*, for instance is a work for the entire humanity. It presents the norms and the value system developed in the Tamil country for the benefit of mankind. The following passages conveying the broad outlook of the Tamils are worth considering:

1. Yātānum Naṭāmāl uramāl urāmāl ennoruvan, Cāntunaiyum kallāta vāṟu
—Kural 317.
2. Paṇṭuṭaiyār pattuṇṭu ulakam ahtinrēl, Manpukku māyvatu man
—Kural 996.
3. Nīrin ramiyā yākkaik kellām, Uṇṭi kotuttōr uyirkotut tōrē
—Puṟam 18.
4. Nilampuṭi peyarva tayinum oruvan, seiti koṅkōrk cuiti yillena, Arampā tinre
—Puṟam 34.
5. Īyena irattal ilintan ṟatanetir, Īyēn enral ataninum iḷnitanṟu, Kollenak koṭuttal uyarntanṟu atanetir, Kollēn enṟal ataninum uyartanṟu
—Puṟam 204.
6. Nallatu ceital āṟṟīr āyinum, Allatu ceital ōmpumin.
—Puṟam.
7. Vinaiyē āṭavark kuyirē
—Kuṟuntokai 135.

Europe.[4] Some specific names like China, Iḷam or Ceylon are found in their true form. But many others are grouped by general names like *Yavanas*[5], or Anniyar or *Maruvūrār*[6] for whom the city of Kaviri-p-pūm-paṭṭinam contained a separate colony with the name Maruvūr-p-pakkam or the foreigners' enclave distinct from Paṭṭina-p-pakkam or the area of the local citizens. It may be noted that contacts with foreign countries on an all India scale had begun many centuries before the Christian era as is evident from both literature and epigraphs. The edicts of Aśoka[7] leave us in no doubt as to the possibility of the Emperor sending out emissaries of his new *dharma* to quite a number of foreign countries. But it is not safe to assert that it was northern India that gave the lead in the process of establishing foreign contacts. The movement was characteristic of the whole of India and a shrewed guess as to South India having done the pioneering work in this regard may not be wholly, without basis. No doubt sea connection with foreign countries was brisk only after the discovery of the Hippalus.[8] But even long before that Peninsular India appears to have set up commercial contacts with the outside world and detailed reference to this is found elsewhere in this paper. The discovery of the Hippalus was a god-send to the westerners who were eager for closer associations with India as the inflow of foreigners to India was very slow before the discovery. At that period it was the daring sea men of Tamil Nād that went far into the sea in search of markets for their articles of trade. It was from these that the foreign merchants learnt about India and developed a keen interest in coming to India.

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4. The references to China are copious in Sanskrit (e.g.) the *Mahābhārata* (Sabhāparvam — 51-1843). See also Scoff's *Periplus* page 246 in which Chinese contact with Malacca with which India was closely connected is mentioned. The betel leaf is considered an exotic product, bought from Malaya. The trade with China was in silk (called Cīnam) and sugar.

5. Cf., *Perumpānāṟṟup paṭai* line 316; *Mullaip-pāṭṭu* line 61; *Neṭunelvāṭai* - line 101; Puram-56 (line-18).

6. *Cilappatkāram* Indira Viḷavu Eṭutta Kātai-5.

7. See the *The Edicts of Asoka* : (Vide : *Inscription of Asoka* by Bhandarkar and Majumdar - Calcutta).

8. Hippalus is credited with having made the discovery of the monsoon wind blowing regularly across the Indian Ocean in 45 A.A. It was calculated that with the help of these winds a ship leaving Okelis, a port at the mouth of the Red Sea would reach Musiri (Cranganore ?) or any other Tamil port of those days in less than forty days.

The term *Yavana*[9] has been the subject matter of a lot of research literature. The term occurs both in Sanskrit and Tamil works of the pre-Christian era. The most commonly accepted meaning of the term is a native of Greece the closest equivalent being *Ionian*. That Greecs and India had known each other intimately is no new knowledge. Possibly before Alexander's invasion of Northern India, the Greeks had known about southern India and their desire to conquer the land must have been induced by the prosperity and the standard of l ving of the people of the south.

Megasthanes had known the Paṇṭiyan country; According to his statement the daughter of Hercules by name Paṇṭiya ruled over the south of India and gave the country her name. No doubt this is historically absurd because Hercules is a legendary name, but the reference to the Paṇṭiyan is significant.[10]

The Periplus of Erythrean Sea and Ptolemy's *Geography* are more communicative about the Tamil country than the other parts of India.[11] Pliny has also a lot to remark about the draining of Roman gold into the Tamil country in exchange for luxuries bought from the

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9. See page 101 of the History and Culture of the Indian people – Vol : *The Age of Imperial Unity*. The author has this to say about 'Yavana'. It was used as a synonym for 'Mlecha' in later literature. But in the earlier centuries of Christian era it meant the Greeks only. The word was derived from the old Persian form 'Yavana' meaning 'Ionian Greeks'. Of course Yavana in India referred to all the Greeks.

10. See : '*Foreign Notices of South India* by K.A. Neelakantha Sastri.

11. The *Periplus* refers to Damirica or the land of the Tamils. The author of the work refers to Musiri and Toṇṭi (Muziris and Tyudis). Muziris according to the *Periplus* abounded in ships with cargoes from Arabia and Greece. It is surmised that the author of the *Periplus* was an Egyptian Greek. He made a voyage to India possibly about 60 or 65 A.D. He has listed the places he visited and the articles of trade in each place. The first harbour he visited was Broach at the mouth of the Narmada. Among the other places were Kalyan on the Bombay coast and ports on the Malabar coast which in those days was Tamil. He rounded the Cape Comorin and visited the harbours of the East Coast. It is possible to identify many of the ancient names with the parallels of to-day.

    Ptolemy was a geographer from Alexandria (150 A.D). He refers to Khaberis or Kavirip – pūm-paṭṭinam, and Nikama identifiable with Nākapattinam Cunningham says "Cōla is noticed by Ptolemy. His *Orthura regia Sornathi* can be identified with Uraiyur, the capital of Soranatha or Cōḷa Naṭu." (vide : *Ancient Geography*, p. 631) Ptolemy also mentions Arkadu about which there is a lot of discussion.

country.[12] In fact, one of the not insignificant causes for the impoverishment of Rome was the export of the large quantities of gold to the Tamil country for buying commodities that pleased individual fancy and hardly added to the permanent national wealth.

That the Tamils were the pioneers of India's foreign trade in ancient times is never disputed. Even as early as the seventh century B.C. with the emergence of Babylon as the emporium of Asian trade the Tamils set up their own Colony in Babylon which had an uninterrupted reputation for thirteen centuries.[13] The Tamils had plenty of opportunities to interact with the Chinese, Phoenicians, Jews and people from Europe in Babylonia. Even after the destruction of the Babylonian empire by Cyrus the south Indian Association did not grow any the less in Babylonia. Darius the Great took keen interest in the promotion of trade on a global scale and it is even suggested that he reopened and widened the Suez Canal. His direct rule over a part of the North-Western India increased his interests in the Indian trade and the use of silk made in India was first propagated during his reign in the Western countries.

The Greeks and the Romans dominated South among the foreigners in India's international trade after the Persians. In a sense the Tamil country was drawn into closer commercial and cultural relations with Europe through Greece. In the works of Sophocles, Aristophanes and others large number of Tamil names are used for commodities possibly for the reason that there were no Greek equivalants. Examples worth noting are *Oryza* for *ariśi* (rice), *Ziggiberos* for *iñjiver* (ginger), *peperi* for *pippali* (long pepper), etc. During this period ending with the first centuay B.C. the Greeks were in intimate commercial and cultural relations with the Tamil country. The term *Yavana* used in Tamil literature may have reference to the Greeks that were found in the streets of the Tamil cities buying and selling. One cannot be certain if the idea of anthology was the gift of Greece to the Tamil country or the other way about. However, this much has to be conceded that the largest number of anthologies most perfectly organized and systematised are to be found in early Tamil literature. In fact anthologies account for a good proportion of classical Tamil literature and the anthology tradition has persisted to this day. In the field of religious literature which was a distinct characteristic of the Pallava and the later Cōḷa

12. Pliny would estimate the quantity of gold coming into India at fifty million sesterces (half a million sterling pounds) each year to pay for the balance of trade.

13. See P.T. Srinivasa Iyengar's *The History of the Tamils*, pp. 96—102.

periods, the anthology idea was helpful in the codification of the writings of different religious leaders into *Divva Prabandham* and *Thirumuṟai.*

Another important aspect of the give and take between Greece and the Tamil Country has to be identified among the cities dominating the administration both in the Tamil country and the Greece. Kavirippūm-paṭṭinam was possibly a city state as was also Uṟaiyur. It is safe not to imagine wide territorial jurisdiction for any early kingdom of the Tamil country beyond a short distance of the capital. We do not know if the Cōḷa kingdom set up in Kavirip-pūm-paṭṭinam had jurisdiction over a vast area. It may be true that over the vast area going by the traditional name of Cōḷa country there was no other rival kingdom as powerful as the one in Kavirip-pūm-paṭṭinam or Pukār. But that there were hundreds of petty principalities each of the size of a village cannot be easily disputed. There were in fact, a large number village states under the shadow of a big kingdom which itself was nothing bigger than the city state.

Next to the Greeks the Romans evinced keen interest in commercial and cultural contacts with the Tamil country. Out of the eighty places in which Roman coins have been discovered in India dated between the first century B.C. and the fourth century A.D. at least thirty-five are to be found in south India, and out of this number more than half in the Tamil country.[14] Coins of emperors like Augustus and Claudius have been discovered in many places in Tamil Nāḍ. These leave no doubt as to the close contact between Rome and the Tamil country, not only commercial but also cultural. The Romans were fond of display and many of the animals that were employed during great events on the circus had been taken from India. Sometimes the guess is hazarded that south Indian trainers went with the animals to train them.

South Indians were great hunters and Indian hounds were employed in foreign countries in hunting. The Greeks, the Romans and the Persians were literally fond of the Tamil hound whose strength and ferocity has been sung in *Puṟanānū-ṟu Perumpāṇāṟṟuppaṭai* and other

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14. In South India alone we have 612 Roman gold coins and 1200 silver coins. The following account in respect of the trade with the Tamil country is furnished by Sewell (*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*), 1904, p. 591): Under the early Roman emperors there was a great demand for pepper, spices fine muslins, perfumes, pearls and precious stones. The preservation of a large number of coins in Madurai might point to a colony of Romans in Madurai.

works.[15] The 'Kata Nāiy' of the Tamil country was the chief factor in the hunting expeditions of the Persians and the Greeks.

Even the insects of the Tamil country had their use in Greece and Rome. The Cobra and Python were really articles of export. One wonders for what purpose these poisonous reptiles were required in foreign lands. Strabo claims to have seen in Egypt an Indian serpent nine feet long. It is significant that at that time the Tamil country was in active commercial relations with Egypt.

Perhaps the most significant single commodity of the Tamil country that affected the way of life of the people in Greece and Rome was the pearl of the gulf of Mannar. There is the funny story of Aesopus who took a costly Indian pearl from the ear of Metella and swallowed it because he wanted to have the satisfaction of eating the costliest thing and the pearl was worth eight thousand pounds. Cleopatra never failed to dissolve costly pearls in her wine.

One significant result of the trade during the centuries preceding the Christian era was the spread of a large number of ideas leading to remarkable changes in the way of life of people in foreign lands. We are awere of many Tamil colonies being set up in most of the countries with which Tamil Nāḍ had commercial intercourse. Even women appear to have followed their men to far off lands. We are informed that in the entourage of Ptolemy philadelphus there were a large number of Indian women. We have already alluded to the South Indian Colony in Babylon. Perhaps somewhat more interesting than all these details is the information that in Armenia with which the Tamil country had active trade contracts some of the religious cults of Tamil Nāḍ were established. We have it on very high authority that the Kṛṣṇa and Baladeva cults spread into Armenia.

There is ground for the belief that these two Indian cults went from the Tamil country rather than from northern India though Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma were north Indian gods. Only in the Tamil country were developed as Kṛṣṇa and Baladeva as separate cults while in the north they eonstituted two aspects of the same cult.[16] Kṛṣṇa was the 'Mayōn' of the Mullai (pastoral) region and Baladeva was the 'Vellaiyon' or of

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15. *Puṟanānūṟu* – 71.
Perumpānāṟṟupaṭai - line 126.
Aka anūṟu – 109 (line 11).

16. For a discussion of this see: P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar's *The History of the Tamils*, pp. 202–205.

white god with the plough, of the Marutam region where agriculture possibly originated. The black and white gods of the Tamil country though borrowed from north Indian hagiology were shaped as two distinct cults only in the Tamil country and their migration to Armenia was from the Tamil country and no where else. So famous were the cults in their foreign habitat that St. Gregory was afraid that they might damage the cause of Christianity. In the fourth century A.D. there was actually some kind of a minor crusade led by the Christians against the Pagans. In the fight the priests were killed, the temples were destroyed and the colonists were converted to Christianity.[17]

Many of the literary conventions of the Tamils apper to have affected those in distant lands. The *Cittira Eḷuttu* of the Tamils had become a memory in the Tamil country long before they were the style and vogue in the middle East and China. The art of ship-building which the Tamils developed must have been far in advance of its counterpart elsewhere considering the fact that Tamil foreign trade was active even in the pre-Hippalus epoch. The animism of the Tamils must certainly have had its impact on the cults and beliefs of foreigners who interacted with the Tamils. The Tamils were the earliest to develop notions of regional geography which must have found their way to the then civilized corners of the world. Foreigners' dietic habits too must have been influenced considerably by the popularity of rice as staple food meterial in far off countries. Sartorial graces and refinements went from out of the Tamil country to Greece and Rome and while many of the old time formals have survived in their shadow from at least in the Tamil country, they have been substituted by the sophisticated later styles elsewhere. But a study of dependable paintings and sculptures depicting old Roman or Greek life would leave us in no doubt as to the indebtedness of the foreigners in respect of the wearing of apparel. This point need not be laboured further because cotton and silk originated in India and the Tamils had the reputation of making the best use of the materials.

In conclusion, it may be stated that the contribution of the Tamils to the concept of cultural internationalism was considerable and the foundations well and truly laid by them led to more extensive contacts during the Pallava, and later Cōḷa periods. The theme of how the Tamil country had been the intermediary of north Indian culture also deserves comprehensive investigation.

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17. Vide: *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1904 – pp. 309–314.

9

M.S. NARAYANA MURTI

PHILOSOPHY OF NUMBER

'All the various forms of human culture and human society, even the most rudimentary types, seem to require some concept of *number* and some process for counting. According to anthropologists, every people has some terminology for the first numbers, although in the most primitive tribes this may not extend beyond two or three.'[1] Very early in the cultural development it became necessary to carry on the most extensive counting to determine the number of cattle, friends and foes, days and nights, etc. As such the number-words (numerals) of higher powers are to be found and to handle larger figures the counting process has to be systematised. When we look back into our past, we find by the time of the *Yajurveda*[2] the system of counting has been developed to such an extent that the highest number-word *parārdha* has the denomination of 10^{12}, when the Greeks had no terminology for the denominations above the *myriad* 10^4 and the Romans above *mille* 10^3.[3]

The reason or nature of number has been a problem confronting many a philosopher of both the east and west. Plato (5c. B.C.) in his *Theaetetus* records that Socrates poses some puzzles concerning number: 'when you (Theaetetus) compare six dice with four we say that the six are more than the four or half as many again; while if you compare them with twelve, the six are fewer— only half as many—

1. Oystein.Ore: *Number and its History*, p. 1.

2. VS. XVII. 2; TS. IV. 4.11.4 & VII. 2. 20. 1; MS. II. 8. 14; KS. XVII. 10. & XXXIX. 6.

3. Bibhushana Datta: *History of Hindu Mathematics*, p. 9.

and one cannot say any thing else'[4]. Among the early Greek Philosophers, Pythagoras (6c. B.C.) says **things are numbers** and it is understood, as Aristotle (4c. B.C.) interprets, in the cosmological sense by his followers.[5] The world according to them was made of numbers in the same sense as others had said it was made of 'four roots' or 'innumerable seeds'. And thus the numbers are not only the formal but also the material cause of things. According to Philolaos, things have number, and the number makes them knowable while the real essence is something unknowable.[6] But the Pythagorenas describe that the numbers are not mere predicates of something else, but had an independent reality of their own. Plato while agreeing with Pythagoreans in giving numbers an independent reality of their own, differs from them in holding that this reality is distinguishable from that of sensible things.[7] Plato reduces 'number' itself to unity and duality as to its fundamental elements. And his argument is that nothing can proceed from one alone, there must be some nature, subordinate to unity, whence multiplicity might proceed and this nature be called duality.[8] He also asserts that in number the formal element is one and the material element is two – all numbers being made up of one and two.[9]

St. Augustine (A. D. 4c.) of medieval times holds that the nature of number is perceived by no sense of the body, but is perceived by whomsoever in understanding, it is one and immutable.[10] Even though in India no one has asserted as Pythagoras or Plato, the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣikas say that magnitude *(parimāṇa)* of triod *(tryaṇuka)* is produced out of number.[11] The Naiyāyikas also advocate

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4. Cornford F.M. (Tr. with Com.): *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 41. "The puzzle adout the dice is this: When we compare six dice with four, we say that six are *more*. At another moment, when we compare them with twelve, we say they are *less*. Yet the six dice have not increased or diminished, in number. Commonsense, we are told, holds that nothing can be at one moment what it was not at another, without becoming; that a thing cannot become greater or less so long as it remains the same in amount; so long as nothing is added or subtracted. How then, can the dice, which have remained the same in amount, have become less". (ibid. p.43).
5. John Burnet: *Early Greek Philosophy*, p.285.
6. ibid.
7. ibid., p.287.
8. Aristotle: *De Anima* and the commentary of St. Thomas, I.ii.49 (p.72).
9. ibid., I.iii.92 (p.99).
10. Richard Mc Keon (Ed.): *Selections from Medieval Philosophers*, p.34.
11. Umesh Misra: *Concept of Matter*, p.117.

that number being a quality resides in substances through inherence and is a reality, while the Idealists (the *Yogācāra* school of Buddhism), maintain that number as non-existent and the notion of number as an imaginary convention. The Advaita-vedāntin would say that 'number', to whichsoever category it may belong, is only a fiction or fabrication and such knowlege is an illusion like 'shell-silver cognition'. Here an attempt is made to critically examine the views held by the schools of Indian Philosophy on the nature of number.

Number, dimension, gravity, velocity, etc., are common to all substances and do not pertain to any particular substance as colour, taste, smell, touch and sound.[12] All these qualities constitute really a state, aspect or arrangement of a thing or its parts and not any attribute inherent in the thing itself.[13] The number is pre-eminently a subjective property and varies according to the will of the person, for one can contemplate a number of things each as separetely, or all as so many or all as one collection.[14] Though it is a fact that we comprehend numbers, we cannot assert positively whether they have a real existence in the external objects or are merely ideas of our own mind superimposed on the objects. Here it should not be forgetten that number is not a standard of any measurement but is only a specifier or differentiator of the members of the same species or of the units in a set of arrangement.[15]

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12. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas classify these common qualities (*sāmānyaguṇas)* into ten (*Muktāvalī*. 91). Aristotle speaks of them only as five, namely, moment, rest, number, shape and dimension. vide: *De Anima*, II.vi.386.

13. Athalye Y.V. (Ed. with notes): *Tarkasaṅgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa, p.160.

14. For example, from the grammarians point of view, we may quote the words *āpaḥ* and *udakam* and the *sūtra* of Pāṇini जात्याख्यायामेकस्मिन् बहुवचनमन्यतरस्याम् I.ii.58, which sanctions the plural number optionally to the generic words (*jātivācakas*). Thus we have *brāhmaṇāḥ pūjyāḥ* and *brāhmaṇaḥ pūjyaḥ*. Similarly *āpaḥ* is in plural when the multitude of water particles are considered as different and *udaka* is in singular when the water particles are considered as a single collection. C.f., अप्च्छब्दोऽवयवात्मकं तमेवार्थं बहुत्वावच्छिन्नमाह। उदकशब्दस्तु समूहरूपमेकमित्यादिशब्दधर्मोऽनुगन्तव्यः (*Prakīrṇaprakāśa* of Helārāja on *Vākyapadīya*, III. *Vṛtti*, 197).

15. C f., ऊर्ध्वमानं किलोन्मानं परिमाणं तु सर्वतः ।
आयामस्तु प्रमाणं स्यात् सङ्ख्या बाह्या तु सर्वतः ।
भेदमात्रं ब्रवीत्येषा नैषा मानं कुतश्चन ॥ *Mahābhāṣya - Vārttika*. V.i.19.

At the outset we may note that all the schools of Indian Philosophy are unanimous in accepting 'one' (1) as an axiom and explaining other numbers as the products of 'ones'. Logically it appears to be reasonable to take 'one' as the basic number; for—in every thing there is existence and there is unity. Therefore, if there is a pot in a place, there are necessarily existence and unity. Again if one says 'pot', we know that existence and unity are included in it. 'All numbers, from duality upwards are artificial, i.e , they are made by our minds; unity alone exists in things themselves—each being one; and they only become two, etc., by our choosing to regard them so, and thus joining them in thought'[16]. Bhartṛhari specifically remarks :

द्वित्वादियोनिरेकत्वं भेदास्तत्पूर्वका यत: ।
विना तेन न सङ्ख्यानामन्यासामस्ति सम्भव: ॥[17]

The Vaiśeṣikas had undoubtedly realised the true nature of number and they called duality, etc., as *apekṣābuddhijanya*. Praśastapāda defines *saṃkhyā* as *ekādivyavahārahetuḥ*[18]. The term *vyavahāra* is used in the text in the sense of expression in words or putting into words (*śabdaprayoga*). Udayana suggests two meanings to *vyavahāra*: knowledge and usage. (i) When *vyavahāra* is taken in the sense of knowledge (*vijñāna*), *saṃkhyā* is that which is responsible for the knowledge in the form of one, two, etc.[19] (ii) When it is taken in the sense of instrument of usage, *saṃkhyā* is the cause, precisely the proximate instrumental cause of the use of terms one, two, etc.[20]

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16. Cowell E.B. (Tr.): *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*, p.151.

C.f., Augustinians also have considered that any number whatsoever is given its value according to the number of times it contains one. vide: *Selections from Medeival Philosophers*, p,36.

17. Bhartṛhari: *Vākyapadīya* (VP.),III. *Saṃkhyā*, 15.

18. Prasastapāda: *Prasastapādabhāṣya* with *Vivaraṇam* (PPBh.), p.48. Kāśī Sanskrit Series No.3.

19. व्यवह्रियतेऽनेनेति हानोपादानादि क्रियत इति व्यवहारो विज्ञानम् ।
एकं द्वे त्रीणीत्याद्याकारं तस्य विषयतया हेतु: सङ्ख्येति प्रमाणमुक्तम् ।
Udayana: *Kiraṇāvalī* (KV.) p.192. Banaras Sanskrit Series, 1919.

20. व्यवह्रियतेऽनेनेति व्यवहार इत्यभिधानमुच्यते तेनैकादिशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं सङ्ख्येत्युक्तं भवति । ibid., p. 193.

Then finding the definition defective he modifies it as: *gaṇitavyavahāra-hetur guṇaḥ*,[21] 'that which is responsible for counting is number'. Thus all numbers that can be counted and comprehended by the human intellect are covered by this definition.

Bhūṣaṇakāra opines that unity is nothing but non-difference (of the thing) and duality is difference (of things).[22] As the unity is identified with non-difference and the numbers duality and the above are merged with difference, Bhūṣaṇakāra does not admit number as a separate quality on the ground that non-difference and difference are also possible in qualities.[23] If number is accepted as a quality it goes against the *Nyāya* convention that no quality is admitted in another quality (*guṇe guṇānaṅgīkārāt*). Aparārkadeva follows suit. But this view is refuted by Udayana that non-difference of thing (*svarūpābheda*) will be the thing itself. For example, non-difference of a pot is nothing other than that pot. If the unity of the pot is the pot itself, in the case of cloth it will have to be assumed as the cloth itself. This would mean that unity is variable and inconsistent. Similarly when 'one' is ordained to be brought none should get a doubt whether a pot or a cloth should be brought. On the other hand if duality is nothing but difference of things (*svarūpabheda*) then it will have to be accepted as existing in more than two things which goes against the *Vaiśeṣika* convention.[24]

Saṃkhyā cannot be an universal *(sāmānya)* because if it is an universal inherent in the substance, it cannot be different from the substance, and if it is *sāmānya* inherent in the substance, quality and action it cannot be other than *sattā*. So it is a *guṇa*.[25] Further one cannot say 'this is one', unless the thing referred to has the attribute denoted by the word 'one'. By the method of elimination the attribute *ekatva* can be shown as a distinct quality.

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21. ibid. p.194

22. स्वरूपाभेद एकत्वं स्वरूपभेदस्तु नानात्व द्वित्वमिति भूषणः प्रत्याख्यातः। KV. p. 192. *Bhūṣaṇa* is said to be an extinct commentary on the *Nyāyasāra* of Bhāsarvajña. The views of Bhūṣaṇakāra are elucidated and supported by Aparākadeva in his *Nyāyamuktāvalī*, a commentary on *Nyāyasāra*. vide: *Nyāyasāra*, intro. pp 7 & 17. and text pp. 143–147. Madras Govt. Oriental Series No. CLVII.

23. तथा च वचनव्यक्तिराचार्यस्य' अभेदभेदौ च स्वात्मपरात्मापेक्षौ च रूपादिष्वपि भवतः। न तयोर्गुणत्वादिकल्पना' इति। *Nyāyasāra*, p. 144.

24. KV. p.193.

25. Śaṅkaramiśra: *Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra*, IV.i.11.

It may be asked: Number, being a quality, how would the Naiyāyikas account for the propositions like twenty-four qualities, five actions, etc., since according to them only substances can have qualities. Kaṇāda says that the cognition of number in qualities, etc., is erroneous.[26] The statements like *eko rasaḥ*, etc., are to be interpreted by assuming implication of the words *(bhāktam)*.[27] It can be objected as to why the statement 'one pot' also be not explained in a secondary sense and the cognition be an illusion. The answer is that it cannot be so because an implication presupposes an absurdity in the primary denotation and an illusion a valid cognition, for the Naiyāyikas are *anyathākhyātivādin*s.[28] Śivāditya is of opinion that the predication of number to qualities is due to the co-existence of number with qualities in the same abode.[29] Some revolutionary Naiyāyikas like Bhāsarvajña, Aparārkadeva,[30] Raghunātha Śiromaṇi,[31] probably taking lead from the Prābhākaras, to get over the difficulty of explaining number in qualities, etc., either by implication or by collocation *(sāmānādhikaraṇya)* postulate it as a separate category.

Number, being a quality, should reside in a substance through the relation of inherence.[32] This means that duality *(dvitva)* should be accepted as residing in each of the two things separately. The question now is how to get the notion of 'one is not two' for duality resides in *one thing* also as mentioned above. To answer this question the Naiyāyikas assume a relation called *paryāpti-sambandha* through which numbers beginning from duality exist in two or more things together.[33]

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26. भ्रान्त तत् । *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, VII.ii.5.

27. प्रयोगस्तु भाक्तः स्वरुपाभेद एव च भक्तिः । *Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra*, VII.ii.5.

28. ibid., VII.ii.6.

29. गुणादिषु सङ्ख्याव्यवहारः सङ्ख्याप्रत्यासत्तिनिबन्धनः ।
अत एव सङ्ख्याप्रत्यासत्तिनिबन्धनत्वन् । *Saptapadārthi*, p.134 (Adyar).

30. *Nyāyasāra* with *Nyāyamuktāvalī*, pp. 142–145.

31. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi: *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, p.75. Pandit ed. 1914.

32. पृथक्त्वासमवेतसर्वान्योन्याभावसमानाधिकरणैकद्रव्यसमवेतवती सङ्ख्या ।
Udayana: *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, p.10. Braj. B. Das & Co, Benares, 1897.

33. यद्यपि द्वित्वादिसम्बन्धः प्रत्येकं घटादावपि वर्तते तथापि एको द्वाविति प्रत्ययाभावात् एको न द्वाविति प्रत्ययसद्भावाच्च द्वित्वादीनां पर्याप्तिलक्षणः कश्चित् सम्बन्धो अनेकाश्रयोऽभ्युपेयते ॥ Viśvanātha: *Muktāvalī*, 108.

So while unity is completely contained in single container *(pratyeka-paryāpti)*, duality, etc., are partially contained *(vyāsajyavṛtti)* in each of the containers and completely only in group of two and so on.[34]

The Vaiśeṣikas are of the opinion that duality, etc., are produced in the substance by *apekṣābuddhi* which is of the nature of co-ordinate group cognition.[35] *Apekṣābuddhi* is a conceptual necessity involved in the process of counting which takes the form 'this is one, this is one and so on'[36]. The Vaiśeṣikas say *apekṣābuddhi* is the instrumental cause *(nimitta-kāraṇa)*, the substrata of unity (substances) are the inherent cause *(samavāyi-kāraṇa)*, and the knowledge of the universal unity *(ekatva-sāmānya-jñāna)* is the non-inherent cause *(asamavāyi-kāraṇa)*.[37] The Naiyāyikas are of opinion that duality etc., are real like unity and *apekṣābuddhi* does not produce the duality but only manifests it *(jñāpyate* or *vyajyate)*.[38] The reason why duality is regarded as *apekṣābuddhi-janya* and not *jñāpya* by the Vaiśeṣkas is subtle. Ś r ī d h a r a says if duality were not *buddhija*, every one must invariably have the cognition of duality like the colour, etc., but when it is *buddhija*, the numbers above duality are comprehended only by him who has this enumerative cognition.[39] U d a y a n a also says that *apekṣābuddhi* cannot simply be a *jñāpaka-hetu* of *dvitva* like the stroke which reveals a sound lying dormant in the Air, but it is the *janaka-hetu* of *dvitva*. because it is always found inseparably associated with *dvitva*, while a *jñāpaka-hetu* need not be so.[40]

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34. Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastri: *Primer of Indian Logic*, p.120.

35. एकत्वत्वसामान्यविशिष्टैकत्वगुणसमूहालम्बनरुपा एका बुद्धिरिति भावः इयमेवापेक्षाबुद्धिः । PPBh. *Vivaraṇam*, p. 49.

36. अनेकैकत्वबुद्धिर्या सापेक्षाबुद्धिरिष्यते । *Muktāvalī*. 109.

37. Śrīdhara: *Nyāyakandalī*, p.116. Vizayanagaram Sanskrit Series No. 6.

38. Misra: op.cit. p.47,
KV. p.196 &
Śaṅkaramiśra: *Kaṇādarahasya*, pp. 68 & 69. Chaukhamba ed.

39. यदि हि द्वित्वमबुद्धिजं स्याद् रूपादिवत्पुरुषान्तरेणापि प्रतीयेत नियमहेतोरभावात्, बुद्धिजे तु यस्य बुद्ध्या यज्जन्यते तेनैवोपलभ्यत इति नियमोपपत्तिः । Śrīdhara: op. cit. p.116.

40. KV. p.200.

The process of production of duality by *apekṣābuddhi* and the qualified cognition of 'two objects' is explained thus in PPBh:[41] When the sense of sight or touch comes into contact with the homogeneous objects like pots or heterogeneous objects like pot and cloth where in duality is to be produced, the cognition of the universal of unity *(ekatvattva)* is produced, then from the cognitions of the unity the *apekṣābuddhi* is produced; this *apekṣābuddhi* produces the quality *dvitva* and destroys the cognition of the universal of unity *(ekatva-sāmānya-jñāna)* simultaneously; this *dvitvaguṇa* produces the indeterminate perception of duality *(dvitvasāmānya-jñāna)* ; this cognition produces the determinate perception of duality and destroys the *apekṣābuddhi* simultaneously; this *dvitvaguṇa* produces the cognition of the objects as 'two objects' and destroys the *dvitvasāmānya-jñāna;* the destruction of *apekṣābuddhi (apekṣābuddhi-nāśa)* destroys *dvitvaguṇa* simultaneously with the production of the qualified cognition of 'two objects' *(dvitva-viśiṣṭa-dravya-jñāna)* ;[42] and this in its turn produces the impression *(saṃskāra)* and destroys the *dravya-jñāna.* Finally *saṃskāra* destroys the *dravya-jñāna* The time taken from the sense contact to the production of the impression is described as eight moments.[43]

The most important point to be noted here is that even though a cognition lasts for only two moments, *apekṣābuddhi* lasts for three moments and comes to an end only at the fourth moment. The reason is – if the longer lease were not given, the *apekṣābuddhi* should die in the third moment from the moment of its orgin along with the rise of the indeterminate perception of duality.[44] In the next moment *dvitva* must be destroyed, when actually the *dvitvaguṇa* is cognised which would be absurd. In order to avoid this undesired result, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* hypothesis allows to it a life of three moments. It comes to an end at the fourth moment i.e., at the time of the determinate perception of duality. Then *dvitvaguṇa* ends only at the time of the qualified cognition of the 'two objects'.

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41. PPBh. pp 48–50.

42. According to the *Vaiśeṣika* dictum *kāraṇanāśāt kāryanāśaḥ* the destruction of *apekṣābuddhi,* the instrumental cause of the production of *dvitvaguṇa,* becomes the cause of the destruction of the *dvitvaguṇa.*

43. इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षमारभ्य संस्कारपर्य्यन्तमष्टौ क्षणाः । *Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra,* VII.ii.8.

44. यद्यपि ज्ञानानां द्विक्षणमात्रस्थायित्वं योग्यविभुविशेषगुणानां स्वोत्तरवृत्तिगुणनाश्यत्वात् तथाप्यपेक्षाबुद्धेस्त्रिक्षणावस्थायित्वं कल्प्यते । अन्यथा निर्विकल्पककालेऽपेक्षाबुद्धेर्नाशात् द्वित्वस्यैव नाशः स्यात् न तु द्वित्वप्रत्यक्षं तदानीं विषयाभावात् । *Muktāvalī,* 108.

The Mīmāṃsakas of the *Bhāṭṭa* school agree in main with the Vaiśeṣikas about the nature and function of number.[45] But as the Bhāṭṭas postulated a relation called *tādātmya*, instead of *samavāya*, the substance and the attribute are not totally distinct from each other but distinct while being the same *(bhedābheda)*. So "it is not right, Kumārila says, to postulate absolute difference wherever the notion of two arises, or absolute unity wherever the notion of one does. Things may be distinct in so far as they are experienced thus: 'this is one, and this is another'; but they may also, at the same time, be one in so far as they are experienced as 'this is *not other (ananya)* than that".[46]

The Prābhākaras differ with the Bhāṭṭas and Vaiśeṣikas and recognise number as a separate category.[47] While the Bhāṭṭas and

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45. सङ्ख्यापुनरेकत्वादिव्यवहारहेतुः सर्वद्रव्यवर्तित्वात् सामान्यगुणः । सा पुनरेकादि-परार्धान्ता । *Mānameyodaya*, p.240. Adyar.

46. M. Hiriyanna: *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, p. 131.

47. द्रव्यं गुणस्तथा कर्म सामान्य शक्तिरेव च ।
साहश्यं समवायश्च सङ्ख्या चेत्यष्टधा स्थितम् ॥

Srinivasacharya, L.: *Mānameyaślakavārttika*, p.62.

C.f., Śālikanātha's *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p.268, and Jayapuri Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa's commentary *Nyāyasiddhi* on it, p. 78, 154 & 156. (Banaras Hindu University Darsana Series No. 4).

Following the view of Bhūṣaṇakāra, Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa holds that number comprehends the difference in its substratum and duality and the above alone are numbers. (पृथक्त्वनिवेशिनी सङ्ख्या अत एवेकत्वस्य न सङ्ख्यात्वम् p156). His rejecting unity as a number would not appear to be reasonable because either the concept of duality or the notion of addition and subtraction is impossible without the unity as a number.

Ganganatha Jha remarks that the inclusion of number as a separate category, as mentioned in *Sarvasiddhāntarahasya*, is wrong on the strength of the passage in *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (on p,155): गुणास्तु — रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः सङ्ख्या-परिमाणपृथक्त्वानि संयोगविभागौ परत्वापरत्वे बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाप्रयत्नाश्च प्रत्यक्ष-ग्राह्याः । (vide: *Pūrvamīmāṃsā In Its Sources*, p.65. B.H.U. 1942). If we examine the context, we find that Śālikanātha includes number in the enumeration of qualities while classifying the *padārthas* that are cognised by perception into substance, universal and quality. (इन्द्रियसंयोगोत्था प्रतीतिः द्रव्य-जातिगुणेषु सा etc. p,154). Here the context is only to demonstrate the

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas accept the number only in *dravya*, the Prābhākaras admit it in all *padārthas*. The Vaiśeṣikas as we have seen above, explain the association of number in qualities by implication and the cognition an illusion. But, for the Prābhākaras either the question of implication or illusory cognition does not arise because the number is expressed by the primary denotation itself, as the association of number is admitted in qualities as in substances and illusion is not admitted in this school as they are *akhyātivādins*. So it is said :

न द्रव्यं गुणवृत्तित्वात् गुणकर्मबहिष्कृता ।
सामान्यादिषु सत्त्वेन सिद्धा भावान्तरं हि सा ॥[48]

The Mīmāṃsakas say that the number in particular is manifested only in the presence of some indicator.[49]

The grammarians accept, in general, the views held on number by both the *saṃsarga-vādins* like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas on one hand and the *avyatiriktadharma-vādins* like the *Sāṃkhyās* on the other; while the former say that the quality 'number' is different from its substratum and resides in it through inherence, the latter postulate that the number

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padārthas that can be comprehended by perception and not categorically classify all the *padārthas*. If the latter were to be the aim of the author, action, inherence, ultimate individuality, similarity and potency also aught to have been mentioned. Jayapuri Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa commenting on the above passage remarks : Number is included under qualities due its similarity of nature namely, dependence upon some other substratum for its manifestation. He also warns that we should not conclude it as a quality on the strength of the above passage (on p.154) as the author himself (on p.268) declares that *Saṃkhyā* is a separate category while concluding *sādṛśya* as a separate category in the *Upamānapariccheda*. [vide : गुणग्रहणेन सङ्ख्यासादृश्यादिरपि ग्रहणम्, परतन्त्रसाम्यात् । यथा — 'चतुर्विधमङ्गजातं जातिगुणद्रव्यभावार्थात्मकम्' इत्यत्र । अत एवेहापि प्रत्यक्षगुणगणनायां सङ्ख्यापि गणिता — सङ्ख्या परिमाणपृथक्त्वमिति । ननु किं गुणभूतैव सङ्ख्या, मैवम् । शक्तिवत्सङ्ख्यावच्च पदार्थान्तरमेवेत्युक्तत्वात् (p. 154.) । Dasagupta, following Dr. Jha, has also mentioned number as a quality in the *Prābhākara* school. (vide : *A History of Indian Philosophy*. Vol. I. p.378).

48. Mādhavasarasvati : *Sarvasiddhāntakaumudī*, p. 91. Tirvandrum Sanskrit series No. CXXXV.

49. सङ्ख्यया तु व्यञ्जिकाभावादव्यक्ता प्रातरादिवत् । यत्र तु व्यञ्जकं किंचित्तत्र सङ्ख्या प्रकाशते । *Nyāyakośa*, p. 904.

and its substratum are not different.[50] As the primary purpose of the grammarian is to examine the correctness of word and its meaning, he does not care for the external reality of the world and its objects.[51] So *padārtha*, according to him, means only the meaning of the word and that alone is eternal and real. The referent of word need not be the same as the external object. So B h a r t ṛ h a r i says:

शब्दादर्थाः प्रतायन्ते स भेदानां विधायकः।
अनुमान विवक्षायाः शब्दादन्यन्न विद्यते ॥[52]

Hence the grammarians care very little whether the number is different from its substratum or the same. Depending upon the function of specifying the difference, the cause of it is termed as number.[53] So H e l ā r ā j a defines number as *bhedāpoddhāralakṣaṇā saṃkhyā ekādikā parārtha-paryavasānā*[54]. B h r t ṛ h a r i says that the referent of the word when it is a substance *(satvabhūto arthaḥ)* is comprehended only as associated with number and the difference of unity and plurality is caused by number.[55] As such the meaning of the subordinate word *(upasarjana-padārtha)* in *vṛtti* is also associated with number, if its referent is a substance. As the meaning of the subordinate member merges with the meaning of the principle member *(pradhānārtha)* by shedding away its independence of being associated with number and gender, the grammarians are forced to postulate a particular kind of number called *abhedaikatvasaṃkhyā*; which is of the nature of either an assemblage or an aggregate of all the

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50. *Prakīrṇaprakāśa*, V.P. III. *Saṃkhyā*, 1.

51. अस्माकं तु शब्दप्रमाणकानां पदार्थविचारानादरात् यथायथ पदार्थकल्पनातीर्थिकैः कृता। तामाश्रित्य लक्षणाङ्गाः पदार्था व्यवस्थाप्याः। ibid., 2.

52. V.P. III. *Vṛtti*, 197.

53. स धर्मो व्यतिरिक्तो वा तेषामात्मैव वा तथा।
भेदहेतुत्वमाश्रित्य सङ्ख्येति व्यपदिश्यते ॥ V.P. III. *Saṃkhya*, 2.

54. *Prakīrṇaprakāśa*, V.P. III. *Saṃkhyā*, 1.

55. सङ्ख्यावान् सत्वभूतोऽर्थः सर्व एवाभिधीयते।
भेदाभेदविभागो हि लोके सङ्ख्यानिबन्धनः ॥ V.P. III. *Saṃkhyā*, 1.

numbers.[56] When there is an indicator the particular number is, however, manifested even in *vṛtti*, as in *śaurpika* and *māsajāta*, etc.[57]

The grammarians also assume the unity as the cause of duality, etc., and accept the numbers beginning from duality and the above as *apekṣābuddhijanya*. B h a r t ṛ h a r i while accepting the stand of the Vaiśeṣikas suggests another view regarding the production of duality, etc.[58] This is without the intermediary *apekṣābuddhi* duality is originated directly by the knowledge of the unity inherent in the objects where in duality is to be known.[59] Even though B h a r t ṛ h a r i alludes to both the views of the *saṃsarga-vādins* and *avyatirikta-vādins*, it is clear from his *kārikas* and the commentary of H e l ā r ā j a that he is in favour of the former.

The grammarians also explain the association of number in qualities by secondary usage like the Vaiśeṣikas.[60] B h a r t ṛ h a r i says that because of the varied capacities of words, the attributes of the substances such as number, action, etc., are superimposed on the qualities,

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56. अभेदैकत्वसङ्ख्या वा तत्रान्यैवोपजायते ।
संसर्गरूपं सङ्ख्यानामविभक्तं तदुच्यते ॥
भेदानां वा परित्यागात् सङ्ख्यात्मा स तथाविधः ।
व्यापाराज्जातिभागस्य भेदापोहेन वर्तते ॥ V.P. III. *Vṛtti*, 99 & 101.

57. उपाधिभूता या सङ्ख्या प्रकृतौ समवस्थिता ।
आदेशैः संज्ञया वापि विभक्त्या व्यज्यते विना ॥ ibid, 124.

58. एकत्वे बुद्धिसहिते निमित्ते द्वित्वजन्मनि ।
एकत्वाभ्यां समुत्पन्नमेवं वा तत् प्रतीयते ॥ *VP*. III. *Saṃkhyā*, 16.

59. अन्ये त्वेकत्वबुद्ध्योर्द्वित्वपरिच्छेद एवान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां व्यापारावधारणादेकत्वे बुद्धिनिरपेक्षे एव द्वित्वं जनयतः । तथा जातमेकत्वबुद्धिपूर्वकं गृह्यत इति मन्यन्ते । *Prakīrṇaprakāśa*, V.P. *Saṃkhyā*, 16.

60. गौणमुख्यभेदेन व्यवहारोपपत्तेस्तावन्मात्रस्य चेहोपयोगात् तीर्थिकपरिकल्पित-प्रक्रियानादरेण भेदगणनमात्रलक्षणा सङ्ख्या सर्वत्राविशेषेण वर्ण्यते । ibid, 3.

like colour, taste, etc., assuming them as independent by way of analysis *(apoddhāra)*.[61]

Even though the absolutic and idealistic schools of Philosophy deny the external reality of the world, they are obliged to accept the conventional truth of it. The Advaitin says that the number is only a superimposition *(adhyasta)* on the substance, just as silver on the shell[62] and when the non-dual and non-differentiated consciousness is realised, both the number and its substratum disappear. The Śūnyavādin believes that all things are of non-essential and indefinable character and void at bottom, and number being a conventional truth is only for keeping things in remembrance.[63] The Vijñānavādin holds that all *dharmas* (qualities) are but imaginary constructions of ignorant mind and there is nothing other than momentary cognition. Śāntarakṣita holds that number does not appear in cognition as any thing distinct from the names of 'elephant' etc.[64] He also points out that the notion of number either in cognitions as in 'one cognition', 'two cognitions' or in things like 'one pot', etc., is based upon the imaginary convention.[65]

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61. अस्वतन्त्रे स्वतन्त्रत्व परधर्मो यथा गुणे ।
अभेद्ये भेदभवोऽपि द्रव्यधर्मस्तथा गुणे ॥
स्वबुद्ध्या तमपोद्धृत्य लोकोप्यागममाश्रितः ।
स्वधर्मादन्यधर्मेण व्याचष्टे प्रतिपत्तये ॥ V.P. III. *Saṁkhyā*, 5, 6.

62. Citsukha: *Tattvapradīpikā* with the commentary *Nayanaprasādinī* of Pratyak-svarūpa, p. 480.
Pub: Udāsīna Samskṛta Vidyālaya, Kaśī, 1956.

63. सङ्ख्यापरिमाणं स्मृतिधारणार्थं एकं, दश, सहस्रं, नियुतमित्युच्यते ।
Guiseppa Tucci (Tr): *Pre-Dinnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese sources, Tarka-śāstram*, p, 28, Geakwad Oriental Series No. XLIX.

64. अतद्रूपपरावृत्तगजादिव्यतिरेकिणी ।
न सङ्ख्या भासते ज्ञाने दृश्येष्टा नैव नास्ति तत् ॥
Tattvasaṅgraha, 638, Geakwad XXX

65 इच्छारचितसङ्केतमनस्कारान्वयं त्विदम् ।
घटेष्वेकादिविज्ञानं ज्ञानादाविव वर्तते ॥
अद्रव्यत्वान्न सङ्ख्यास्ति तेषु काचिद्भेदिनी ।
तज्ज्ञानं नैव युक्तं तु भ्रान्तमस्खलितत्वतः ॥ ibid., 639-40.

Even the realists (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas) have to accept that the pure substance undelimited by any adjunct is beyond the comprehension of *bheda* and *abheda* and they are comprehended as different or one only when they are coloured with qualities. Thus B h r t ṛ h a r i states :

अतो द्रव्याश्रितां सङ्ख्यामाहुः संसर्गवादिनः ।
भेदाभेदव्यतीतेषु भेदाभेदविधायिनीम् ॥[66]

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66. V. P. III. *Saṃkhyā*- 12.

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VILLIVALAM NARAYANACHARYA.

प्रतिबिम्बतत्त्वबिम्बः

लम्बालकबिम्बाधरकान्ताश्लिष्टं प्रणम्य नरसिंहम् ।
प्रतिबिम्बतत्त्वविषये बिम्बीभूतां कृतिं विधास्येऽहम् ॥ १

चम्पकविपिने लक्ष्मीभवने विदुषां पुरस्तु यो जातः ।
वादो विभिन्नवर्त्मा तं नेतुं निर्णयं ह्ययं यत्नः ॥ २

वादिविप्रतिपत्तेर्बिम्बातिरिक्तं प्रतिबिम्बं नाम किं किंचिदस्ति तत्त्व नेति विचार्यते। तदर्थं श्रीभाष्यकृतामाशयः अनयोः कं पक्षमुपोद्बलयतीति च विचिन्त्यते। भाषितं हि तैर्यथार्थरव्यातिसमर्थनावसरे – 'दर्पणादिषु निजमुखप्रतीतिरपि यथार्था। दर्पणादिप्रतिहतगतयो हि नायनरश्मयः दर्पणादिग्रहणपूर्वक निजमुखादि गृह्णन्ति। तत्राप्यतिशैघ्र्यादन्तराळाग्रहणात् तथा प्रतीतिः' इति ॥

अत्रेदं प्रथमतोऽवधानमर्हति – उदाहृतश्रीसूक्तेनोपक्रान्तस्य विचारस्य साक्षादुत्तरं श्रयते। यतः दर्पणे यो 'मम मुख पश्यामि' इत्यध्यवस्यति, तस्यायमध्यवसायः 'किं यथार्थः उतायथार्थः' इति प्रश्नमुपक्षिप्य तत्र याथार्थ्यपक्षरक्षणमात्राय सा प्रावर्तत। तस्मादत्र भाष्यकारस्योपात्तं वचनं प्रकृतविचारे किं परम्परयापि वा क्वचित्पक्षे पतति अथ माध्यस्थ्यमेवावलम्बते? क्वचित्पक्ष इति चेत् – कस्य पक्षः? माध्यस्थं चेत् – तदान्यतर-पक्षनिर्धारणस्य सर्वथास्मदधीनत्वात्, 'तत्र किं प्रमाणम्' इत्यादि स्वयं विचारणीयं भवतीति ॥

अत्र केचित् – बिम्बातिरिक्त प्रतिबिम्ब नास्ति। तत्र प्रमाणं चोदाहृतश्रीसूक्तिरेव। तत्र हि बिम्बग्रहणातिरिक्तं न किंचित् दर्पणे वस्तुग्रहणं नामेति निर्धार्यत इत्यतिरोहितं सर्वेषाम्। प्रतिहतगतयश्चक्षूरश्मयः दर्पणदेशग्रहणपूर्वकं निजमुखाद्येव तत्र गृह्णन्तीति समर्थनात्। तदिदं बिम्बदर्पणस्थवस्तु ग्रहणयोरन्यतानिषेधनं तद्विषयीभूतवस्तुनोरप्यन्यतानिषेध एव पर्यवस्यति। यथा नैयायिकादिरीत्या तमस्तेजोभावग्रहणयोरन्यत्वनिषेधस्य तमस्तेजोभावयोरन्यतानिषेधे पर्यवसानात्। अन्यथा किमर्थं भगवान् भाष्यकारः एवंविधां प्रतिपादनप्रक्रियां परिश्रमप्रदामाद्रियेत। आतिरिक्तदर्पणगतप्रतिबिम्बरूपवस्तुसद्भावे हि दर्पणे वस्तुग्रहणं तदात्मकमेवास्तु। न मुखरूपं बिम्बग्रहणात्मनोपपादनीयम्। तच्च यथार्थमेव। तत्र सत एव वस्तुनस्तत्स्थतयानुभवात् इत्याद्याशङ्क्येत। एवं च यस्माद्दर्पणे प्रतिबिम्बग्रहणं बिम्बग्रहणात्मकमस्थाप्यत, तस्मादेव अर्थात् ज्ञायते प्रतिबिम्बं बिम्बमेव न ततोऽन्यदित्याहुः॥

अत्र ब्रूमः– उदाहृतभाष्यसूक्ते किं दर्पणे बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बग्रहणसामान्यस्य बिम्बग्रहणात्मकत्वमुक्तम्, अथ तत्र निजमुखरूपबिम्बग्रहणस्य विशेषस्यैवेति विवेचनीयम्। यदि भाष्यकृत् बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बयोरनन्यतामाविवक्षिष्यत्, तर्हि दर्पणे बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बग्रहणसामान्यस्य बिम्बग्रहणात्मतां प्रत्यपादयिष्यत्। न च तथा प्रत्यपीपदत्। अपि तु यत्र दर्पणे पुरःस्थिते कश्चित् स्वमुखं तत्र स्थितं मत्वा' दर्पणे मम मुखं पश्यामि' इति प्रत्येति, तत्रैवान्यथाख्यातित्वशङ्कायां तां वारयितुं इदं श्रीभाष्यवाक्यमवतार, नान्यत्र॥

तत्र न हि स स्वस्कन्धे स्वमुखं पश्यति; न वा दर्पणे स्वमुखाख्यबिम्बसदृशं प्रतिबिम्बं स्थितं पश्यति; येनोभे अपि तादृश्यौ प्रतीती स्वत एव निर्वाहनिरपेक्षे यथार्थतरे स्याताम्॥

अपि तु स दर्पणे 'मम मुखं पश्यामि' इति प्रत्येति। तत्र च अन्यथाख्यातिरीतिरवर्जनीयापतेदेव। तत्रासतस्सत्त्वेन भानात्। ततश्च भगवान् भाष्यकारः 'यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानमिति वेदाविदां मतम्' इत्याज्ञानशुद्धया ऋजुविमलया स्वबुद्ध्या सर्वज्ञानेष्वपि याथार्थ्यं प्रतिजानानः उक्तस्थले दर्पणे स्वमुखप्रतीतिमपि तत्पुरुषीयां यथार्थतया निर्वोढुं जातनिबन्धो भूत्वा तथैव निरवहत्। तथाहि नायनरश्मयो हि तद्रन्ध्रेण बहिः प्रसृता दर्पणदेशं गत्वा तं गृहीत्वा सोसकद्रव्यलेपप्रतिबन्धात् ततः प्रतिहतास्सन्तः प्रतिस्रोतोरूपेण मुखदेशं यात्वा मुखं च गृह्णन्ति। ततश्चोभयोस्तयोः शैघ्र्यातिशय रूपदोषवशेनान्तरालग्रहणात् 'दर्पणे मम मुखं पश्यामि' इति आधाराधेयभावेन भवति तस्य मतिः।

तत्र दर्पणग्रहणं, मुखग्रहणं, तयोरन्तरालग्रहणमित्यस्त्येवांशत्रयम् । तत्र को वांशोऽयथार्थः, तत्र ग्रहणद्वयं यथार्थमेव । तृतीयं चाग्रहणरूपत्वान्न विवादपदम् । तथाच अख्यातिसंवलितयथार्थख्यातिद्वयेन 'दर्पणे मम मुखम्' इति प्रतीत्युद्भव इति नान्यथाख्यातिगन्धोऽपीति ॥

अतश्चात्रैव बिम्बग्रहणातिरिक्तप्रतिबिम्बग्रहणाभावः वक्तव्यः । यत्र तु आदर्शे कस्यचित् 'मम मुखप्रतिबिम्बं पश्यामि' इत्येव परामर्शो भवति, न तु 'मम मुखं पश्यामि' इति; 'दर्पण एतन्मुखप्रतिबिम्बं पश्यामि, नत्वेतन्मुखम्' इति । अन्यस्य वा पार्श्वस्थस्य परामर्शः तत्र तावुभौ प्रत्ययौ स्वत एव यथार्थौ नोक्तरीत्या निर्वाह्यौ भवतः । एवं भूतलादौ आतपेन वृक्षादिप्रतिबिम्बप्रत्ययोऽपि पार्श्वस्थस्य स्वत एव यथार्थो भवति । अत एव चक्षूरश्मिप्रतीपगत्या याथार्थ्यसमर्थनावसरे भाष्ये एतादृशबहुविधप्रतीत्यसंस्पर्शाय दर्पणादिषु निजमुखप्रतीतिरपि यथार्थेति 'दर्पण निजमुख' शब्दानां प्रयोगो व्यधायि । तत्र नायनरश्मिपरावृत्त्या स्वतस्सिद्धयाथार्थ्यस्योपपादनासम्भवादनपेक्षणाच्च ॥

यद्यपि 'दर्पणे निजमुखं पश्यामि' इति प्रतीतावपि मुखं = मुखसदृशं तत्प्रतिबिम्बं पश्यामीत्यबाधितार्थविवक्षया याथार्थ्योपपत्तिर्विना क्लेशं सुकरा, तथाऽपि अयथार्थत्वेन पराभिमतमुखरूपमुख्यार्थविषयकं तादृशप्रतीतेरेव यथार्थतया निर्वाह्यत्वस्य प्रकरणसिद्धत्वात् तथा कृतमिति बोध्यम् । ततश्च एवमादिस्थलेषु प्रतिबिम्बग्रहणस्य बिम्बग्रहणात्मकतायाः उपवर्णयितुमशक्यत्वात् प्रतिबिम्बग्रहणं बिम्बग्रहणात् पृथगेवेति न सर्वत्र तयोरैक्यं सुसाधम् ॥

अत्र चेत्थं निष्कर्षः— क्वचिद्बिम्बग्रहणात्मकत्वे दर्पणस्थवस्तुग्रहणस्यार्थवशात् प्रतिपादितेऽपि न सर्वत्र तथा शास्त्रार्थ इति एतावता प्रदर्शितत्वात् क्वाचित्कोभयग्रहणैक्यसाधनमात्रेण नार्थयोरैक्यं सेध्दुमर्हति । अन्यथा अर्थयोः क्वचिदैक्यं, क्वचिद् भेद इति स्यात् । तन्न युक्तम्; वस्तुनि विकल्पायोगादिति नोदाहृतभाष्यश्रीसूक्तिः परम्परयापि प्रकृतविवादं शमयिष्यतीति ॥

ततश्च स्वयं मतान्तराणि परिशील्य एतत् समापनीयं भवति । तथैव च करिष्यामः । अन्यत्र बहवः पक्षाः श्रूयन्ते, बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बयोरैक्यं, भेदः, प्रतिबिम्बग्रहणं नामोक्तरीत्या स्वदेशस्थमुखग्रहणमेव, दर्पणाद्युपाधिदेशस्थग्रहणमेव, प्रतिबिम्बस्य सत्यत्वं, मिथ्यात्वमित्यादयः ॥

तत्र प्रतिबिम्बस्य सत्यता बिम्बेनैक्यं च, पञ्चपादिकायां बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावेन जीवब्रह्मणोरैक्यप्रतिपादनावसरे पद्मपादाचार्यैः प्रतिपाद्यते। 'यत्पुनर्दर्पणजलादिषु मुखचन्द्रादिप्रतिबिम्बोदाहरणं, तदहङ्कर्तृरनिदमंशो बिम्बादिव प्रतिबिम्बं न ब्रह्मणो वस्त्वन्तरम्, किंतु तदेव तत्, पृथगवभासविपर्ययस्वरूपतामात्रं मिथ्या' इति दर्शयितुम्। कथं पुनस्तदेव तत्? एक स्वलक्षणत्वावगमात्। तथा च यथा बहिस्थितो देवदत्तः यत् स्वलक्षणः प्रतिपन्नः तत् स्वलक्षण एव वेश्मान्तः प्रविष्टोऽपीति प्रतीयते, तथा दर्पण-जलस्थोऽपि। 'न तत् वस्त्वन्तरत्वे युज्यत' इत्यादिना विस्तरशः बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बयोरैक्य-मनेकाक्षेपप्रतिक्षेपपूर्वकं स्थापयित्वा, अनन्तरं 'अत्राह — भवतु न वस्त्वन्तरं तदेव तदिति तु न क्षम्यते। शुक्तिकारजतस्य मिथ्याभूतस्यापि सत्यरजतैकरूपतावभासिता-दर्शनात्। मैवम् — तत्र हि बाधदर्शनात् मिथ्याभावः नेह स बाधो दृश्यते। यत्पुनर्दर्पणापगमे तदपगमः न स बाधः, दर्पणेऽपि तत्प्रसङ्गात्' इति प्रतिबिम्बस्य मिथ्यात्वमपि ममृजे॥

'अत्राह' इत्युक्तः प्रतिबिम्बमिथ्यावादः बृहदारण्यकवार्त्तिके सुरेश्वराचार्यैः कक्षीकृतो विलोक्यते —

'दर्पणाभिहता दृष्टिः पर्यावृत्त्या स्वमाननम्।
याप्नुवन्त्यविभागेन भ्रान्तिं नो जनयेद्यथा'॥

इति। अत्रेदमस्माभिरुच्यते — अस्मदनिष्टं प्रतिबिम्बस्य मिथ्यात्वं सुरेश्वरादिसम्मतं बाधाभावादिना पञ्चपादिकाकारैरेव खण्डितमिति परकीयाङ्गुल्या अन्यदीयनयन-वेधनन्यायसारस्य वेदिभिरस्माभिर्नातीवात्मा तत्रायासयितव्य इति पञ्चपादिकादिस्थापितं बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बैक्यमेव यत्नतस्समुन्मूलनीयमवशिष्यते। यत्तयोरैक्यं एकस्वलक्षणत्वेन बहिरन्तरवस्थितं देवदत्तं निदर्श्य तत्रास्थापि तन्न। देवदत्तस्य कालभेदेनैवान्तर्बहिश्च दर्शनादेकस्वलक्षणतयाभेदसिद्धावपि, एकस्य स्वमुखरूपबिम्बस्य स्पार्शनेन स्वकण्ठोपरि क्वचित्, तदैव प्रतिबिम्बस्य चाक्षुषेणान्यत्र च दर्पणादौ स्वयं दर्शनात् उभयोरैक्यायोगात्॥

पार्श्वस्थैरुभयोरपि एकदैवान्योन्यदेशावच्छेदेन भेदेन चक्षुषैव गृह्यमाणत्वाच्च। रूपेण संख्यादेरिव बिम्बस्य द्वीन्द्रियस्य एकेन्द्रियप्रतिबिम्बेनैक्यं च सर्वथा न संभवति। 'बिम्बादिवोद्धृतौ बिम्बौ रामदेहात् तथापरौ', 'चेद्बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बत्वं दृष्टान्तस्तदलङ्कृतिः'

इत्यादेः प्रतिबिम्बमिथ्यात्वे सर्वथानुपपत्तेश्च। वास्तवबिम्बसरूपप्रतिबिम्बसद्भावाभिप्रायकत्वात् तस्य। एवं च शरीरावयवविशेषत्वतदातपच्छायात्वाभ्यां भेदे निश्चिते तयोरेकस्वलक्षणत्वस्य सादृश्यमात्रे पर्यवसानमेव युक्तम् ॥

किंच तयोरैक्ये विच्छिन्नदेशद्वये भानानुपपत्तिः। यत्तु तत्रैव पञ्चपादिकायामुक्तम् – 'न वयं विच्छेदावभासं पारमार्थिकं ब्रूमः, किन्त्वैक्यम्' इति। विच्छेदस्तु मायाविजृम्भितः। न हि मायायामसंभावनीयं नाम। असंभावनीयावभासप्रचुरा हि सा। तदुक्तं विज्ञानात्मकृतेष्टसिद्धौ –

'दुर्घटत्वमविद्याया भूषणं न तु दूषणम्।
कथंचिद्घटमानत्वेऽविद्यात्वं दुर्घटं भवेत्' ॥

इति। तन्न; तथा सति विच्छेदावभासस्येव तयोरेकत्वावभासस्यापि मायाविजृम्भितत्वापत्तेः। प्रत्युत क्वचिदविच्छिन्नोभयावभास एव मायाविजृम्भितत्वस्य वक्तव्यतया विच्छेदावभासस्य मायाकल्पितत्वोक्तिर्वैपरीत्यात्। ततश्चैतावतैतदुक्तं भवति - प्रतिबिम्बो बिम्बाद् भिन्न एव, मिथ्याऽपि नेति बिम्बव्यतिरिक्त सत्यप्रतिबिम्बसिद्धिः। तत्र च क्वचित्प्रतिबिम्बग्रहणं विपरीतचाक्षुषतेजस्संचारात् स्वदेहस्थ बिम्बग्रहणरूपं भवति। तावता तदुभयग्रहणैक्यकथनेन तयोः तत्त्वस्थितेः न मात्रयापि विपर्यासः। तयोर्भेदपक्ष इदानीमपि तथैव भेदः। मिथ्यात्वपक्षेऽपि तथैव मिथ्यात्वम्। अत एव प्रतिकूलचक्षुर्वृत्त्या ग्रहणयोरैक्यं प्रतिबिम्बमिथ्यत्ववादिना बृहदारण्यकवार्तिककृता तन्मिथ्यात्वसिद्ध्यर्थं, तस्य भेदं सत्यत्वं च वदता श्लोकवार्त्तिककृता कुमारिलभट्टेन अन्यथाख्यातिपरिहारार्थं च, अविगानेनाश्रितं दृश्यते। 'दर्पणाभिहता दृष्टिः' इत्यादि बृहदारण्यकवार्त्तिकं च पूर्वमेवोक्तम्। शब्दनित्यत्वाधिकरणस्थश्लोकवार्त्तिकं च –

'अत्र ब्रूमो यदा तावज्जले सौरेण तेजसा।
स्फुरता चाक्षुषं तेजः प्रतिस्रोतः प्रवर्तितम् ॥

स्वदेश एव गृह्णाति सवितारमनेकधा।
भिन्नमूर्ति यदा पात्रं तदास्यानेकता कुतः ॥

ईषन्निमीलिताङ्गुल्या यथा चक्षुषि दृश्यते।
पृथगेकोऽपि भिन्नत्वाच्चक्षुर्वृत्तेस्तथैव नः ॥'

इति। एवमनयोः पक्षयोर्भगवद्भाष्यकृता पश्चिमपक्षाश्रयणेनापि पक्षाश्रयणेनैव वा उदाहृत-भाष्यग्रन्थप्रणयनसंभवात्, ऐक्यमिथ्यात्वपक्षयोः बहुदूषणगणग्रासात्, निर्निमित्तमुदाहृत-भाष्यवाक्यश्रवणमात्रात् अन्यथा भाष्यकृदाशयवर्णनं महान्तो न सहन्त एव। एवं क्वचिद्दर्पणाद्युपाधिदेशस्थप्रतिबिम्बग्रहणमेव भवतीत्यपि उक्तमेव ॥

छायापर्यायप्रतिबिम्बस्य सत्यत्वं तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापे 'छायादिर्न त्वसत्य' इति जीव-सरश्लोके 'स्वरूपच्छायया गृध्रानुमानेऽपि नासत्यात्सत्यधीः। छायास्वरूपस्य सादृश्यस्य च निर्बाधत्वाद्' इति, शतदूषण्यामसत्यात्सत्यसिद्धिभङ्गे – स्वप्नार्थेन शुभादिः, प्रतिबिम्बेन बिम्बतत्वमिति मूलमुपादाय चण्डमारुते प्रतिबिम्बे बिम्बाभेदाध्यवसायात् तद्विशिष्टरूपेणा-सत्यत्वं प्रतिबिम्बस्येति व्याख्यातमिति च स्पष्टमवगन्तव्यम् ॥

एवं च प्रतिबिम्बातिरिक्ततायास्सत्यतायाश्च अत्र चतुरश्रं स्थापितत्वात् श्रीमद्भिर-भिनवरङ्गनाथपरकालमहामुनिभिः स्वकीये गूढार्थसङ्ग्रहे 'शान्ताङ्गार इव' इत्यादि श्लोक याख्यानावसरे यदुक्तं – 'बिम्बव्यतिरेकेण सत्यमसत्यं वा प्रतिबिम्बं न कल्पनीय-मिति यथार्थख्यातिनिरूपणावसरे विवेचयिष्यत' इति – तच्चिन्त्यम्। उक्तस्य भाष्य-वाक्यस्यातिरिक्तसत्यप्रतिबिम्बसद्भावेऽपि सामञ्जस्यस्योपपादितत्वात् ॥

तैरपि पृथक् तत्रान्यथाविवेचनात्। अत्र 'बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बयोरैक्यं न संभवति। स्वदेशस्थबिम्बग्रहणमेव प्रतिबिम्बग्रहणमिति श्लोकवार्तिके शब्दनित्यत्वाधिकरणे – 'अत्र ब्रूमो यदा तावज्जले सौरेण तेजसा' इत्यादिना भट्टपादैः स्थापितत्वादिति दर्पणप्रति-बिम्बस्थले भट्टपादसिद्धान्त एवोत्तरत्र यथार्थख्यातिनिरूपणावसरे स्थापयिष्यत इति च 'प्राक्तनस्वोक्तिद्वयेन साकं विरोधाच्चेति बोध्यम् ॥

11

J. SURYANARAYANA

తన (ము) వర్ణకమా ?

ఆంధ్ర మహాభారతమునందు పదునైదు పర్వములను రచించిన మహాకవి తిక్కన. ఇందితడు వాడిన తద్ధిత ప్రత్యయాంతములగు పదములు సుమారు 350 గలవు. వానిలో — తన (ము) అను తద్ధిత ప్రత్యయము చేరి పదములుగా ప్రయుక్తములయినవి 95 ఉన్నవి. తన ప్రత్యయాంతములే తిక్కన వాడిన తద్ధిత ప్రత్యయాంతములలో నధిక సంఖ్యాకములై యున్నవి.

— తన (ము) అను నీ తద్ధిత ప్రత్యయము విశేషణములపైనను విశేష్యముల పయినను చేరినట్లీతని ప్రయోగముల వలన తెలియును. అల్లఁదనంబు — కొడుకుఁదనము అనునవి యుదాహరణములు. సంస్కృత పదములపైన నీ ప్రత్యయము చేరుటయు నిందు గలదు అరాతితనము — దుర్బుద్ధితనము మొదలగు తద్ధితాంతములందలి 'అరాతి' 'దుర్బుద్ధి' యనునవి సంస్కృత పదములు.

— తన అను నీ ప్రత్యయముకన్న (ము) నందును ప్రచురముగ నున్నది. తెలుగు నందు వలె నిది విశేషణములపైనను (గణ్ణు తన) విశేష్యములపయినను (కివుడు తన) గనుపట్టుటయేగాక సంస్కృత పదములపైనను (కృపణ తన) గననగును.

— తన యను నీ తద్ధిత ప్రత్యయము త్వార్థమును గలిగియున్నదని చిన్నయసూరి బాలవ్యాకరణమునందు చెప్పియున్నాడు. (బాల — తద్ధిత—1) ఇచట నుదాహరణములుగ నాతడిచ్చిన రూపములు గమనింపఁదగియున్నవి. వీనిలో నాల్గింట ప్రకృతినామము. (రాముని తనము — రాముతనము — మనుమనితనము — సీతతనము) మిగిలిన నాల్గింటియందును ప్రకృతి విశేషణము (గొప్పతనము — కొఱతనము — నల్లఁదనము — పుల్లఁ

దనము) విశేషణ విశేష్యములు రెంటి పైనను ఈ ప్రత్యయమును సూరి యంగీకరించి యున్నాడు. తన ప్రత్యయము నామముపై చేరుచో నామము ద్వితీయాది విభక్త్యంగము (Oblique) గ నుండును. కన్నడము నందును నామము ద్వితీయాది విభక్త్యంగముగనే (నాము తన) తన ప్రత్యయమునకు పూర్వ ముండుట గమనింపదగియున్నది.

—ము అను ప్రత్యయ మంతము నందున్న పదము కర్మధారయసమాసమునందు మొదటి పదమగుచో నా 'ము' 'పు' గ మారును. 'కర్మధారయంబులందు మువర్ణ కంబునకు పుంపులగు' (బాల — సంధి — 32) అను సూత్ర మీ యంశమునే స్థాపించుచున్నది. బాలవ్యాకరణము నందలి సంధి పరిచ్ఛేదములోని 35 సూత్రము నందు పు — ఁపు లకు పరము —తన (ము) వచ్చుటను తత్కర్త స్థాపించియున్నాడు. 'సరసపుఁ దనము అను ని దిచట యుదాహరణము. ము — పు గ మారుట కర్మధారయసమాసమునందే జరుగునని సూరి కంతోక్తముగ చెప్పియున్నందున నాతడు తద్ధిత ప్రత్యయముగా చెప్పిన — తన (ము) చేరి యేర్పడిన 'సరసపుఁ దనము' ఇత్యాదులు సమాసములే యనియు తద్ధిత ప్రత్యయాంతములగు పదములు గావనియు నూహింపనగును.

కాని సమానము కనీసము రెండు ధాతువులను గలిగియుండవలయునను నియమము గలదు. 'సరసపుఁ దనము' అనుచో — తన (ము) ప్రత్యయమయి నందున ధాతువుగా నేరదు. కాని ప్రత్యయములును కొన్ని పదత్వము బడసి ధాతువులుగా పరిగణింపబడుట గలదు. తన (ము) నట్లు ఏర్పడిన ధాతువుగా గ్రహింపనగును.

తద్ధిత ప్రత్యయములు ప్రథమాంతములగు పదములపై చేరునేగాని ద్వితీయాది విభక్త్యంగములపై చేరవు. — 'కాడు' అను నీ తద్ధిత ప్రత్యయము 'విలు' మొదలగు వానిపై చేరగా 'విలుకాడు' మొదలగు రూపములు నిష్పన్నములగుచున్నవి. వాడు అను నది పదము గావున నది ద్వితీయాది విభక్త్యంగమగు వింటి మొదలగు వానిపై చేరఁగా వింటివాడు ఇత్యాదులు సిద్ధించుచున్నవి. — తన ద్వితీయాది విభక్త్యంగముపై చేరు చున్నందున నేతద్ఘటితములగు పదబంధములు సమాసములేయగును. — తన (ము) అను దానికి వాడు అను దానికి వలె స్వతంత్ర ప్రయోగ యోగ్యత లేదు. స్వతంత్ర ప్రయోగ యోగ్యత లేని ద్వితీయాది విభక్త్యంగములకు పదత్వము నంగీకరించిన రీతిని దీనికిని పదత్వము నంగీకరింప వచ్చును.

—తన (ము) అనునది ప్రత్యయముగాదు. పదమే యననగును. ఈ యంశ మును తెలుగునందేగాక కన్నడమునందును సమన్వయము చేయవచ్చును.

తన (ము) అను నీ ప్రత్యయమంతము నందు చేరి యేర్పడిన తద్ధిత ప్రత్య

యాంతములు 95 తిక్కన భారతము నందున్నవని యంటిని. ఈ రూపముల నీ క్రింది రీతిని విభజింపవచ్చును.

ఈ విభజనమున మరియొక యంశముగూడ పాటించియుంటిని. తన (ము) అను నీ తద్ధిత ప్రత్యయము చేరినపుడు ప్రకృతిప్రత్యయమునకు నడుమ నుగాగమమును ద్రుత సంధిని చిన్నయసూరి బాలవ్యాకరణమునందు విధించియున్నాడు. ఈ వ్యాకరణకార్యములు తిక్కన ప్రయోగముల విషయము నందెంత మాత్రము సమన్వయమగుననుటయే ఆ యంశము.

అదంతములగు గుణవాచకశబ్దముల తరువాత — తన (ము) అను నీ ప్రత్యయమున్నపుడు నడుమ నుగాగమ మగునని బాలవ్యాకరణమునందు (సంధి. 35) గలదు. గుణవాచకములుగాని అకారాంతములపైన తనము వచ్చుట తిక్కనలో గలదు. అప్పుడు నుగాగమమురాదు. అదంతములగు నీ పదములు ద్వితీయాది విభక్త్యంగము నకున్న యర్థమును గలిగియున్నవి.

అనద తనము. ఉద్యోగ. 3 — 64 శల్య. 2 — 236, శాంతి. 3 — 24.
పేద తనము. అను. 2 — 340.
ఒజ్జ తనము. అశ్వ. 1 — 54.
బేల తనము. కర్ణ. 3 — 61, 2 — 60.
తులువ తనము. ఉద్యోగ. 2 — 60.
పొలువ తనము. స్త్రీ. 2 — 54.
తులువ తనంబు. శల్య. 2 — 126.
మగువ తనము. అను. 1 — 292.
మగ తనంబు. విరాట. 3 — 170, భీష్మ. 2 — 397, ఉద్యోగ. 2 — 165, 4 — 401.
చెట్ట తనంబు. అను. 4 — 382.

అకారాంతమగు సంస్కృత పదముపై తన (ము) చేరుటయు గలదు. లాసిక తనము.

ము అను ప్రత్యయాంతములగు' దిట్టము, గరువము' అను వానికి తన (ము) పరము గాఁ గాని — ము లోపించుచున్నది. దాన నకారాంతములగు దిట్ట, గరువ, అను వానికి తన (ము) చేరుచున్నది. ఇవియు ద్వితీయాది విభక్త్యంగములుగనే యుండును.

దిట్ట తనము. భీష్మ. 1 — 159.
గరువ తనము. విరాట. 3 — 56.

ఈ క్రింది యుదాహరణములందలి పూర్వపదము లదంతములయినను గుణ వాచకములుగావు. అయినప్పటికిని నుగాగమము వచ్చుట విశేషము. ఇవియన్నియు ద్వితీయాది విభక్త్యంగములు. ఇట్టివాని తరువాత నుగాగమును సూరి విధించియుండలేదు.

అలుకఁదనంబు.	ఉద్యోగ 4_312
పరుసఁదనంబు.	కర్ణ 2_293
ప్రన్నఁదనంబు.	శాంతి 2_348 అను 5_100
ప్రేకఁదనంబు,	విరాట 1_106
పరుసఁదనంబు.	శాంతి 2_299 అను 5_167
బేలఁదనంబు.	శాంతి 3_244
బేలఁదనము	శాంతి 4_372

అకారాంత గుణవాచకములకు తన (ము) పరముగాఁగా నుగాగమము వచ్చిన రూపముల నీ క్రింద నిచ్చుచున్నాను. ఈ నుగాగమము సూరికి సమ్మతము.

పొల్లదనంబు.	కర్ణ 1_133
నల్లఁదనంబు.	శాంతి 2_206
తిన్నఁదనము	సౌప్తిక 1_31
విన్నఁదనము	స్త్రీ 1_118
అల్లఁదనము	విరాట 1_245, శాంతి 1_248
తిన్నఁదనంబు	సౌప్తిక 1_17
లెస్సఁదనంబు	ఉద్యోగ 1_378
నల్లఁదనము	అను 2_93
వట్రువఁదనము	శాంతి 3_476
తియ్యఁదనము	శాంతి 3_256
సున్నఁదనంబు	విరాట 2_221
వెల్లఁదనంబు	ద్రోణ 2_4
వెల్లఁదనము	ద్రోణ 2_231
ఎఱ్ఱఁదనంబు	ఆశ్రమవాస 2_40
మెత్తఁదనము	భీష్మ 3_421
చిరుతఁదనంబు	ఉద్యోగ 3_361.

పెద్ద, అకారాంతము గుణవాచకమునగు దీనికి సూరి విధించిన నుగాగమము తన (ము) పరముగ నున్నపుడు రాలేదు.

పెద్ద తనంబు. ఉద్యోగ. 1 — 278, 2 — 65.

ఉదంత స్త్రీ సమంబులకు తన (ము) పరమయినపుడు నుగాగమమును సూరి (సంధి 35) విధించియున్నాడు ఈ విధి నీ క్రింది తిక్కనప్రయోగములందు సమన్వయము చేయవచ్చును. ఇందలి పూర్వపదములు ద్వితీయాది విభక్త్యంగములుగ నున్నవి

కొడుకుఁ దనము. ఉద్యోగ. 4 — 370, 391.
చెడుగుం దనము. శాంతి. 3 — 213.
ఆడుఁ దనంబు. విరాట. 1 — 338.
ముదురుఁ దనంబు ఆను. 2 — 21.

ఈ విధి కపవాదములగు (నుగాగము రాని) ప్రయోగములును తిక్కనలో గలవు.

బంటు తనము. ఉద్యోగ. 2 — 28, భీష్మ. 3 — 259, 2 — 56.
విరాట. 3 — 151.
బంటు తనంబు. ఉద్యోగ. 3 — 59, ద్రోణ. 2 — 333, 3 — 300.
కర్ణ. 3 — 340.
మల్లు తనము విరాట. 1 — 81.

పు, ంపులకు తన (ము) పరమయిన నుగాగమము వచ్చునని సూరి చెప్పియున్నాడు. తిక్కన ప్రయోగము లీనియమముననుసరించియే యున్నవి.

చుట్టపుఁ దనము. స్త్రీ. 2 — 103.
బెడిదపుఁ దనము. శాంతి. 3 — 24.
బెడిదంపుఁ దనము. ఉద్యోగ. 3 — 61.
బెట్టిదంపుఁ దనంబు. భీష్మ. 3 — 285.

ఇకారాంతములపై నీ తన (ము) చేరును.

ఈ క్రింది యుదాహరణములందు ఈ తన (ము) ఇకారాంతములగు సంస్కృత శబ్దములపై చేరినట్లు గననగును.

దుర్బుద్ధి తనము. కర్ణ. 3 — 89.
అరాతి తనము. ఉద్యోగ. 1 — 344.

అరి అను తద్ధిత కృత్ప్రత్యయాంతములపైనను నిది చేరుచున్నది.

కిలారి తనము.	విరాట. 1 – 100.
ఇమ్మరి తనము.	శాంతి. 6 – 208.
అడియరి తనము.	సౌప్తిక. 1 – 7, ఉద్యోగ. 1 – 250.
పోటరి తనము.	శల్య. 2 – 129 (కృదంతము చేరినది).

ఇకారాంతములగు విశేషణములపై తన (ము) చేరుట నీ క్రింది యుదాహరణము లందు గ్రహింప నగును.

దండి తనము.	ద్రోణ. 5 – 95.
దండి తనంబు.	భీష్మ. 1 – 37.
వెఱ్ఱి తనము.	ఉద్యోగ. 1 – 375.
మంచి తనంబు.	అను. 4 – 73.

ఇకారాంతములగు విశేష్యములపై తనము చేరుట నీ క్రింద నిచ్చుచున్నాను. ఇవి యన్నియు ద్వితీయాది విభక్త్యంగములే యగును.

పిరికి తనము.	ఉద్యోగ. 3 – 57.
పెంటి తనము.	భీష్మ. 1 – 192.
కలి తనమ్ము.	ద్రోణ. 2 – 20, శల్య. 1 – 232.
కలి తనంబు.	విరాట. 4 – 223.
పేడి తనంబు.	విరాట. 4 – 160.
పేడి తనము.	విరాట. 1 – 87, 229.
కలి తనము.	విరాట. 2 – 67, శల్య. 1 – 162, స్త్రీ. 1 – 166.
ఆలి తనంబు.	శల్య. 2 – 35.
దండి తనము.	కర్ణ. 3 – 172.
కల్కి తనము.	శాంతి. 1 – 248.
వెంగలి తనము.	సౌప్తిక. 1 – 48.

12

RAVINDRA KUMAR JAIN

साहित्यिक आलोचना

स्वरूप, आवश्यकता, उद्देश्य, महत्वांकन

स्वरूप —

संवेदनशील मानवहृदय की भास्वर रागरश्मियां जिस प्रकार ललित साहित्य का अनादिस्रोत रही हैं, ठीक उसी प्रकार मानव में निष्ठ बुद्धि और रसग्राहिता की प्रवृत्ति जो कि आलोचना का मूलाधार है, मानव के उद्भव के साथ ही चली आ रही है। अतः साहित्य की भांति आलोचना भी चिरकालिक है। फिर भी आलोचना सृजनात्मक साहित्य की अपेक्षा एक नवीन विधा के रूप में ही गृहीत है। यद्यपि आलोचक और स्रष्टा में यह भेद प्रचलित है, परन्तु प्रत्येक आलोचक एक स्रष्टा है और प्रत्येक स्रष्टा एक आलोचक है। सृजनकर्ता में हृदयपक्ष का प्राबल्य होता है और आलोचक में बुद्धिपक्ष का। साथ ही प्रत्येक आलोचनात्मक कृति एक विशिष्ट भावस्तर पर पहुंचकर स्वयं सृजन हो जाती है।

आंड् उपसर्ग पूर्वक लुच् - दर्शने धातु से यह शब्द उत्पन्न हुआ है। इसकी युत्पत्ति संस्कृत में इस प्रकार की जा सकती है — आ समन्तात् लोचनम् - आलोचनम् अवलोकनम्, तस्य स्त्रियां टाप् इति आलोचना। इसका अर्थ हुआ, आंड् अर्थात् सब ओर से पूर्णतया, और लुच् अर्थात् देखना, समझना, परखना। तो इसका पूर्णार्थ हुआ - किसी वस्तु या कृति को पूर्णतया देखना या समझना ही आलोचना है। समीक्षा सम् + ईक्षा, अर्थात् सम्यक् ईक्षण, अवलोकन और परीक्षा - परितः -

चारों ओर, ईक्षा - देखना भी इसी अर्थ के द्योतक शब्द हैं। मीमांसा शब्द भी इसी अर्थ में यदा कदा प्रयुक्त होता है, परन्तु यह दर्शन शास्त्र का शब्द है और तार्किक पद्धति पर इसमें बल दिया जाता है। गवेषणा, अन्वेषण, शोधदृष्टि ये शब्द भी एक सीमा तक आलोचना का अर्थ देते हैं, परन्तु इनमें शोधतत्व की अधिकता रहती है। यदि उस अर्थ पर बौद्धिक - आलोचनात्मक दृष्टि पडती है तो वह आलोचनात्मक शोध हो जाती है। अंग्रेजी में आलोचना के लिए क्रिटिसिज्म शब्द प्रचलित है। यह एक ग्रीक शब्द क्रिटिकास से निकला है - जिसका अर्थ है - निर्णय करना। दूसरा शब्द है - क्विपल्व, जिसका अर्थ है विश्लेषण या पृथक्करण। संस्कृत में भी अतिप्राचीन काल से आलोचना के लिए अनेक नाम चले आ रहे हैं। कामशास्त्र के प्रसिद्ध सृष्टा वात्स्यायन ने चौसठ कलाओं में एक कला क्रियाकल्प भी स्वीकार की है और वह इसी अर्थ में गृहीत है। क्रिया का अर्थ है सृजन - काव्यसृजन, और काव्य का अर्थ है तद्विषयक विधान। अतः काव्यरचना के विधायक शास्त्र के रूप में आलोचना स्वीकृत हुई। परन्तु यह नाम अल्पायु ही रहा, अधिक प्रसिद्धि न पासका। दशम शती के प्रारम्भ में राजशेखर ने अपनी "काव्यमीमांसा में आलोचना को साहित्यविद्या नाम से अभिहित किया। क्रियाकल्प की भांति यह भी न चल सका। इसके बाद सर्वाधिक प्रसिद्धिप्राप्त शब्द 'अलंकारशास्त्र' हमारे सामने आया। ध्यान यह देना है कि यहाँ अलंकार शब्द काव्य के शोभाधायक बाह्य तत्व के या साधनमात्र के रूप में गृहीत नहीं है, अपितु अलंक्रियते अर्थात् शोभते अर्थात् काव्य शोभा। यह शोभा आन्तरिक गुण-सौन्दर्य के रूप में गृहीत है। पांचवीं शती में आचार्य वामन ने अलंकार को "सौन्दर्यमलंकारः" कहकर एक सर्वथा नवीन अर्थाभिव्यक्ति प्रदान की और इस प्रकार अलंकार शास्त्र का व्यापक अर्थ हुआ - काव्य के समस्त अन्तः बाह्य सौन्दर्य के आधायक अंगों का विवेचक शास्त्र। इस शब्द के विषय में ज्ञातव्य यह है कि संस्कृत में वामन ने "सौन्दर्यमलंकारः" के द्वारा सौन्दर्य को ही अलंकार माना और सौन्दर्य मूलतः आन्तरिक होता है। दूसरी बात है कि भारतीय दृष्टि में आलोचना के अन्तर्गत गुणग्रहण या सौन्यर्य पर ही दृष्टि रही है। किन्तु प्रत्येक युग के साथ विचारधारा और सोचने के ढंग में अन्तर होता है। आलोचना के साथ भी यही हुआ। संस्कृत में रीति, ध्वनि, रस, वक्रोक्ति आदि विविध सम्प्रदाय उक्त आशय के पोषक हैं। आलोचना का सुदीर्घ इतिहास किन्ही, स्थिर

विकास से सम्बद्ध तर्कपूर्ण सिद्धन्तों को तो प्रदर्शित नहीं करता है। उसमें विषय, प्रक्रिया और उद्देश्यों की भी सुदृढ़ अन्विति का एक लम्बी सीमातक अभाव है। हाँ, उसकी धारावाहिकता को मानव के बदलते जीवनमानों और विश्वासों के साथ स्वयं को भी तदनुसार परिवर्तित करने में देखा जा सकता है। आलोचना का स्वरूप प्रायः सामयिक परिस्थितियों से भी प्रभावित होता रहता है। जिस प्रकार समय के साथ भाषा, शैली, साहित्यिकरुचि, सिद्धान्त आदि की व्याख्या और प्रायोगिकता के रूप बदलते हैं, उसी प्रकार अपितु उससे भी तीव्रता से आलोचना में परिवर्तन आता है। तो भी इस तथ्य की बहुधा उपेक्षा होती रही है कि आलोचना ने सदैव उन साहित्यिक समस्याओं को जो उसके सामने प्रत्येक युग में प्रस्तुत हुई हैं, समाधान दिया है। यह दूसरी बात है कि यह समाधान अगली - परवर्ती पीढ़ियों को सदा सन्तुष्ट नहीं कर सका है। यहाँ इतना ही ध्यान रखना है कि आलोचना एक द्रुत विकासशील साहित्यिक विधा है। उसको समझने और परिभाषा में बांधने के प्रयत्न प्रत्येक युग में होंगे और वह आगे भी बढ़ेगी ही। अनेक पाश्चात्य विद्वानों ने भी इस विधा में समय-समय पर संस्कार, परिष्कार किया। अपनी मान्यताएं भी प्रस्तुत कीं। किसी विद्वान ने केवल छिद्रान्वेषण - दोषोद्घाटन ही आलोचना का काम बताया और घोषणा की कि काव्य की अपूर्णताएं बताना ही आलोचना का लक्ष्य है। मेथयू आर्नाल्ड जैसे सिद्ध आलोचकों ने आलोचना को गुणग्राहिका वृत्ति के रूप में ग्रहण किया। उनका आशय था कि दोषों पर दृष्टि कम से कम हो। माउल्टन और तेन जैसे विचारकों ने तो कहा कि दोष-निरूपण आलोचना का काम नहीं है। जो कुछ भी सामने आवे उसको उसी रूप में ग्रहण किया जाए। तो कुछ अन्य विचारकों ने कहा - "किसी विषय या वस्तु पर निर्णय देना ही आलोचना है।" दूसरों ने कहा – "तुलना ही आलोचना है।" इस दिशा में कुछ पाश्चात्य प्रतिनिधि आचार्यों की परिभाषाएं भी दृष्टव्य हैं, रावर्टसन् –

'Criticism is a process that goes on over all the field of human knowledge, being simply comparison or clash of opinion.'

लेखक का दृष्टिकोण सामान्य ही अधिक है। आशय है – मानव के ज्ञान-क्षेत्र की समस्त दिशाओं में तुलना और मतवैविध्य की एक प्रक्रिया ही आलोचना है। गोडकिन का मत है –

'All genuine criticism consists in comparison between two ways of doing something.'

अर्थात् किसी कार्य की दो विधियों में तुलना करना ही श्रेष्ठ आलोचना है। उक्त दोनों परिभाषाओं में तुलनापर अधिक बल दिया गया है, परन्तु इस तुलना में निर्णय का भी अभिप्राय ध्वनित होता सा लगता है। साथ ही इन परिभाषाओं में कल्पना और भावना का रंग भी कुछ आ ही गया है। प्रसिद्ध कवि एवं आलोचक मेथ्यू आर्नाल्ड की परिभाषा भी अवलोक्य है –

'To see the object as in itself it really is, and an endeavour to learn and propogate the best that is known and thought in the world.'

क्या आर्नाल्ड की इस परिभाषा को निर्णयात्मक दृष्टि सम्पन्न कहा जा सकता है ? नहीं, इसे हम निष्पक्ष एवं रचनात्मक प्रशंसादृष्टि कह सकते हैं। इसमें आलोचना को केवल निर्माणकारिणी शक्ति के रूप में लिया गया है। उसके नाशकारी रूप को अस्वीकार किया गया है। आलोचक केन्ट से आर्नाल्ड की तुलना की जा सकती है। केन्ट –

'Criticism is an endeavour to find the principle or common ground which lies back of every difference of opinion.'

अर्थत् आलोचना का कार्य उस सिद्धान्त अथवा सामान्य धरातल की खोज है जो प्रत्येक मतभेद की रीड में निहित है। इसी प्रसंग में संस्कृत के सुप्रसिद्ध विचारक राजशेखर - १० वीं शती, का आलोचना के ध्येय पर व्यक्त किया गया मत भी उल्लेख्य है। उक्त आचार्य ने "काव्य मीमांसा" में कहा है – "सा च कवेः श्रममभिप्रायं चभाक्यति, तथा खलु फलितः कवेः व्यापारतरुः अन्यथा सोवकेशी स्यात्। अर्थात् आलोचक कवि के रचना सम्बन्धी शिल्प को तथा काव्य में निहित गूढ अभिप्राय को प्रकट करता है। आलोचक के इस यत्न से ही कवि कर्म का तरु फलित होता है, अन्यथा निष्फल ही रह जायगा। अपनी पराशक्ति से आलोचक काव्य के अन्तः बाह्य दोनों को पूर्ण प्रकाश में लाता है। कवि की कारयित्री प्रतिभा को आलोकित करना ही आलोचक की भावयित्री प्रतिभा का काम है। उल्लिखित सभी परिभाषाओं और मतमतान्तरों को दृष्टि में रखते हुए यह कहा जा सकता है कि किसी कृति का समग्र, सम्यक्, एवं सहानुभूतिपूर्ण - अवगाहनपरक निर्णयात्मक मूल्यांकन ही साहित्यिक आलोचना है। यह अवगाहन

हमारे सम्मुख चार पक्षों को प्रस्तुत करता है। अर्थात् आलोचना में प्रधान उपकरण चार हैं –

१ – कृति के मूल तथा बाह्यरूप का विवेचन - विश्लेषण।

२ – कृति में निहित लेखक के निजी भावस्तर एवं आदर्श।

३ – संभाव्य सामाजिक प्रतिक्रियाओं का आकलन, नक्युग का ध्वनन।

४ – कृति की समग्रता का निर्णयात्मक मूल्यांकन।

इन चार उपकरणों के अतिरिक्त एक पांचवाँ उपकरण भी आवश्यक है। आलोचना के प्रचलित मानदण्डों और नूतनमानों में एक सन्तुलित दृष्टि रखने पर ही आलोचक को अपने कार्य में पूर्ण सफलता मिल सकती है।

क्या आलोचना के कुछ मानदण्ड स्थिर किए जा सकते हैं? वस्तुतः ऐसा सम्भव नहीं है, क्योंकि समय के साथ जनरुचि बदलती है और वह साहित्य को भी प्रभावित करती है। साहित्य और आलोचना सदैव एक दूसरे से प्रभावित होते रहे हैं। यदि मान भी लिया जाय कि आलोचना के कुछ नियम हैं - सिद्धान्त हैं, तो दूसरा प्रश्न उठता है कि उनका आधार क्या है? दर्शनशास्त्र, मनोविज्ञान, समाज या सौन्दर्य शास्त्र। यदि ये आधार हैं तो क्या ये स्वयं शाश्वत् हैं, या जनता की चेतना और रूचि के साथ परिवर्तित होते रहते हैं। रूचि का भी मानदण्ड क्या है? सभी राष्ट्रों में रूचि सम्बन्धी समानता कहाँ तक सम्भव है? आलोचना में वैयक्तिक मत वैविध्य को कैसे समाप्त किया जाय? प्राचीन श्रेष्ठ ग्रन्थ कहाँ तक आलोचना के मार्गदर्शक बन सकते हैं? क्या उन्हें आलोचना के आदर्शों के रूप में ग्रहण किया जा सकता है? साथ ही क्या एक साहित्यिक रचना के लिए यह सम्भव है कि वह आलोचना के नियमों की उपेक्षा करे और फिर भी श्रेष्ठ बनी रहे? ये सभी पृच्छाएं आलोचना के विधान के सम्बन्ध में उठती हैं। यह पहले ही स्पष्ट किया जा चुका है कि आलोचना भी नवनवोन्मेषशालिनी प्रतिभा के समान विकासशील है और किसी जडता से स्वयं को कभी बांधकर नहीं रख सकती। पौर्वात्य एवं पाश्चात्य आलोचना का इतिहास इस बात का साक्षी है।

आवश्यकता —

ऊपर विवेचित आलोचना के स्वरूप से उसकी महत्ता प्रतिपादित हो चुकी है। फिर भी बहुधा यह प्रश्न उठाया जाता है कि साहित्य तो स्वयं जीवन की विशद व्याख्या है, तब उस व्याख्या की भी व्याख्या से क्या लाभ ? दूसरा प्रश्न यह है कि उत्कृष्ट साहित्य स्वयं ही चेतना को झंकृत करता है, हृदय को उत्साह तथा बुद्धि को प्रखरता देता है और स्वयं में प्रत्येक दृष्टि से पूर्ण होता हैं, फिर उसके किस गूढ पक्ष अथवा रहस्य का प्रतिपादन या उद्घाटन आलोचना करती है — करना चाहती है ? हित के स्थान पर आलोचना द्वारा साहित्य और समाज का अहित ही होता है। प्राय: पाठक आलोचक के निजी मन्तव्यों और वक्तव्यों से प्रभावित हो जाता है, ओर फिर एक पूर्वनिश्चित बंधी हुई परदत्त दृष्टि से ही वह किसी कृति का आस्वादन करता है। उसका निजी भावनामय योग और चिन्तन उस अधीत कृति में नहीं जुड। फलत पाता: साहित्य का जो एक बहुत बडा कार्य है कि पाठक भी उससे सम्पृक्त होकर स्वकीय भावों के उच्चतम स्तर को प्राप्त कर स्वयं भी प्रतिभामय, सम्वेदनशील एवं रागोद्वलित हो उठता है ; सम्भव नहीं हो सकता। आलोचना द्वारा पाठक को साहित्य में निहितमर्म समझाना और हृदयंगम कराना ऐसा ही है जैसे कि दुधमुहे बच्चे को चम्मच से भोजन कराना और उसकी अपनी शक्ति को न पनपने देना। अत: साहित्य के लिए आलोचना की आवश्यकता नहीं है।

ये सभी प्रश्न और शंकाएं सर्वथा निराधार हैं यह कदापि नही कहा जा सकता। पर इतना तो कहा ही जा सकता है कि इनके पीछे भावुकता एवं एकांगिता पर्याप्त है। यदि हम एक श्रेष्ठ आलोचक और आलोचना की कसौटियों को ठीक समझ लें तो फिर किसी प्रकार की शंका का अवसर नहीं रह जाता। अपरिपक्व आलोचक तो अनाडी होता ही है। उसके द्वारा आलोचित रचना का तो अन्यथा प्रतिपादन होता ही है, साथ ही वह पाठकों की रुचि को भी दिशान्तरित एवं पंकिल करता है। श्रेष्ठ आलोचना के विषय में हम जान ही चुके हैं। योग्य आलोचक की क्षमता के सन्दर्भ में भी कुछ अपेक्षित है। —

१ — आलोचक समाज का प्रतिनिधि बनकर कृति को देखता है, यद्यपि लेखक के साथ उसकी पूरी सहानुभूमि होती है। अत: आलोचक

जनता और साहित्यस्रष्टा के बीच की कड़ी है जो दोनों को युगनद्ध करती है।

२ – उसे आलोच्य विषय का पूर्णज्ञान होना ही चाहिए। साथ ही लेखक के दृष्टिकोण से ही उसे कृति में प्रवेश करने का अभ्यासी होना चाहिए।

३ – निष्पक्षता - किसी सिद्धान्त अथवा लेखक के प्रति किसी प्रकार का भी उसका पूर्वग्रह न हो।

४ – उसका सम्बन्ध कलाकार से न होकर कृति से हो, यद्यपि कृति के पूर्ण अध्ययन के हेतु उसमें व्याप्त लेखक के भावस्तरों का ज्ञान भी आवश्यक है।

५ – कृति के प्रति अपने निर्णयों को बड़ी कुशलता, स्पष्टता और पूर्णता से रखने की उसमें अपार क्षमता हो। निर्णयोद्घाटन की निर्भीकता और भाषागत सौम्यता का उसमें समन्वय हो। यद्यपि भारवि ने कहा है, 'हितं मनोहारि च दुर्लभं वचः' पर यही उसकी कसौटी है।

६ – भाषा सर्वत्र ससार हो, कोरी बाहवाही न हो।

७ – स्वदेशी के साथ उसे विदेशी का भी ज्ञान होना चाहिए, और आज के आलोचक में तो यह बहुज्ञता और भी अधिक आवश्यक है। क्योंकि अद्यतनीन साहित्य पर विदेशी साहित्य का भी पर्याप्त प्रभाव है।

८ – स्रष्टा के प्रतिभा स्तरों और उसकी भावाकोटियों की गहनता और व्यापकता को पूर्णतया हृदयंगम करने के निमित्त आलोचक में भी एक सीमातक रचनात्मक प्रतिभा वांछनीय है।

९ – उदीयमान लेखक के प्रति विशिष्ट सहानुभूति अपेक्षित है क्योंकि वह नवांकुरित पौधे की भांति होता है। अतः आंधी और मूसलधार वर्षा जैसे आलोचना - प्रहारों को नहीं सह सकता।

प्रसिद्ध आलोचक एवरकाम्बी ने सूत्रात्मकशैली में योग्य आलोचक के गुणों का उल्लेख किया है। –

"Insight, sympathy, imaginative response, common sense or mere power to express discriminating gusto."

अर्थात् अन्तर्दृष्टि, सहानुभूति, कल्पनात्मक प्रतिक्रिया, सामान्य व्यवहारबोध अथवा केवल गुणदोष की भेदक क्षमता से उत्पन्न स्वाद को अभिव्यक्त करने की शक्ति। यदि आलोचक ऊपर निर्दिष्ट इन सभी विशेषताओं से युक्त है तो उसके द्वारा किसी भी कृति का भ्रामक विवेचन सम्भव नहीं। साथ ही साहित्यिक कृति कितनी भी महत्वपूर्ण क्यों न हो; पूर्ण क्यों न हो, सभी पाठक उसके गहनस्तरों को नहीं समझ सकते, यह सुविदित ही है। आलोचना की सुदीर्घ परम्परा भी इसकी साक्षी है। इस दिशा में भी चिन्तन और अध्ययन का निष्कर्ष इस प्रकार प्रस्तुत किया जा सकता है –

१ – समाज और लेखक के बीच एक मध्यस्था पद्धति की आवश्यकता।

२ – समाज में कृति के प्रति राग विराग की तीव्रता आलोचना द्वारा ही सम्भव है। आलोचना द्वारा किसी कृति के प्रति पाठकों में भाव-भूमि तैयार होती है। प्राय: ज्ञान और भावना के क्षेत्र में हम जगाए जाने के आदी हैं।

३ – आलोचना ही किसी कृति में निहित विवध तत्वों पर व्यापक प्रकाश विकीर्ण करती है।

४ – समाज और लेखक की रुचि और विचारों में नवीनता, सम्पन्नता, विशालता एवं सप्राणता ही लाती है।

५ – आलोचना एक ओर यदि राजनैतिक विरोधीदल जैसी है, तो दूसरी ओर स्वस्थ विचारों की प्रसारिका एवं समर्थिका भी है। हीनस्तरीय, खोखले एवं जघन्य कला से युक्त साहित्य को आलोचना पनपने से रोकती है और सामाजिकों को ऐसे साहित्य के प्रति असहयोग के हेतु प्रस्तुत भी करती है।

६ – सूर्य का जो महत्व कमल के लिए है, चन्द्रमा का कुमुदिनी के लिए है, मेघ का मयूरों के लिए है ठीक वही महत्व आलोचना का साहित्य एवं मानव समाज के लिए है।

अतः जिस प्रकार साहित्य जीवन के मर्म की ललित व्याख्या है उसी प्रकार आलोचना उस याख्या की भी सुपुष्ट, तर्कसंगत एवं निर्णयात्मक व्याख्या है। इस प्रकार सृजनात्मक साहित्य की भांति आलोचना की भी आवश्यकता समाज को सदा रहेगी ही। आलोचना को प्रायः रचना से न्यून स्तर का समझा जाता है, परन्तु क्या यह बात तथ्य विवेचनपरक आलोचना के की भांति निर्णयात्मक आलोचना पर भी लागू की जा सकती है। हाँ, यह अवश्य ही हुआ है कि प्रायः आलोचक रचनाकारों के प्रति क्रूरदृष्टि रहे हैं, अतः वे स्वयं लघु हो गये हैं। जो आलोचना लेखक की मौलिकता पर प्रहार करना ही अपना ध्येय समझती है, वह दूसरों के लिए तो हितावह हो ही नहीं सकती, अपितु स्वयं के लिए भी घातक सिद्ध होती है। साहित्यिक धाराएं और आन्दोलन कभी भी कटु आलोचना से न रुके हैं और न बदले हैं, हाँ, ऐसे अवसरों पर उनका वेग प्रखरतर ही हुआ है। परन्तु यह भी एक अनुभूत सत्य है कि आलोचना साहित्य को निश्चित रूप से प्रभावित करती है। आटे में मिले नमक की भांति उसका स्वाद आता ही है। हम उसे विश्लेषित न कर सकें या न करना चाहें यह दूसरी बात है। आलोचना द्वारा साहित्य को एक उचित सन्तुलन सदा से ही मिलता रहा है। अन्यथा आज स्वाभाविकता और निर्भीक अभिव्यक्ति के नाम पर न जाने कितनी अनर्गल एवं अमंगलीक सामग्री साहित्य में भर जाती। वैसे भरी भी कम नही है। कहा जाता है कि किसी उत्कृष्ट रचनाओं के युग की भांति उत्कृष्ट आलोचना का युग नहीं हो सकता। एक श्रेष्ठ कवि श्रेष्ठ आलोचक नही हो सकता। एक ही व्यक्ति में दोनों गुण अपनी पूर्णता पर कभी नही देखे गये। किन्तु यहाँ इतना कह देना अनुचित न होगा कि यदि कोई बहुत बडी भेदक रेखा - लक्ष्मणरेखा न खीची जाए तो यह भी देखा जा सकता है कि अनेक व्यक्ति कवि और आलोचक दोनों ही रूपों में श्रेष्ठ सिद्ध हुए हैं। श्रेष्ठ आलोचना स्वयं के उत्कृष्ट भावस्तरों एवं बुद्धिस्तरों के कारण एक रचना - क्रिएशन, होती है। साथ ही किसी रचना पर प्रस्तुत की गई आलोचना उससे आगे एक दूसरी रचना भी कही जा सकती है। अंग्रेजी में ड्रैडन्, वर्डस्वर्थ, कालरिज, आर्नाल्ड और इलियट, तथा हिन्दी में प्रसाद, पन्त, निराला और दिनकर के उदाहरण हमारे सामने हैं ही। ये सभी कवि और आलोचक दोनों ही रूपों में प्रसिद्ध हैं। मान्यता की अधिकता कविरूप में रही है। दूसरी ओर आचार्य रामचन्द्र शुक्ल और डा० नगेन्द्र के ऐसे भी उदाहरण हैं कि जो कवि की अपेक्षा

आलोचक के रूप में ही अधिक प्रसिद्ध हुए हैं। यहाँ इतना कहना ही पर्याप्त होगा कि प्रतिभा पराकाष्ठा पर तो एक व्यक्ति की एक ही दिशा में होती है, किन्तु इसके अपवाद भी मिलते हैं। अतः कारयित्री और भावयित्री प्रतिभा के आधार पर छोटे बड़े का भेद अधिक संगत प्रतीत नहीं होता। एक दृष्टि यह भी है कि प्रत्येक उत्कृष्ट कवि में एक सफल आलोचक भी होता है, परन्तु प्रत्येक आलोचक कवि नहीं हो सकता। इसका कारण यही है कि कविता और आलोचना की प्रतिभा जन्मजात होने पर भी कविता मूलतः जन्मजातत्व पर निर्भर करती है, जब कि आलोचना अध्ययन,अनुभव की महती वांछितता के कारण अर्जित अधिक होती है। अतः हम कह सकते हैं कि साहित्य यदि दृश्य है तो आलोचना उस दृश्य की भव्यता स्पष्ट करनेवाली एकदृष्टि है अतः उसकी महती आवश्यकता है।

उद्देश्य —

क्या आलोचना किसी रचनात्मक कृति के गुणदोष विवेचन, व्याख्या और उसपर एक निर्णयात्मक दृष्टि प्रस्तुत करके विराम ले लेती है। अथवा किसी वस्तु मूलक बृहदुद्देश्य से भी परिचालित है? इसकी अपनी क्या मौलिकता है? इसका अपना क्या विधान है? क्या गुरुलक्ष्य है? यदि इसका कुछ उद्देश्य है भी तो क्या वह आलोचक की आत्मतुष्टि तक ही सीमित है, अथवा सार्वजनीन है? किसी सामायिक लक्ष्य से वह चालित है अथवा कोई स्थायी दृष्टि उसके पीछे है? — इस प्रकार की अनेक पृच्छाएं सामने आती हैं। वास्तव में जिस मत, आन्दोलन, सम्प्रदाय अथवा प्रवृत्ति के पीछे कोई पुष्ट विधान अथवा उद्देश्य नहीं होता, उसका टिकना ही सम्भव नहीं हो पाता, लोकप्रियता प्राप्त करने का तो प्रश्न ही नहीं उठता। जहाँ तक आलोचना के उद्देश्य की बात है, इतना स्पष्टतया कहा जा सकता है कि यह विधा सोद्देश्य और महत्वपूर्ण है; इसकी अपनी मान्यताएं हैं; इसकी अपनी स्वतन्त्रसत्तात्मक क्रियाशीलता है। यह घोडे की उस पूंछ सदृश नहीं है जिसका काम केवल पीछे रहकर - अनुसरण करके यथावसर घोडे के शरीर पर बैठी मक्खियां उडाते रहना है। किन्तु बात कुछ और ही है। आलोचना यदि पुच्छ की भांति साहित्य-अश्व की सेवा में - रक्षा में रत है तो दूसरी ओर उसके जबडों में पडी हुई लगाम की भांति उसकी उच्छृंखलता पर नियन्त्रण करनेवाली भी है। परन्तु यह लगाम ऐसी है जो साहित्य को शासन में नहीं, आत्मानुशासन में रहने

के लिए एक प्रीतिपूर्ण मधुमय संकेत दिया करती है। आलोचना का उद्देश्य उसकी परिभाषा के सन्निकट होना चाहिए। यह बात चर्चित परिभाषाओं द्वारा स्पष्ट ही है। ज्ञानप्राप्ति के अन्य साधनों की भांति अपने आप में यह भी एक रुचिपूर्ण कार्य है। अन्य साहित्यिक विधाओं की भांति यह भी एक विधा है अतः उसका महात्वांकन भी उसी रूप में होना चाहिए। साहित्य के रसास्वादन में आलोचना सहायक है। वह स्वस्थ प्रभाव की वृद्धि करती है तथा दुरूह स्थलों की व्याख्या करके उन्हें स्पष्ट करती है। साहित्य के अन्तर्गत हेय, प्रेय, तथा श्रेय को स्पष्ट करके वह हमारा समय तथा शक्ति बचाती है। वह जनता को साहित्यकार के लिए सन्नद्ध करती है। साहित्यकार को जनोन्मुखी और युगोन्मुखी होने का सन्देश देती है। वह साहित्यिक रुचि को नियमित और अनुशासित करती है। वह साहित्य को पूर्वाग्रह और सनक से मुक्त करती है। जनता और साहित्यकार के बीच से मरणोन्मुखी रुग्णता और गलनशीलता को उन्मूलित करती है; और जनता को जिस के पास मौलिक ग्रन्थ पढने का समय नहीं है, जो नूतन ग्रन्थ जानने में असमर्थ है नूतन सिद्धान्त अपनी दुरूहता के कारण जिसे एक समस्या बन चुके हैं; नव्यतम स्वच्छ, सरल ग्रन्थ एवं नये उद्वेलक विचार देती है। इस प्रकार साहित्यिक आलोचना अनेक बृहत् उद्देश्यों से परिचालित है। "आलोचना भिन्न भिन्न व्यक्तियों के अनुरूप भिन्न प्रकार की हो सकती है। किन्तु मूलतः उसका उद्देश्य एक ही रहता है। अर्थात् कविकर्म का प्रत्येक दृष्टि से मूल्यांकन कर उसे पाठकों के सम्मुख प्रस्तुत करना और उनकी रुचि परिष्कृत कर साहित्य की गतिविधि निर्धारित करना।" प्रसिद्ध विचारक आर्नाल्ड के ये शब्द अत्यन्त दृढता से आलोचना के लक्ष्य का - कार्य का समर्थन करते हैं –

"Simply to know the best that is known and thought in the world, and by in its turn making this known to create a current of true and fresh ideas."

अर्थात् आलोचना का लक्ष्य जगत में ज्ञात एवं विचारित उत्तमोत्तम को जानना और विज्ञापित कराना तथा इस प्रकार नितान्त सद्यः एवं सच्चे विचारों का प्रवाह उत्पन्न कर देना है। वस्तुतः जिस आलोचक ने जीवन को जितनी अधिक निकटता से समझा है, उसमें निमग्न होकर उसका अनुभव किया है; वह उतना ही श्रेष्ठ आलोचक हो सकता है और महान् उद्देश्यों की अवतारणा भी कर सकता है। आलोचना

आरम्भ से ही एक विकासशील साहित्यविधा रही है। इसके उद्देश्य के सम्बन्ध में प्राचीन भारतीय-संस्कृत, तथा पाश्चात्य साहित्य में अनेक आचार्यों की अनेक महत्व-पूर्ण मान्यताएं रही हैं। भारतीय दृष्टि में रस, अलंकार, ध्वनि, रीति और वक्रोक्ति पर पृथक पृथक आचार्यों का अपना अपना आग्रह रहा। पश्चिम में सौन्दर्य, नैतिकता, यथार्थ आदि से सम्बद्ध धाराएं थी। औचित्य और मनोविज्ञान सम्बन्धी धाराओं का भी वहाँ प्राबल्य रहा। किन्तु आर्नाल्ड, सेन्ट्सबरी, आडेन तथा रिचार्ड आदि मर्मी आलोचकों ने आलोचना के ध्येय को व्यापकता प्रदान की और अपनी मान्यता स्थापित की कि आलोचना का सर्वोच्च ध्येय सांस्कृतिक और साहित्यिक परम्पराओं तथा नवयुग की नवदृष्टि को अन्विति देना तथा मानव की आधारभूत शाश्वत् एकता को बल देना, तथा जीवन और कलात्मक मूल्यों में मैत्रीपूर्ण सम्बन्धों की स्थापना करना ही है।

महात्वांकन —

आलोचना सृजनात्मक साहित्य की पृष्ठपोषिका, हृदयोद्घाटिका तथा प्रसारिका ही यदि है, तो यह भी कम महत्वपूर्ण कार्य नही है। क्योंकि, इससे साहित्यिक मूल्यों की स्थापना होती है और जनरुचि में अपार विस्तार होता है पाणिनि का व्याकरण के प्रखर एवं मेधावी सृष्टा के रूप में महत्व है, तो उनके वार्तिककार एवं भाष्यकार कात्यायन और पतंजलि का भी कम महत्व नही है। कालिदास की ख्याति में मल्लिनाथ का कितना हाथ है इसे कौन नहीं जानता। परन्तु आलोचना केवल कृति की परिष्कृति ही नहीं है, अपितु उसकी अपनी दृष्टि भी है; अपने सिद्धान्त भी हैं। आलोचना का महत्वांकन संक्षेप में इन आधारों पर किया जा सकता है —

१ — वह वर्तमान और अतीत जीवनमूल्यों के प्रति पूर्णतया जागरूक रहकर साहित्यिक मूल्यों की स्थापना करती है।

२ — समृद्ध आलोचना प्रशंसात्मक या निन्दात्मक नही, निर्णयात्मक ही हो सकती है। इसी में उसका सच्चा महत्व निहित है।

३ — वह भावयित्री प्रतिभा के साथ कारयित्री प्रतिभा भी है। आलोचना में आलोचक की आत्माभिव्यक्ति भी होती है, और यही कारयित्री

प्रतिभा का आधार है। जो तत्व-भावचिन्तन कारयित्री प्रतिभा में निहित है, वे ही आलोचना में भी। हाँ, इतना निश्चित है कि आलोचना में विचारतत्व प्रबल है और रचना में भावतत्व।

४ — साहित्य की भांति आलोचना भी श्रेष्ठ विचारों और क्रियाशीलता का उन्मेष करती है।

५ — आलोचना एक ऐसा दिग्व्यापी एवं सार्वकालिक प्रकाशस्तम्भ है जो अतीत की प्रेरणा, वर्तमान का जीवन तथा भविष्यत् की महती आशा को अपने आप में संजोए रहता है। अतः स्पष्ट है कि आलोचना द्वारा त्रिकालों को एकसूत्रता प्रदान की जाती है। उनके उत्तमोत्तम को अपने युग के लिए प्रस्तुत किया जाता है।

६ — आलोचक सामाजिक प्राणी है, अतः उसके कुछ अपने समाजसापेक्ष विचार भी हो सकते हैं, जिनका वह उपयोग करना ही चाहेगा। आलोचना कोई जड केमरा या एकसरे की मशीन नहीं है जो वस्तु के वर्तमान भौतिक रूप की याथातथ्यात्मक प्रस्तुति में ही इतिकृत्य हो जाती है; अपितु प्रस्तुत वस्तु में वह अपनी भावयित्री प्रतिभा और लोक सन्दर्भों को भी योजित करती है। रचना की अन्य सम्भावनाओं पर भी विचार करती है। इसी में उसकी मौलिकता और महत्व दोनों निहित हैं।

७ — हृदय और बुद्धि अर्थात् भावना और विचारों का अन्योन्याश्रयत्व बनाए रखना अथवा इसके लिए भूमि प्रस्तुत करना भी आलोचना का महत्वपूर्ण कार्य है। किसी देश की साहित्यिक समृद्धि में आलोचना का महत्वपूर्ण योग रहता है।

८ — अन्तिम रूप में आलोचना का महत्व इस बात पर निर्भर करता है कि वह अपने मुख्य लक्ष्य - कृति के मूल्यांकन का आधार कृति का मनोवैज्ञानिक विश्लेषण ही माने। नीति और आचार पर उसका आग्रह अधिक वांछनीय नहीं है। कारण यह है कि ये अत्यन्त सापेक्ष शब्द हैं, अतः नीति और आचार के सूचक "उदात्त" और "पवित्र" शब्द सदा अविश्लेष्य ही रहेंगे।

अन्त में हम कह सकते हैं कि आलोचना से साहित्य की स्थिति में दृढ़ता, परिपक्वता तथा लोकरुचि की अभिवृद्धि होती है। यह स्वयं भी रचनात्मक साहित्यिक प्रवृत्तियों को प्रोत्साहन देनेवाली एक श्रेष्ठकोटि की साहित्यिक रचनात्मक विधा है। हिन्दी में जितनी विपुल मात्रा में आज सृजनात्मक साहित्य आ रहा है, उसी के अनुरूप आलोचना भी प्रवर्धमान है और यह किसी भी देश की हार्दिक एवं बौद्धिक प्रकृष्टता का संसूचक लक्षण है।

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

1.	Sri N. Subramania Sastri	: Curator, S. V. University Oriental Research Institute Manuscripts Library Tirupati, retired on 16-11-1968 only.
2.	Dr. J.B. Bhattacharya	: Reader in Sanskrit, Calcutta University, Calcutta.
3.	Dr. V. Kameswara Rao	: Lecturer in History, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati.
4.	Dr. V. Anjaneya Sarma	: Lecturer in Sanskrit, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati.
5.	Dr. C. B. Rawat	: Formerly Reader in Hindi, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati. Now Head of the Department of Hindi, Banasthali Vidyapeetha, Jaipur (Rajasthan).
6.	Dr. V. Yasoda Devi	: Lecturer in History, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati.
7.	Dr. (Smt) Aparna Chattopadhyay	: Lecturer in History, Benaras Hindu University, Benaras.
8.	Sri N. Subbu Reddiar	: Lecturer in Tamil, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati.
9.	Sri M.S. Narayana Murti	: Research Assistant, S. V. University Oriental Research Institute, Tirupati.
10.	Sri Villivalam Narayanacharya	: Principal, Sanskrit College, Madhurantakam.
11.	Dr. J. Suryanarayana	: Lecturer in Telugu, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati.
12.	Dr. Ravindra Kumar Jain	: Lecturer in Hindi, Sri Venkateswara University; Tirupati.

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अपाणिनीयप्रामाण्यसाधनम्

APĀṆINĪYA – PRĀMĀṆYA – SĀDHANAM

By

NĀRĀYAṆA BHAṬṬAPĀDA

Edited with Introduction, English Translation and Notes

By

E. R. Sreekrishna Sarma

SRI VENKATESWARA UNIVERSITY
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FOREWORD

The present work *Apāṇiniyaprāmāṇya-sādhanam* issued as No. 2 under 'Texts and Studies' an appendage to *S.V. University Oriental Journal* is a critical edition of a *krodapatra* written by a versatile scholar Melpputtur Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri or Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭapāda. This work is a reply to the dogmatic views of one Vainateya who was supposed to be a contemporary of the author of this work and who avowedly accepted the grammatical works of only Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali as authoritative ones and rejected all others. Thanks to Prof. E.R. Sreekrishna Sarma for preparing a scholarly edition of the work with an English translation and copious notes. The Editor has added an erudite Introduction to the work wherein he summerises the outlines of arguments systematically advanced by the author in favour of accepting the non-Paninian grammars also as authoritative.

TIRUPATI,
Dt. 31–12–1968.

J. CHENNA REDDY,
GENERAL EDITOR.

INTRODUCTION

The *Apāṇiniyaprāmāṇya-sādhanam* was described under the title *Parapakṣakhaṇḍanam* in the Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Curator's Office Library, Trivandrum (1939), No. 475. Through an article under the caption *Oru kattu* (A Letter) in the issue of the *Mathrubhumi* weekly, Calicut, dated 5-2-1939, the late pandit E.V. Rāman Nampūtiri brought to the notice of the public the last portion of the work which is in the form of a covering letter addressed to the scholars of the Coḷa country in general, and one Someśvara Dīkṣita and Yajñanārāyaṇa Dīkṣita in particular. Subsequently in 1942 the same scholar brought out an edition of the work with the name *Apāṇiniyapramāṇatā* which was printed in *Devanāgarī* script in the V.V. Press Branch, Trivandrum. It is curious to note that as per the information given on the title page of this edition only 54 copies were printed. The present edition is based on this printed edition (designated R in the foot-notes) and an old transcript of the manuscript described in the Trivandrum Catalogue (designated as Tc in the foot-notes) which was made available to me by Sri M.S.K. Nampūtiri.

The author of this *kroḍapatra* is the well known versatile scholar Melpputtur Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri who flourished between 1560 and 1666 A.D.[1] Thus, he was a contemporary of the renowned scholars of Coḷadeśa, like the celebrated Appayya Dīkṣita, Veṅkaṭeśa Makhin and Rājacūḍāmaṇi Dīkṣita, although there seems to be no full knowledge of the works of Bhaṭṭatiri in Coḷadeśa and the works of the Coḷa scholars in Kerala at that time.

The *kroḍapatra* is a reply to the dogmatic views of one Vainateya who held that the grammatical works other than of the trinity of sages, namely, Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali were not authoritative. In the grammatical work *Prakriyāsarvasva* Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri has accepted the authority of the grammars of non-Paninian school. Particularly Bhoja, the author of the *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* and *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* was held by him in high esteem and he has even copied some sections of the *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* in his own grammatical work (e.g. the *Nyāyakhaṇḍa* in the *Prakriyāsarvaśva*.),

1. K.K. Raja: *The Contribution of Kerala to Sanskrit Literature*, p. 130.

One may imagine that seeing the *Prakriyāsarvasva*, the Vainateya Paṇḍita in question might have challenged the acceptance of non-Paninian views by Bhaṭṭatiri ; but there is yet no support to this imagination. If we could unearth some work which avowedly denies the authenticity of non-Paninian works, we may be able to understand the situation under which Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri wrote this *kroḍapatra*.

The work is unique in the sense that there is no other treatise found so far devoting itself to the task of proving the authority of non-Paninian grammars through systematic argumentation, although the ideas expressed herein are found scattered in the works of the trinity of Sages, the *Vākyapadīya* and in the works of the grammarians down to Bhojadeva. The main idea presented here is that the scope of language is wider and the grammar is only an aid to undrestand the correctness of usages. Many noted writers have used forms which are not noticed by Pāṇini and his followers. Are we to reject those usages as incorrect because rules for them are not found in the Paninian grammar? Or shall we consider those usages as correct and acceptable even to Pāṇini though not noticed by him? The fanatics would answer the first question in the affirmative, and this treatise is a fitting answer to them. Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri is of course a votary of the Paninian school. He maintains that Paninian rules are the clearest and the briefest of the Sanskrit grammars. But he would not admit that the other grammars are therefore non-authoritative. For the grammar is for explaining and codifying the language, whereas language is too wide to be restricted by grammatical rules.

Beginning from Kaiyyaṭa upto Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa, there has been a tendency to reject the authority of the non-Paninan grammars and to show forcibly that the forms which are not found in the rules of the trinity of the sages can be somehow or other pressed out of their works. In this process even the religion of the authors has been brought to play a part. For example, the incorporation of some rules of Candragomin in the *Kāśikāvṛtti* was resented by the votaries of the trinity of sages. The author of the *Nyāsa* has been criticized sometimes very severely, presumably on the grouud that he was a Jaina although his work is one of the best in the Paninian system. This narrowness of outlook in the academic matters is what is not favoured by Nā āyana Bhaṭṭatiri. Of course, his teacher, the celebrated grammarian and astronomer Ac ṇta Piṣāroṭi had already shown this broad outlook in his excellct manual on grammar the *Praveśaka*. Bhaṭṭatiri has however given us a well-reasoned treatise vindicating this broad outlook and liberality through this *kroḍapatra*.

The Vainateya whose views criticised in this *kroḍapatra* is yet to be identified. Appākavi or Periyappā Śāstri, the author of the *Śṛṅgāra Sāhajīyam*[2], says that his uncle as well as one of his brothers is Vainateya. Dr. V. Raghavan states that there were several Vainateyas.[3] But until the treatise which has been criticised in this *kroḍapatra* is known we are unable to identify the Vainateya in question. Appākavi's father Aṇṇā Sāstri is said to have been in the court of Veṅkaṭapatirāya of Vijayanagar[4]. His brother Vainateya is said to have written a commentary on the *Prakāśa* (most probably Rucidatta's commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*).[5] This Vainateya must be then a contemporary of Nārāyaṇa Baṭṭatiri. But it is not yet known whether he was maintaining the view that the non-Paṇinian grammars were not authoritative.

The covering letter at the end of the *kroḍapatra* is addressed to one Someśvara Dīkṣita and Yajñanārāyaṇa Dīkṣita. The former is still to be identified while the latter must be the scholar minister of Raghunātha Nāyak of Tanjore[6]. It is also mentioned here that the Someśvara Dīkṣita was a scholar of deep erudition in Grammar, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Tarka and he wrote a work *Kāmadeva-vijaya* and vanquished one Kāmadeva. The prologue to the *Śṛṅgāra Sāhajīyam* referred to above mentions that Aṇṇan Śāstri vanquished one Kāmadeva in the court of Veṅkaṭapatirāya. Aṇṇan Sāstri's other name was Cidambara according to M. Krishnamachary,[7] but his identity with Someśvara is still unknown. Ullūr S. Parameswara Aiyar[8] identifies this Someśvara with the author of Rāghavayādaviyam[9], but no proof is given to substantiate his statement. The nature of the work *Kāmadeva-vijaya* is also not known. Was it a treatise on Grammar, or Mīmāṃsā or Tarka?[10] This point is not clear from the reference in this *kroḍapatra*.

The works of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri deserve to be known more widely. It is hopped that the present edition with the English translation and notes will prove to be usefull to the students of Sanskrit in general and of Sanskrit grammar in particuiar.

2. Described under R.No. 1843 in the Madras Government Oriental MSS Library Catalogues.
3. See foot-note No. 3 of the translation of the present work.
4. Vide R.No. 1843 of the Madras Government Oriental MSS. Library Catalogue. According to *New Catalogus Catalogorum* this was Veṅkaṭapati III who ruled from 1632-42
5. ibid.
6. The last but one verse of the covering letter indicates this. Raghunātha Nāyak ruled between 1614 and 1633.
7. *History of Classical Sanskrit Literature*, p. 245.
8. *Kerala Sāhitya Caritram*, vol II. p.390.
9. This author's family name was *Viñjimūri*. He was a desciple of one Dvivedī. See R.No. 1859 of Madras Govt. Oriental Mss. Library Catalogue.
10. According to *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, vol. III. p. 348, it is a grammatical work.

IMPORTANT NOTE

Page ४ para १३ sentence 5 of the Sanskrit Text may be read as follows:

ननु पतञ्जलेः सर्वोत्कृष्टत्वात् कथं तद्वचनबाध इति चेत्। तर्हि व्यासादेरपि सर्वोत्कृष्टत्वात् तद्वचनबाधाभावाय व्याकरणान्तरमपि प्राप्तम्।

Page 19, para 13 sentence 3 of the Translation may be read as:

[Objection:] Because Patañjali is the best of all (i.e., the three sages) how can his words be annulled?

[Answer:] In that case because Vyāsa, etc., are also the best among all, in order to avoid the annulment of their words other grammars (than those of the trinity of sages) are also to be anticipated.

Foot-note No. 33 on page 19 may be treated as cancelled.

[These corrections are necessiated as the result of my opportunity to see for myself the original MS. of the work after the printing of the pages is over. I crave the indulgence of scholars in this matter.]

E. R. S. S.

अथ

अपाणिनीयप्रामाण्यसाधनम्

सुदर्शनसमालम्बी सोऽहं नारायणोऽधुना ।
वैनतेय भवत्पक्षमाक्रम्य स्थातुमारभे ॥

तत्रायं संग्रहः –

पाणिन्युक्तं प्रमाणं न तु पुनरपरं चन्द्रभोजादिशास्त्रं[1]
केऽप्याहुस्तल्लघिष्ठं न खलु बहुविदामस्ति निर्मूलवाक्यम् ।
बह्वङ्गीकारभेदो भवति गुणवशात्, पाणिनेः प्राक् कथं वा ?
पूर्वोक्तिं[2] पाणिनिश्चाप्यनुवदति, विरोधेऽपि कल्प्यो विकल्पः ॥

१. अत्र तावद् 'इन्द्रचन्द्रकाशकृत्स्न्यापिशलिशाकटायनादिपुरातनाचार्यरचितानां व्याकरणानामप्रमाणत्वमेव, मुनित्रयोक्तस्यैव तु प्रामाण्यम्' इति केचित् पण्डितंमन्या मन्यन्ते । तदपहसनीयमेव; चन्द्रादिवचसामनाप्तप्रणीतत्वाभावेन प्रामाण्यनिश्चयात्। पुरुषवचसामप्रामाण्यं तावदनाप्तप्रणीतत्वहेतुकमेवेति चन्द्रादिशास्त्राणामप्रामाण्यं वदद्भिस्तेषामनाप्तत्वे प्रमाणं वक्तव्यम् ॥

२. तत्र तेषामनाप्तत्वं तावत् प्रत्यक्षतो न लक्ष्यते । 'चन्द्रादिवाक्यमप्रमाणम्; शिष्टानङ्गीकृतत्वात्, अवैदिकवाक्यवद्' इत्यनुमानमत्र प्रसरीसर्ति इति चेत्; तत्र शिष्टानङ्गीकृतत्वमसिद्धमेव । तथा हि – के नामात्र शिष्टा व्यपदिष्टाः ? किं वैदिका एव ? उत साधुशब्दव्यवहारिणः ? उत ये केचिद् भवदभीष्टा वा ?

३. तत्राद्ये तावत्, परमवैदिकानां वेदव्यासादीनां मुनित्रयालक्षितबहुपदप्रयोगदर्शनात्, 'दृष्ट्वा बहु व्याकरणं मुनिना भारतं कृतम्' इति चोक्तत्वात्; शङ्कराचार्याणामपि प्रपञ्चसारादिषु 'हुनेद्' इत्यादिमुनित्रयानुक्तपदप्रयोगात्; वैदिकोत्तमानां च मुरारिमिश्रसुरेश्वराचार्यादीनां 'विश्रामा'दिशब्दप्रयोगात्; वैदिकवीरस्य

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1 R. सूत्रं 2. R. क्तं

नैषधकारस्य 'नैवाल्पमेधसि पटो रुचिमत्त्वमस्य' इत्यादिप्रयोगात्; वैदिकस्थापकानां विद्यारण्याचार्याणां धातुवृत्तौ 'कथापयति' इत्यादौ शाकटायनादिमताङ्गीकारात्; बोप्पदेवकौमुदीकारादीनां च वैदिकवराणामपाणिनीयानेकशब्दप्रदर्शनदर्शनात्; इदानीमप्युत्तरदेशस्थैर्वैदिकश्रेष्ठैः सारस्वतादिव्याकरणानां प्रमाणीकरणात्; कौमुद्याश्च सर्वदेशपरिगृहीतत्वात्; पाणिनीयोत्पत्तेः प्राग्भवैश्च वैदिकैः व्याकरणान्तराणामेवाङ्गीकृतत्वात्; पाणिनीयव्यतिरिक्तच्छान्दसलक्षणानां प्रतिशाख्यानां युष्माभिरप्यङ्गीकृतत्वाच्च व्याकरणान्तराणां शिष्टाङ्गीकृतत्वं स्पष्टतरमेव ॥

४. ननु व्यासाद्यृषिवचसां छान्दसत्वेन सिद्धत्वात् तत्सिद्धये कुतो व्याकरणान्तराङ्गीकारः? 'दृष्ट्वा बहु व्याकरणं' इत्यस्य च 'एकमेव व्याकरणं बहुशो दृष्ट्वा' इत्यर्थः इति चेत्, तन्न; मुनित्रयानुक्तच्छान्दसपदसमर्थनार्थं छान्दसलक्षणतयापि व्याकरणान्तराणां तैरादरणीयत्वात्; 'बहु व्याकरणम्' इत्यस्य क्लिष्टार्थकल्पनानुपपत्तेः ॥

५. ननु 'व्यत्ययो बहुलम्', 'बहुलं छन्दसि', 'सर्वे विधयश्छन्दसि विकल्प्यन्ते' इति सूत्रवार्तिकवचनादेव सिद्धेः व्याकरणान्तरं नान्वेष्यमिति चेत्, तर्हि एतैरेव वचनैः कृतार्थौ पाणिनिकात्यायनौ छान्दसविषयशेषग्रन्थिकत्थायां किमर्थं परिक्लिष्टौ? तस्माद् व्यासाद्युक्तावपि विशेषलक्षणव्याकरणान्तरं लभ्यमेव ॥

६. न च प्रातिशाख्यलभ्यमिति वाच्यम्; तेषामपि व्याकरणान्तरत्वेन भवदुक्तविरोधित्वात्। ननु प्रातिशाख्यान्यसाधारणव्याकरणान्येव, साधारणव्याकरणान्तराणामेव च प्रामाण्यमस्माकमनिष्टम् इति चेत्, न। अपाणिनीयत्वसाम्येऽपि असाधारणव्याकरणानामिष्टत्वे साधारणेषु विद्वेषे च निमित्ताभावात्। पाणिनीयस्य नियमपरत्वात् तत्सदृशेष्वन्येषु प्रद्वेष इति तु पश्चान्निराकरिष्यते। यत्तु 'अपशब्दास्त्रयो माघे' इत्यारभ्य 'व्यासस्तन्मयतां गतः' इति, तदपि गुरुलघ्वोः 'ग' 'ल' शब्दोक्तिवत् नामैकदेशेन नामग्रहणाद् अपशब्दा इति अपाणिनीयशब्दा इति व्याचक्षते महान्तः। उक्तं च —

'अष्टादश पुराणानि नव व्याकरणानि च।
निर्मथ्य चतुरो वेदान् मुनिना भारतं कृतम् ॥'

इति।

'यान्युज्जहार भगवान् व्यासो व्याकरणाम्बुधेः।
तानि किं पदरत्नानि भान्ति पाणिनिगोष्पदे ॥'

इति च ॥

७. ननु छान्दसानामच्छान्दसत्वेन प्रयोगादेव व्यासस्य याकरणानभियुक्तत्वमिति चेत्, मैवं सर्वज्ञं व्यासं प्रत्यमङ्गलं वोचः। एवं च पाणिनेरपि व्याकरणानभियुक्तत्वं स्यादिति स्वगलच्छेदकमेवेदं भवतो वचनम्। सोऽपि हि 'वृद्धिरादैच्' इति कुत्वाभावं छान्दसमेव प्रयुक्तवानिति 'कुत्वं कस्मान्न भवति' इत्यादिना भाष्यजालेन भाष्यत इत्यास्तां तावत् ॥

८. एतेन 'साधुशब्दव्यवहारित्वं शिष्टत्वम्' इति च निरस्तम्। किंच शिष्टव्यवहृतानामेव साधुत्वम्, साधुशब्दव्यवहारिणामेव शिष्टत्वम्, इति परस्पराश्रयोऽपि प्रसज्येत। शिष्टप्रयुक्तानामेव साधुत्वमिति च व्याकरणमीमांसायामविवादमिति ॥

९. एवं तृतीयपक्षोऽपि भ्रदीयान्। मुनित्रयमतमात्राङ्गीकारिण एव शिष्टा इत्यत्र श्रुतिस्मृतिवचनाभावेन भवत्कपोलमात्रकल्पितत्वात्। मुनित्रयवचनस्यैव प्रामाण्यात् तदङ्गीकारिणामेव शिष्टत्वमिति चेत्, कर्हिचित् प्रामाण्यवशात् तदङ्गीकारिणां शिष्टत्वं शिष्टाङ्गीकृतत्वाच्च प्रामाण्यम् इत्यन्योन्याश्रयलाभ एव धन्यात्मनाम्। अथ ये केचिदेव भवदभीष्टाः शिष्टा इति चेत्, ये केचिदस्मदभीष्टा इति दुर्युक्तियुक्त एवायं वादकलहः स्यात्। तदिदमुक्तम् — 'न खलु बहुविदामस्ति निर्मूलवाक्यम्' इति। बहुविदां व्यासशङ्करादीनां निर्मूलपदप्रयोगाभावात् तन्मूलतया व्याकरणान्तराणां तैरङ्गीकृतत्वात्, शिष्टानङ्गीकृतत्वहेतुरसिद्ध एवेति भावः ॥

१०. शब्दश्च वैदिको वा मन्वादिकथितो वा न व्याकरणान्तराणामप्रामाण्य-बोधको दृश्यते। न च मुनित्रयवचनं तदनुसारि ग्रन्थान्तरं वा पुनरितरप्रामाण्य-प्रतिक्षेपकं साक्षादीक्षामहे ॥

११. यत्तु क्वचिद् 'विश्रामा'दीनामयुक्तत्वभाषणं तल्लक्षणान्तरदर्शनेन प्रयोक्त-व्यमित्येतावत्परम्। अन्यथा सर्वदैव मुनित्रयवचननिबद्धादराणां मुरार्यादीनां तत्प्रयोगा-नुपपत्तेः ॥

१२. किंच मुनित्रयतदनुसारिवचसां प्रमाण्यातिशये सिद्ध एव तैरन्यशास्त्राणां बाधः, अन्यशास्त्राणामेतद्बाध्यत्वेन दौर्बल्यातिशये सिद्ध एव च एतद्वचसां प्रामाण्याति-शयसिद्धिः, इत्यन्योन्याश्रयेणैव हन्यन्ते महान्तः। मुनित्रयवचनादेव मुनित्रयवचन-प्राबल्यसिद्धिरिति स्वाश्रयमपिप्रसक्तमेव॥

१३. न च 'पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्याः' इतिवत् मुनित्रयवचनेन 'एत एव साधुशब्दाः' इति नियमितत्वादन्येषामप्रामाण्यमिति वाच्यम्। 'आबादयः प्रयोगत अनुसर्तव्याः' इत्यादि तत्र तत्र वर्णनाद् आकृतिगणादिपरिग्रहाच्च नियमाभावस्य स्पष्टत्वात्। अन्यथा पाणिनिकात्यायनाभ्याम् 'एत एव साधवः' इति नियमनाद् भाष्यकारकृतेष्ट्यादिवचनमप्रमाणं स्यात्। पाणिनिनियमितत्वाद् वा कात्यायनवचनान्यपि बाध्येरन्। ननु पतञ्जलेः सर्वोत्कृष्टत्वात् तद्वचनबाधाभावाय व्याकरणान्तरमपि (प्राप्तम्) बाध्यम्। मुनित्रयवचनस्य नियमपरत्वे छान्दससूत्रैरेत एव साधुशब्दा इति नियमितत्वात् प्रातिशाख्यान्यपि प्रत्याख्येयानि स्युः ॥

१४. ननु मुनित्रयवचने वेदविशेषलक्षणानिरीक्षणात् सामान्यलक्षणपराणि व्याकरणान्तराण्येव तेन व्यावर्त्यन्ते, न वेदविशेषलक्षणपराणि प्रातिशाख्यानि इति चेत्, न। 'संबुद्धौ शाकल्यस्येतावनार्षे', 'यजुष्युरः', 'देवसुन्नयोर्यजुषि कांठके', 'सामखिकः', 'प्लुतपूर्वस्य सवर्णदीर्घबाधनार्थं यणादेशो वक्तव्यः' इत्यादिवेदविशेषलक्षणानामपि स्पष्टदृष्टत्वात्। न च 'दृष्टानुविधिश्छन्दसि भवति' इति वचनात् छान्दसेषु न नियमः प्रवर्तत इति वाच्यम्। शास्त्रसाकल्यस्य नियमपरत्वे तदन्तर्गते छान्दसेऽपि नियमस्य दुर्वारत्वात्। 'शिष्टप्रयोगानुसारि व्याकरणम्' इति तत्र तत्र दर्शनेन लौकिकेष्वपि शिष्टानुविधिसाम्याच्च। तस्मादाकृतिगणादिभिः सावशेषे शास्त्रे 'एतेषामेव शब्दानां प्रयोगे धर्मो भवति' इति नियन्तुमशक्यत्वाद् 'एतत्प्रकाराणां साधुशब्दानां प्रयोगे धर्मः, तदितरापशब्दप्रयोगे त्वधर्मः' इत्येतावदेव नियमपरत्वं वक्तव्यम् ॥

१५. अत एव तद्धितप्रकरणे 'शिष्टप्रयोगतोऽनुगन्तव्यम्' इत्यस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिकारेणोक्ते पदमञ्जरीकृदाह — 'किमर्थं तर्हि व्याकरणमिति चेद् उच्यते। व्याकरणोक्तान् शब्दान् विदित्वा तत्सम्यग्व्यवहारिणः पुरुषान् दृष्ट्वा शिष्टा एत इत्यवगम्य तत्प्रयुक्तमन्यदपि ग्राह्यतया ज्ञातुं शिष्टपरिज्ञानार्थं व्याकरणम्' इति। अतो नियमपरत्वं परास्तम् ॥

१६. किं चात्र भाष्यादिगिरा तदुक्तेः
प्राबल्यमित्येवमुदीर्यते चेत्।
ततो मदुक्तत्ववशान्मदुक्तिः
प्रमाणमित्येव वचो लघीयः ॥

१७. तत् सिद्धं अपौरुषेयः पौरुषेयो वा शब्दो न व्याकरणान्तराणामप्रामाण्यं बोधयतीति। तदिदमुक्तम् — 'न खलु बहुविदामस्ति निष्फलवाक्यम्' इति। बहुविदां

भाष्यकारादीनां निर्मूलं शास्त्रान्तराप्रामाण्यकथनं स्ववचनप्राबल्यवचनं वा स्वाश्रयाभिभवान्न संभवतीति भावः। अत्र क्वचित् परशास्त्रदूषणमस्ति चेदपि युक्तिरसमात्रेणैव इत्यवगन्तव्यम्। किंच 'असिद्धवदत्राभाद्' इत्यादि परशतानि सूत्राणि भाष्यनिरस्तान्यपि न त्यज्यन्ते। तद् वस्तुपरं शास्त्रमिति॥

१८. ननु बह्वङ्गीकारान्यथानुपपत्त्या मुनित्रयवचसामेव प्रामाण्यम्, अन्यशास्त्राणामप्रामाण्यमपि सिद्धम् इत्यर्थापत्तिरेवात्र प्रमाणमिति चेत्, तदपि न। सुग्रहत्वपरिमितत्वादिगुणातिशयवशादेव बह्वङ्गीकारविशेषणस्योपपत्तेः। तद्वशादन्येषामप्रमाण्यस्य साधयितुमशक्यत्वात्। अन्यथा तर्कग्रन्थेषु मणिरेव बह्वङ्गीकृत इति कुसुमाञ्जलिकिरणावलिपक्षिलभाष्यादीनि अप्रमाणानि भवेयुः। शब्दशास्त्रेऽपि कैयटटीका बह्वङ्गीकृतेति भर्तृहरिटीकाद्यप्रमाणं स्यात्। स्मृतिष्वपि मानवादीनां पुराणेष्वपि भागवतादीनां शिक्षासु च शौनकीयादीनां बह्वङ्गीकृतत्वाद् इतरेषामप्रामाण्यं वदन् भवानवैदिकतमश्चापद्येत। पाणिनीयानां तु गुणातिशयोऽस्माकमिष्ट एव। इतरेषामप्रामाण्यमेव त्वनिष्टम्। एनेन मीमांसादिषु व्याख्यानाय पाणिनीयमेव गृहीतमिति तस्यैव प्रामाण्यमित्येतदपि निरस्तम्। गुणवत्त्वात् प्रसिद्धतया मीमांसादौ तदुपादानोपपत्तेः। तेनान्येषामप्रामाण्यकल्पनानवकाशात्। तदिदमुक्तम्—'बह्वङ्गीकारभेदो भवति गुणवशाद्' इति॥

१९. किंच एवंवादिना पाणिनेः प्राक् कथं शब्दव्यवहारवार्ता इति वक्तव्यम्। न हि तदा साधुशब्दव्यवहार एव नास्तीति युक्तम्। ऊहादिसाधुत्वाभावेन सकलधर्मानुष्ठानविप्लवप्रसङ्गाद्, अपशब्दप्रयोगकृतसर्वनरकपातप्रसंगात्, सर्वेषां म्लेच्छताप्रसंगाच्च। न च तदा व्याकरणं विनैव साधुशब्दान् जानन्तीति वाच्यम्। 'ब्राह्मणेन निष्कारणः षडङ्गो वेदोऽध्येयो ज्ञेयश्च' इति श्रुतिवचनात्, तदानीं षडङ्गाध्ययनाभावेन सर्वेषामब्राह्मणत्वप्रसंगात्। न च पञ्चाङ्गान्येव तदानीमध्येयानीति वा पाणिनीयस्यैवाङ्गत्वमिति वा वचनमस्ति। भाष्यकारोऽपि 'तस्मादध्येयं व्याकरणम्' इत्येव मुहुर्मुहुराह, न त्वध्येयं पाणिनीयमिति। तस्मात् पणिनीयोत्पत्तेः पूर्वं पूर्वव्याकरणानामेव बह्वङ्गीकारात् तदन्याथानुपपत्तिजं प्रामाण्यं तेषामप्यनिवार्यम्॥

२०. किंच पूर्वं तावत् पूर्वशास्त्राण्येव बह्वङ्गीकृतानि संप्रत्यपि संप्रथन्ते, पाणिनीयं तु इदानीमेव बह्वङ्गीकृतम्, पूर्वं न प्रावर्तत, इति बह्वङ्गीकारविशेषणप्रामाण्यसाधने तेषामेव वैशिष्ट्यं स्यात्॥

२१. ननु प्रमाणचराण्यपि पूर्वशास्त्राणि पाणिनीयोत्पत्तेः परस्तात् परास्तप्रामाण्य-मसूणान्यप्यभूवन् इति चेत्, मैवम्।

कथं प्रमाणभूतानां कालात् प्रामाण्यनिह्नवः।
श्रुतिस्मृत्यादयोऽप्येवमप्रमाणाः स्युरेकदा॥

अत एव हि 'कृते तु मानवो धर्मः' इति केनचित् साक्षादुक्तमप्यनादृत्य कलियुगेऽपि मनुवचनं प्रमाणीक्रियते। अतो न कालवशात् प्रामाण्यक्षयः गुणभेदादङ्गीकारभेद एव तु भवति इति। तदिदमुक्तम् - 'पाणिनेः प्राक् कथं वा' इति॥

२२. एवमप्रामाण्यहेत्वभावे सिद्धे 'न खलु बहुविदामस्ति निर्मूलवाक्यम्' इत्यनेनैव शास्त्रान्तराणां प्रामाण्यं साध्यम्। 'चन्द्रादिवाक्यं प्रमाणम्, समूलवाक्यत्वात्, पाणिनीयवत्'; 'समूलं च तद्वाक्यम्, बहुविद्वाक्यत्वात्, तद्वदेव'; 'बहुविदश्च ते, शास्त्रकारित्वात्, पाणिनिवदेव'॥

२१. न हि बहुविधं वक्तव्यजातं सम्यगजानन् शास्त्रं कर्तुमारभते। आरभ-माणोऽपि वा परिहासास्पदं स्यात्। तस्मात् शास्त्रकारत्वेन प्रसिद्धानां तेषामपि शब्द-तत्त्वविस्तरवेदित्वात्, भ्रान्तिविप्रलम्भकत्वशङ्कायाश्च पाणिनिवदेव तेषामपि निरवका-शत्वात्, सावकाशत्वे वा पाणिनेरपि तच्छङ्काया दुर्वारत्वाद्, आप्तप्रणीतत्वहेतुना व्याकरणान्तराण्यपि प्रमाणानीति सिद्धम्॥

२२. ननु पाणिनीयगतज्ञापकादिनैव शिष्टप्रयोगाणां साधयितुं शक्यत्वाद् व्याकरणान्तराणां वैफल्यादेवाप्रमाणत्वं ब्रूम इति चेत्, तदपि न। क्वचित् प्रयोगाल्लक्षण-कल्पना, क्वचिल्लक्षणात् प्रयोगकल्पनमिति पाणिनीयपातिव्रत्यजुषामप्यविवादम्। तत्र शिष्टप्रयोगे दृष्टे ज्ञापकादिनैव साध्यत्वं नाम। यत्र तु 'कथापयति' इत्यादौ व्याकर-णान्तरलक्षणमेव दृष्टं, तत्र कथमस्य गतार्थत्वकृतमप्रामाण्यमापाद्यते? अपिच, शिष्टप्रयोगदृष्टिस्थलेऽपि 'विश्रामा'दौ व्याकरणान्तरसाक्षाल्लक्षणस्य स्पष्टदृष्टत्वात् क्लिष्ट-तरज्ञापकादिवर्णनं गौरवायेति प्राप्तेऽपि प्रौढिकामैर्मुनित्रयपूजनार्थं तदीयज्ञापकादिनैव साध्यते चेदस्माकमप्यभीष्टतरमेव। न तु तेन व्याकरणान्तराणां गतार्थत्वमप्रामाण्यं वा इत्यास्तामेतत्॥

२५. किंच पूर्वाचार्याणां प्रामाण्यं पाणिन्यादीनामप्यनुमतमेव। 'आङि चापः', 'औङ आपः' इत्यादौ पूर्वाचार्यमतसाक्षात्संज्ञाया एवोपात्तत्वात्। 'व्योर्लघुप्रयत्नतरः

शाकटायनस्य', 'वा सुप्यापिशलेः', 'वष्टि भागुरिरल्लोपमवाप्योरुपसर्गयोः' इत्यादौ पूर्वाचार्यमतस्य साक्षादुपादानाच्च। न हि पूर्वाचार्यसंकीर्तनमात्राद् विकल्प उत्तिष्ठति। तन्मतमेवं मम मतमेवमिति तन्मतोपादानादेव विकल्पसिद्धिः। किं च 'तदशिष्यं संज्ञाप्रमाणत्वात्', 'लुब्योगाप्रख्यानात्' इति पूर्वाचार्योक्तं पाणिनिः स्वयमेव दूषयित्वा पुनः 'जनपदे लुप्' इत्यादीनि दूषितचराण्येव पूर्वाचार्यवचनानि स्पष्टमुपादत्ते। तेन ज्ञायते क्वचिद् युक्तिरसाद् दूषणे कथितेऽपि पूर्वाचार्यवचनमुपादेयमेवेति ॥

२६. एवं पाणिनिना स्वेन दूषितस्यापि संग्रहात्।
पूर्वाचार्यमतं क्वापि व्याख्यादौ दृश्यते यदि ॥
युक्तिप्रौढिरसेनैवेत्यवगच्छन्तु कोविदाः।
तावता हेयता नेति ज्ञापयामास पाणिनिः ॥

तेन पाणिन्युक्तं प्रमाणमित्यङ्गीकुर्वतापि तदभिमतत्वादेव पूर्वशास्त्राण्यपि प्रमाणमित्यङ्गीकर्तव्यम्। तदिदमुक्तम् - 'पूर्वोक्तं पाणिनिश्चाप्यनुवदति' इति ॥

२७. किंच 'अनादिश्चैषा व्याकरणपरंपरा' इत्युक्तत्वात् पूर्वव्याकरणमूलमालोच्य पाणिनिनापि शास्त्रं कृतमिति वक्तव्यम्। 'तेन प्रोक्तं' इत्यत्रैव च 'पाणिनीयं शास्त्रम्' इत्युदाह्रियते, न 'कृते ग्रन्थे' इत्यत्र। तस्मात् पाणिनिनापि शास्त्रस्य प्रत्याहारविशेषशालित्वेनोक्तत्वमेव; न कृतत्वम्, इत्यवगम्यते। ततश्चापाणिनीयत्वात् पूर्वशास्त्राणामप्रामाण्यं वदता पाणिनीयस्यापि निर्मूलत्वादप्रामाण्यमेवापादितमिति सकलव्याकरणभञ्जनं संजनितं महाशाब्दिकैः ॥

२८. ननु पाणिनिः पूर्वशास्त्राणि प्रयोगान्तराणि च दृष्ट्वा तेषु हेयभागमपहाय शास्त्रं कृतवानिति पाणिन्यनुक्तं हेयमेवेति चेत्, न। पाणिन्यनुक्तस्य हेयत्वे वार्तिककीर्तितस्यापि हेयत्वप्रसंगात्। न च सूत्रवार्तिककारयोरसर्ववित्त्वेऽपि भाष्यकारस्तु भगवान् शेष एवेति तस्मिन्नज्ञातृत्वशङ्काभावात् तदनुक्तं हेयमेवेति वाच्यम्। ज्ञातृत्वेऽप्यानन्त्यवशादनुक्तिसंभवात्। अन्यथा आकृतिगणादीनि कुतस्तेन परिच्छिन्नानि? इत्यस्तां तावत् ॥

२९. तेनैवमेव वक्तव्यम् —

दृष्ट्वा शास्त्रगणान् प्रयोगसहितान् प्रायेण दाक्षीसुतः
प्रोचे, तस्य तु विच्युतानि कतिचित् कात्यायनः प्रोक्तवान्।

तद्भ्रष्टान्यवदत् पतञ्जलिमुनिस्तेनाप्यनुक्तं क्वचि-
ल्लोकात् प्राक्तनशास्त्रतोऽपि जगदुर्विज्ञाय भोजादयः ॥

अतः सिद्धं पाणिनीयमूलभूतत्वात् पूर्वशास्त्राणां प्रामाण्यमनिवार्यमिति। तदप्युक्तम् – 'पूर्वोक्तं पाणिनिश्चाप्यनुवदति' इति ॥

३०. नन्वस्तु तावदेवमविरोधस्थले; पाणिन्यादिवचनविरोधे तु शास्त्रान्तरोक्तं बाध्यमेव; इति चेत्, न। तेषामपि प्रमाणत्वेनाबाध्यत्वस्य स्थितत्वात्। उदितानुदित-होमवत्, षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणवच्च विकल्पस्यैव प्रकल्प्यत्वात्। अत एव स्मृतिचन्द्रिका-दिषु स्मृतिकारवचनयोर्विरोधे सति द्वयोरपि विकल्पेन ग्राह्यत्वं तत्र तत्रोच्यते।

तत्र तत्र विकल्पार्थं पूर्वाचार्यानुदीरयन्।
मतभेदे द्वयं ग्राह्यं ज्ञापयत्येव पाणिनिः ॥

३१. न चैकस्यैव शब्दस्य शास्त्रद्वयेन साधुत्वमसाधुत्वं च बोध्यत इति वस्तुतो द्वैरूप्यायोगेन विरोधस्यैव युक्तत्वात् न ग्रहणाग्रहणानुष्ठानवद् विकल्पसंभव इति वाच्यम्। नहि केनापि शास्त्रेण शास्त्रान्तरोक्तस्यासाधुत्वं बोध्यते। किंतु लक्षणशिष्टप्रयोग-रहिताः शब्दा असाधव इति दिक्प्रदर्शनन्यायेन बोधितं भवतीति नियमपरत्वदूषणावसर एव भाषितम्। किं च षोडशिग्रहणमपि शास्त्राभ्यामदृष्टहेतुत्वेन प्रत्यवायहेतुत्वेन च बोधितमिति कथं तत्र श्रुतिशरणानां विकल्पेनापि प्रवृत्तिसिद्धिरिति पृष्टे यः परिहारः स एवात्रापि भविष्यतीति सिद्धं विरोधप्रतिभानेऽपि विकल्पेन ग्रहणमिति। तदिद-मुक्तम् – 'विरोधेऽपि कल्प्यो विकल्पः' इति ॥

३२. किंच विरोध एव पाणिनीयेतरवचसोर्न संभवति। तत्र विधिसूत्रेषु तावद् 'एतेभ्य एवायं प्रत्ययो भवति' इत्यादिनियमो न संभवति; अप्राप्ते नियमायोगात्। न च 'सर्वं वाक्यं सावधारणम्' इति न्यायेन नियमः शङ्कनीयः। अयोगव्यवच्छेदेना-प्यवधारणसंभवात्। अन्यथा अप्राप्तविधिनियमविधिद्वयकथाप्युच्छिद्येत। तस्मादप्राप्त-विधिषु तावत् परशास्त्रैरधिकोक्तौ न विरोधः। यत्र तूत्सर्गतः प्राप्तावपवादतया नियमार्थं सूत्रं तत्रापि परैरधिकोक्तौ 'क्वचिदपवादविषयेऽप्युत्सर्गो भवति' इति न्यायादविरोधः ॥

३३. न च पाणिनिना 'न' इत्युक्ते परैः 'अस्ति' इत्युच्यमाने विरोधः; 'ज्ञापकगणनञ्निर्दिष्टान्यनित्यानि' इति नञ्निर्दिष्टस्यानित्यत्वकथनेन परविरोद्धृत्वाभावात्। न च भाष्याद्युक्तयुक्तिभिर्विरोध इति वाच्यम्;

युक्तयो न्यायवाक्योत्था न्यायाश्च ज्ञापकोद्भवाः।
ज्ञापकोक्तास्त्वनित्याश्च न चानित्या विरोधिनः॥

युक्त्यैव शब्दसिद्धिश्चेद् विप्लुता शब्दसाधुता।
तस्माद् दृढप्रयोगान् वा पूर्वव्याकरणानि वा॥

आलम्ब्यैव हि युक्त्यापि साधयन्ति मनीषिणः।
अत एव हि युक्त्युक्त्या साधने वक्तृचिन्तनम्॥

तस्माच्छब्दाभियुक्तानां युक्त्या द्वेधापि साधने।
समूलत्वाद् द्वयं ग्राह्यमविरोधश्च वर्णितः॥

३४. न च क्वचिद् ज्ञापकं विनाऽपि 'विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम्' इति साक्षाद् वचनमेव युक्तिः स्यादिति तत्रानित्यत्वाभावाद् विरोध इति वाच्यम्। साक्षाद् वचनेऽपि विधि-निषेधकोटयोरविरोधस्य प्रागुक्तत्वात्। तत् सिद्धमविरुद्धत्वात् सर्वव्याकरणानां सम-प्रामाण्यम्। तदिदमुक्तं विरोधस्यासंभवद्योतकेन 'विरोधेऽपि' इत्यपिशब्देन॥

३५. नन्वस्तु तावदेवं पूर्वव्याकरणानामार्षत्वेन प्रामाण्यम्; अर्वाचीनभोजबोप्प-देवादिवचनानां तु कथं कथ्यत इति चेत्, तत्रापि 'न खलु बहुविदामस्ति निर्मूल-वाक्यम्' इति ब्रूमः। भाष्यादिकथितसकललक्षणानुकथनादिपरिनिश्चितबहुविद्भावा हि भोजादयः शास्त्रान्तरमहाजनप्रयोगादिमूलमालम्ब्यैव शास्त्राणि प्रणीतवन्त इति पाणिनीयवत् तेषामपि प्रामाण्यमेव। त्रिमुनिव्याकरणे उत्तरोत्तरं च प्रमाणमित्यत्रापि बहुवित्त्वमेव उत्तरोत्तरप्रामाण्ये हेतुः। दृष्टहेतुसंभवेऽदृष्टहेतुकल्पनानुपपत्तेः। तच्च बहुवित्त्वं भोजादीनामपि समानमिति तेषां विशेषादरणीयत्वमेवेति॥

३६. 'न खलु बहुविदाम्' इत्यस्यान्योऽप्यर्थः। निर्मूलं खलु व्याकरणान्तरा-प्रामाण्यं बहुविदो न वदेयुः। एतदपेक्षया तावद् बहुविदां विद्यारण्यादीनां तदकथनात्।

तस्माद् बहुग्रन्थवेदित्वाभावादेवायं प्रतिवादी निर्लज्जमेव निर्मूलवाक्यं प्रलपतीत्युपहसनीयमेवेति ।

पूर्वव्याकरणादि मूलरहितं युक्त्यैव यत् साध्यते
कैश्चित्तत्र मुनित्रयाप्रतिहते हेयत्वमुद्घोष्यते ।
अन्येभ्यो गुणवत्तया च बहुभिर्यद् गृह्यते खल्विदं
तस्मात् खल्वयमन्यशास्त्रमखिलं मिथ्येति विभ्राम्यति ॥

इति ॥

३७. एवमस्माभिर्व्याकरणान्तरप्रामाण्ये साधिते सति यत् पुनः परेणाप्रामाण्यसाधनं कृतं तदर्थाद् गर्भस्रावेण गतमपीदानीं प्रत्येकयुक्त्युपादानेन खण्ड्यते ॥

३८. तत्र यत् तावदुक्तं 'शंकराचार्य प्रभृतिभिः श्रुतिव्याख्यादिषु पाणिनीयमेव गृहीतमिति तस्यैव प्रामाण्यम्, अन्यव्याकरणानां व्याख्यानागृहीतत्वादप्रामाण्यम्' इति, तदसारम् । शंकराचार्यमुरारिप्रभृतिभिरपि स्वप्रयोगमूलत्वेन व्याकरणान्तराणामङ्गीकरणात् । व्याख्यादिषु ग्रहणाग्रहणयोः बहुप्रसिद्ध्यल्पप्रसिद्धिनिबन्धनत्वेन प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यप्रयोजकत्वाभावात् । विद्यारण्यादिभिश्च 'अल्पमेधः'पदादिव्याख्याने, क्षीरस्वामि-सर्वानन्दसुबोधिनीकारादिभिश्च अमरसिंहनिघण्टुव्याख्याने तत्र तत्राङ्गीकृतत्वाद् वेदनिघण्टुव्याख्यात्रा च भाजसूत्रस्य सर्वत्राङ्गीकृतत्वाद्, व्याख्यानादिष्वपरिगृहीतत्वस्याप्यसिद्धेः । पाणिनीयप्राक्काले च तेषामेव प्रामाण्यमङ्गीकार्यम् । न च सिद्धस्य प्रमाण्यस्य नाशे कारणमस्ति इत्याद्युक्तमेव ॥

३९. यत्तु मुनित्रयवचनस्य 'एत एव साधुशब्दाः' इति नियमपरत्वाद् एतद्विरोधादन्यशास्त्राणां त्याज्यत्वमुक्तम्, तदपि नियमस्य शास्त्रस्वभावत्वे पाणिनिनियमितत्वाद् वार्तिकाप्रामाण्यं स्यादिति बहुधा परोक्तनियमपरत्वनिरसनादपास्तमेव । विरोधे चैकमेव ग्राह्यमित्येतच्च षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणादौ स्मृतिचन्द्रिकाद्युक्तस्मृतिद्वयोक्तविकल्पनीयत्वे च व्यभिचरितमित्युक्तप्रायम् । विरोधश्च नियमाभावान्नास्तीत्युक्तम् ॥

४०. यत्तु व्यासोक्तानां प्रातिशाख्यरूपासाधारणव्याकरणमूलत्वमिति, तदपि न । अपाणिनीयत्वसाम्येऽप्यसाधारणव्याकरणानामिष्टत्वे साधारणेषु विद्वेषे च निमित्तं

नास्तीत्युक्तत्वात्। छान्दससूत्रैः एत एव वेदे साधव इति नियमितत्वेन परमते प्रातिशाख्यप्रामाण्यस्यापि दुःसाधत्वाच्च ॥

४१. यत्तु आचार्यसंकीर्तनस्य विकल्पाद्यर्थत्वेनोपपत्तेः न तत्प्रामाण्यमङ्गीकृतमिति, तदपि न। 'तन्मतमेवं तन्मतमेवम्' इति तन्मतस्य प्रामाण्यानङ्गीकरणे विकल्पस्यैवासिद्धेः स्वमाग्विरुद्धत्वात्। न च संकीर्तनमात्राद् विकल्प उत्तिष्ठति। प्रामाण्यानङ्गीकारे पूजार्थत्वं तु दूरापास्तम् ॥

४२. यत्तु मीमांसादावनभिमताचार्यसंकीर्तनवदिदमुपपन्नमिति, तन्न। तत्र दूष्यत्वेनैव तन्मतोपादानात्। इह तु तदभावात्। न च 'तत् प्रमाणं बादरायणस्यानपेक्षत्वाद्' इत्यादौ ग्राह्यतासंकीर्तनेऽपि देवताविग्रहवत्त्वादौ तन्मतस्य परित्यागदर्शनादत्रापि तथा इति वाच्यम्। तत्रापि मतभेदेन सर्ववैदिकपक्षाणां गृह्यमाणत्वदर्शनात् ॥

४३. यत्तु कौमुदीकारादिभिः स्वबुद्धिविस्तारबोधनार्थमेव मतान्तरप्रदर्शनं कृतं, न तत्प्रामाण्यादिति, तदप्यबद्धम्। अप्रमाणभूतस्य कथने स्वबुद्धिमान्द्यस्यैव प्रकाशनप्रसंगादिति। एवं परोक्तावस्मदुक्तविरुद्धोंऽशः खण्डितः।

ततोऽन्यग्रन्थसंदोहैर्मदुक्तान्येव साधयन्।
वैनतेयो ममात्यन्तं बन्धुरेवेति शोभनम् ॥

— .. —

हे! श्रीमच्चोळदेशप्रथितबुधवराः शब्दशास्त्रान्तराणां
कोऽप्यप्रामाण्यमूचे किमपि निगदितं तत्र चास्माभिरेवम्।
कौमुद्यां धातुवृत्त्यादिषु कथिततया वैदिकाङ्गत्वसाम्याद्
युष्माकं संमतं स्यादिति लिखितमिदं शोधयध्वं महान्तः ॥

श्रीसोमेश्वरदीक्षिताभिधमहाविद्वत्कुलाग्रेसरा
मीमांसाद्वयशब्दतर्ककुशला युष्मानधृष्योन्नतीन्।
तत्त्वज्ञान् करुणानिधीन् प्रशमिनः श्रुत्वेदमभ्यर्थये
यत् किंचिल्लिखितं मयाऽत्र तदिदं स्वीकार्यमार्यात्मभिः ॥

युष्माभिः खलु कामदेवविजये व्यालेखि कक्ष्याक्रम-
स्तं द्रष्टुं भृशमुत्सुका वयमतः संप्रेष्यतां सांप्रतम् ।
युष्माद्दक्षविचक्षणोक्तिपदवीसंप्रेक्षणेन क्षणा-
दस्माकं खलु बुद्धिशुद्धिरुदियादित्येष[1] तत्राशयः ॥

प्रयुक्तहेतौ सति कामदेवे कृतोऽस्य भङ्गः पटुदर्शनेन ।
सोमेश्वराख्याग्रहणस्य[2] चैतत् सर्वज्ञभावस्य च युक्तरूपम् ॥

युष्मद्वैदुष्यधूतं[3] खलु कटकभुवि त्रायते भोगिराजं[4]
वाणीवेणीविधूतामपि सुरसरितं[5] कङ्कटीको जटायाम्[6] ।
इत्येवं यज्ञनारायणविबुधमहादीक्षिताः शत्रुवर्ग-
त्राणाद् देवस्य तस्याप्यपहरथ धिया साधु सार्वज्ञ्यगर्वम्[7] ॥

युष्मास्वेव क्षितीशो विपुलनयनिधिस्तिष्ठते राज्यदृष्टौ
तिष्ठध्वे यूयमेव प्रथितबुधजने सन्दिहाने समेते
युष्मभ्यं तिष्ठते कस्त्रिदशगुरुसमानोऽपि युष्मादृगन्यः
[8]प्रज्ञालुर्यज्ञनारायणविबुधमहादीक्षिता[9] वीक्ष्यते[10] कः ? ॥

अस्वस्थाः केरलस्थाः स्वयमतिमृदवस्तत्र चाहं विशेषात्
सर्वे दूरप्रचारे खलु शिथिलधियः किं पुनर्देशभेदे
एवंभावेऽपि दैवात् कुहचन समये कल्यताकल्यते चेत्
प्रज्ञाब्धीन् यज्ञनारायणविबुधमहादीक्षितानीक्षिताहे ॥

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1. Tc. ०रुदयेदि० 2. Tc. ०ग्रगणस्य 3. Tc. ०धूतः
4. Tc. ०राजो 5. Tc. ०सरितः 6. Tc. जटायाः
7. Tc. सर्वज्ञगर्वम् 8. R प्रज्ञालून्; Tc. प्रज्ञालो
9. R. ०दीक्षितान् 10. R. वीक्षते.

PROVING THE AUTHORITY OF NON-PANINIAN GRAMMARS

I, the same Nārāyaṇa[1], now depending upon Sudarśana[2], O! Vainateya[3]! propose to maintain myself having overpowered your *pakṣa*[4].

This is the summary [of this treatise]:

Some say that what is said by Pāṇini is authoritative, not the treatises of Candra, Bhoja, and others; this is most flimsy; for those who know much do not speak without base; that more people prefer a thing is due to its merits; how was it before Pāṇini? Pāṇini himself quotes what was said by [his] predecessors; even if there be a conflict an option is to be presumed.

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1. i.e., The author of the *Prakriyāsarvasva* (PS) in which the authority of the non-Paninian grammars is admitted.
2. The word means 'correct view' as well as the divine disc of that name associated with Nārāyaṇa, Viṣṇu.
3. This name is yet to be identified. There were several Vainateyas (probably belonging to *Tārkṣya* family). See: Dr. V. Raghavan, Introduction to the *Śahendravilāsa*, Tanjore Saraswati Mahal Series No. 54, p. 44.
4. *Pakṣa* means 'view' or 'opinion' and also the wing, The whole verse is an allusion to the mythical story of *garuḍagarvabhanga* narrated in the *Udyoga-parvan* of the *Mahābhārata*. Canto 105, where Viṣṇu overpowers the celestial bird Garuḍa and brings him to his knees. The verses 18 and 32 are most pertinent:

स तस्य वचनं श्रुत्वा खगस्योदर्कदारुणम् ।
संक्षोभ्यं क्षोभयंस्तार्क्ष्यमुवाच रथचक्रभृत् ॥

एवं विष्णुबलाक्रान्तो गर्वनाशमुपागतः ।
गरुडो बलवान् राजन् वैनतेयो महायशाः ॥

1. Here there are some who, professing themselves to be scholars, think that the grammars composed by the ancient teachers like Indra[5], Candra[6], Kāśakṛtsni[7], Āpiśali[8] and Śākaṭāyana[9] are not authoritative; what is said by the trinity of sages alone is authoritative. This is indeed rediculous; for the words of Candra and others are to be deemed as authoritative since they are not spoken by untrustworthy persons. Lack of authority of human words is due to nothing else but their being uttered by an untrustworthy person; so those who speak of the lack of authority for the [grammatical] rules of Candra and others will have to show the proof for their untrustworthiness.

2. Their untrustworthiness is not known by direct perception. Nor can it be known by the inference 'the words of Candra etc., are not authoritative, because they are not accepted by the righteous, like the non-vedic words', because [the probans] 'non-acceptance by the righteous' is not proved. Who are those that are meant here by [the expression] 'the righteous'? Those who are the votaries of the *Vedas*? Or those who use correct words? Or only those whom you accept to be the righteous?

3. In the first instance it is very clear that the righteous have accepted other grammars. For,

a) Vedavyāsa, etc., who were the supermost among the votaries of the *Veda* have used many words which are not noticed by the trinity of sages; and it is recorded that 'after seeing many a grammar the *Bhārata* was composed by the sage';

b) Saṅkarācārya has also used the words '*hunet*', etc., in his *Prapañcasāra* which are not sanctioned by the trinity of sages;[10]

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5. There is much controversy regarding this grammarian. Some place him before Pāṇini, while others either bring him down to the Post-Paninian period or identify him with the author of the *Kātantra*. See *Systems of Sanskrit Grammar* (SSG) by S.K. Belvalkar, pp. 10 ff.

6. Candragomin who flourished, probably, in the fifth century A.D. His work was made use of by the authors of the *Kāśikā* (K).

7. According to the *Mahābhāṣya* (MB) the author is Kāśakṛtsni and his work *Kāśakṛtsnam*. *Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar* (DSG) gives the form Kāśakṛtsna alone as the name of the author. The *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi* has only *Kāśakṛtsni*. The *prātipadika kāśakṛtsna* is included in the *upakādi* (Pā. II. 4. 69) and *arīhaṇādi* (Pā. IV. 2. 80) *gaṇas*. The *Brahmasūtras* refer to Kāśakṛtsna, an author.

8. A grammarian referred to by Pāṇini in VI. 1. 92, etc.

9. This is not the ancient teacher known to Pāṇini, but the Jaina grammarian who wrote the *Śākaṭāyana-śabdānuśāsana* and a commentary on it. SSG. p. 68 ff.

10. The form should be *juhuyāt* according to Pāṇini. *Prapañcasāra* (Arthur Avalon, Calcutta 1935), VI. 93, 94, 97. In VI. 91, however, the form *juhuyāt* is used.

c) Murārimiśra[11], Sureśvarācārya[12], etc., who were the best among the votaries of the *Veda*, have used the words, *viśrāma*, etc.;

d) the author of the *Naiṣadha*, the hero of the followers of the *Veda*, has used '*naivālpamedhasi paṭo rucimattvam asya*'[13];

e) Vidyāraṇyācārya who was the re-establisher of the vedic religion has accepted the view of Śākaṭāyana, etc., in respect of the words *kathāpayati*, etc.[14], in the *Dhātuvṛtti*;

f) Boppadeva[15], the author of the *Kaumudī* and many others who are noted among the votaries of the *Veda* have used several words which are not accepted by Pāṇini;

g) even now the revered followers of the *Veda* in the Northern regions regard the *Sārasvata* Grammar,[16] etc., as authoritative;

h) the *Kaumudī*[17] is accepted (for study) in all regions;

i) the votaries of the *Veda* prior to Pāṇini's birth should have necessarily accepted only other grammars;

and

j) you yourself have accepted the *Prātiśākhyas* whose rules on Vedic usages are quite different from those given by Pāṇini.

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11. *Anargharāghava*: 1, 10. (Also see *Meghadūtam*, I. 27, where Mallinātha remarks: विश्रामो वा इति चान्द्रव्याकरणविकल्पेन वृद्धिविधानाद् रूपसिद्धिः।)

12. Apparently the author means Bhavabhūti, whose identity with Sureśvarācārya has the blessings of a tradition. See Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya's article in *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, vol. VII, pp. 301–8. In PS under Pā. VII. 3. 62, the author mentions the form as used by Murāri and Bhavabhūti:

विश्रामस्यापशब्दत्वं वृत्युक्तं नाद्रियामहे।
मुरारिभवभूत्याद्यैर्नप्रमाणीकरोति कः॥

Sureśvara's works, *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* and the *Vārttikas* do not have *viśrāma*. But, if we depend upon the word *ādi* in *viśrāmādi* we can show non-Paninian usages of Sureśvara. For example, the word *avasitum* found in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya-vārttikam*, II. 1. 465; IV. 3. 728, etc., is non-Paninian. It must be *avasātum* as the root *ṣo* is *an ṭ*.

13. *Naiṣadhīyacarita*, XIII. 13. The form must be *alpamedhe* as according to Pā. V. 4. 122 the *asic* suffix is added to *medhā* only when the latter is preceded by *nañ*, *su* or *dus*. The form has, however, been justified by resorting to an implication provided by the word *ityam* in the *sūtra*. See K.

14. According to Pāṇini the form is *kathayati*. PS admits *kathāpayati* as advocated by Śākaṭāyana. But in Śākaṭāyana under IV. 2. 100 we find *kathayati*. Roth and Monier Williams record *kathāpayati*.

15. The MSS. of PS have *Boppadeva* although SSG and DSG have *Bopadeva* alone. The doubling may be to facilitate Dravidian pronounciation.

16 Ascribed to Anubhūtisvarūpācārya, though the real author seems to be Narendrācārya. SSG. p. 17.

17. The *Prakriyā-Kaumudī* of Rāmacandra.

4. [Objection:] The usages of the sages like Vyāsa are valid as vedic usages; so where is the need for other grammars to establish their validity. The phrase 'after seeing many grammars' can be taken to mean 'after seeing the same grammar for many times'[18].

[Answer:] In order to justify the vedic usages which are not mentioned by the trinity of sages, they (Vyāsa, etc.) should have resorted to other grammars at least for the rules of Vedic words. It is also not proper to assume such a stretched meaning for the expression '*dṛṣṭvā bahu vyākaraṇam*'.

5. [Objection:] Now in the *Sūtrās* and *Vārttikas* we find such statements as: 'Deviation of these rules is found in many cases (in the Vedic language)'[19]; 'In the Vedic language the rules vary (in many ways)'[20]; 'All rules are to be understood as optional with regard to the Vedic language'[21]; so there is no necessity of the search for another grammar.

[Answer:] This is not correct; because if this be the case, why should Pāṇini and Kātyāyana instead of being satisfied with these statements exert themselves to expatiate the remaining portion related to the language? Therefore even for the usages of Vyāsa, etc., other grammars of special rules can be found.

6. It cannot be said that those usages can be obtained from the *Prātiśākhyas*: for they are also *other* grammars and so it is against your own words.

[Objection:] The *Prātiśākhyas* are special grammars; what we do not favour is the authority of other general grammers.

[Answer:] There is no reason why one should like the special grammars but dislike the general grammars when both are equal in being other than the grammar of Pāṇini. The point that because of the restrictive nature of the rules of Pāṇini there is dislike for other grammars similar to that of Pāṇini will be refuted elsewhere [in this treatise].[22] [The verse] that begins with 'there are three ungrammatical words in the *Māgha*' [and ends in] 'Vyāsa has become one with them' (i.e., the ungrammatical words)[23] is interpreted by eminent [scholars] taking the word *apaśabda* as standing for *apāṇīnīyaśabda* by [the method of]

18. i.e., Taking *bahu* as an adverb.
19. Pā. III. 1. 85.
20. ibid. V. 2. 122; VI. 1. 34; VII. 1. 8; VII. 1. 103; VII. 3. 97 and VII. 4. 78.
21. MB on Pā. I. 4. 9: योगविभागः कर्तव्यः। वा छान्दसि सर्वे विधयो भवन्ति।
22. See: Paragraphs 13 and 14.
23. The source is to be traced.

uttering a part of the name instead of the whole name,[24] just like [the words] '*ga*' and '*la*' (standing) for *guru* and *laghu* [respectively, in the works of prosody]. It is also stated:

> After churning the eighteen *Purāṇas*, nine grammars and the four *Vedas*, the *Bhārata* was composed by the sage.[25]

Further,

> Could those gems of words, which the venerable Vyāsa took out of the ocean of grammar, be measured in the small puddle of Pāṇini?[26]

7. (If you say) Vyāsa is [to be regarded] not versed in grammar for the same reason of using Vedic words as non-Vedic words, (my reply is) please do not utter such an ominous word against the omniscient Vyāsa. This statement amounts to cutting your own throat, since (according to this) Pāṇini will also have to be deemed as not versed in grammar; for he has used *Vṛdhir ādaic* where the absence of *kutva*[27] is Vedic as has been pointed out by the eleborate *Bhāṣya* beginning with 'why there is no *kutvam* here'[28]. So let this [argument] be closed.

8. By this [the contention that] the righteous are those who use correct words is also set aside. Moreover the [defect of] interdependence [in this argument] is also to the point: The words which are used by the righteous are alone correct and only those who use correct words are the righteous. That the words used by the righteous alone are correct is undisputed in the science of grammar.[29]

9. In this way the third view is also frail. 'Only those who have accepted the views of the trinity of sages are the righteous' is not said by any *śruti* or *smṛti*; it is only your presumption. [If it is contended that] since the words of the trinity of sages alone are authoritative, only those who accept them are the righteous, your Blessed Self will have nothing but the benefit of incurring the [defect of] interde-

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24. MB on Pā I. 1. 45 (*Vārttika* 3): पदेषु पदैकदेशान् । देवदत्तो दत्तः सत्यभामा भामेति ।
25. The source is to be traced.
26. Devabodha commentator on the *Mahābhārata* has another version:

    यान्युज्जहार माहेन्द्राद् व्यासो व्याकरणार्णवात् ।
    शब्दरत्नानि किं तानि सन्ति पाणिनिगोष्पदे ॥

27. According to Pā. VIII. 2. 30. *c* at the end of a word is to be replaced by *k*.
28. On Pā. I. 1. 1.
29. MB on Pā. I. 3. 1. (Vā. 13):

    स चावश्यं शिष्टप्रयोग उपास्यः ।

pendence [in the argument], namely, because the words are authoritative those who accept them become the righteous, and the words are authoritative because they are accepted by the righteous. If [it is the idea that] the righteous are only those whom you have favoured to be so, then, they could as well be only those who are favoured by us [to be so]; and this debate will only prove to be an irrational strife. This is what is meant by 'those who know much do not speak without base'. This means that as Vyāsa, Śaṅkara and others, who know many things would not use words without a base, they should have accepted other grammars as the source of their usages; thus the probans 'being accepted by the righteous' is proved.

10. No verbal testimony of the *Vedas* or Manu and the like is available showing the lack of authority of other grammars. Nor do we find any direct statement by the trinity of sages or any other work of their followers to repudiate the authority of other grammars.

11. The statement (found in some places) that the usages like *viśrāma* are not proper[30], really means that such words are to be used according to the rules found in other grammars. Otherwise, Murāri and others, who have always held the words of the trinity of sages in high reverence could not have made such usages.

12. More over, Your Honour is beaten by the inter-dependence [of your own arguments], for, only when the extra authority of the words of the trinity of sages and its followers is established they can rule out the treatises of others, and only when the extra weakness of the other treatises is established as a result of their being ruled out, the extra authority of the words of the former can be proved. Besides, this would amount to say that the extra strength of the words of the trinity of sages is proved only on the strength of the words of the trinity of sages; thus [the defect of] self-dependance is also to the point.

13. It cannot be said that just as in the case of the statement 'five clawed are to be eaten'[31] the words of the trinity of sages are restrictive that 'only these words are correct', and so others are not authoritative; for, the absence of such a restriction is evident from the statements made very often that 'the [suffixes] *āp*, etc., are to be followed according to the usage'[32], as well as from the acceptance of *ākṛtigaṇas*. Otherwise, as

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30. K. VII. 3. 34: सूर्यविश्रामा भूमिरित्येवमादिकं प्रयोगमन्याय्यमेव मन्यन्ते ; also see f.n. 12. *supra*.
31. *Manusmṛti*, V. 17, 18.
32. MB on Pā. IV. 1. 3: *Padamañjarī* on Pā. IV. 1. 1.
विचित्रा हि शब्दानां शक्तयो यथादर्शनमुपगन्तव्याः ।

Pāṇini and kātyāyana have already restricted that 'these words alone are correct', the emendations of the author of the *Bhāṣya* would have no authority. The statements of Kātyāyana would also be ruled out by Pāṇini's restrictive rules. Because Patañjali is the most revered [among the three] in order to avoid the nullification of his words other grammars have also to be ruled out.[33] If the words of the three sages are taken as restrictive, since their rules dealing with the Vedic language have determined the correct usages, the *Prātiśākhyas* will also have to be repudiated.

14. [Objection:] Since no special rules regarding the Vedic language are noticed in the works of the three sages, only the grammars dealing with the general rules are ruled out by them, not the *Prātiśākhyas* which deal with the special rules regarding the Vedic language.
[Answer:] This argument cannot hold. For even the special rules regarding the Vedic language are clearly seen in the rules (of the three sages) such as '[The sound] *o* belonging to the vocative singular (is *pragṛhya*) when followed by a non-vedic *iti*'[34], 'In the *Yajus* the word *uras* ending in *o* will not get euphonic change when followed by *a*',[35] 'The (words) *deva* and *sumna* [will get *ā* for their last phoneme] in the *Kāṭhaka-yajus*'[36], *sāmasvikaḥ*,[37] '[A vowel] preceded by a *pluta* will be replaced by *yaṇ* in order to prevent its elongation',[38] etc. It is not to be said that the restriction does not operate with regard to the Vedic usages because of the statement 'for the Vedic (language) the rules are to be presumed in accordance with the usages found'[39]; for when the grammar in its entirety is recognized to be restrictive, it is hardly possible to exclude the restrictive nature of the vedic portion which is also included in it. The rules regarding the classical language also equally follow the correct usage of the righteous; for again and again one finds the statement that the grammar closely follows the usage of the righteous.[40] Therefore in a grammar which is evidently not exhaustive due to the [concept of] *ākṛtigaṇa*, etc., it is impossible to have a restriction that 'the usage of these words alone bring in the unseen merit'. The restric-

33. The reading *prāptam* found in the MS. does not make the sense coherent; hence the suggestion to read *bādhyam*.
34. Pā. I. 1. 16.
35. ibid. VI. 1. 117.
36. ibid. VII. 4. 38.
37. This rule could not be traced.
38. Vā. on Pā. VI. 1. 77:
यणादेशः प्लुतपूर्वस्य च दीर्घशाकलप्रतिषेधार्थम् ।
39. MB on Pā. I. 1. 6, Vā. 1: दृष्टानुविधित्वाच्च छन्दसः ।
40. See f. n. 29 *supra*.

tion could only be that 'a merit will emerge by the usage of words similar to those which are derived here; and a demerit by the usage of words other than these'.[41]

15. That is why in the context of *taddhita* when the author of the *Vṛtti* made a statement to the effect that (the correctness of words is to be determined) by following the usage of the righteous,'[42] the author of the *Padamañjarī* said:

'[If it be asked] what is then the grammar for, the answer is this: After knowing the [correct] words given in the grammar and noticing the persons who use them in the right way, one understands that 'these persons are the righteous'. This leads to the knowledge that their usages other than those [found in the grammar] are also to be accepted. So the grammar is for recognizing the righteous'.[43] Therefore [the contention] that the grammatical rules are restrictive is set aside.

16. Further, if it is maintained that the words of those (i.e., the three sages) are powerful because of the statement of *Bhāṣya*, etc., then it would be easier to say 'my word is authoritative because it is said by me'.

17. Thus it is proved that there is no verbal testimony either superhuman or human teaching the non-authority of other grammars. This is what is meant by 'those who know much do not speak without base'. The sense is that the author of the *Bhāṣya*, etc., who know much would not make a baseless statement amounting to the non-authority of other grammars and the authority of their own words, because it (such a statement) is vitiated by self-dependence. Even if there be, in certain cases, an adverse criticism of other grammars, it is only for the pleasure of reasoning. Further, more than a hundred of aphorisms like 'here up to the end of the rules referring to the name *bham* [the rules are] as if they have not operated',[44] though nullified by the *Bhāṣya* have not been discared. So the science of grammar is objective.

18. [Objection:] The authority of the words of the three sages alone and the non-authority of other-grammars are proved by [the means of] Presumption, as otherwise the acceptance of the former alone by the majority [of scholars] could not be well accounted for.

41. MB. vol. I. p. 8. Vā. 1: लोकतोऽर्थप्रयुक्ते शब्दप्रयोगे शास्त्रेण धर्मनियमः; *Vākyapadīya*, I. 140.

42. K. VI. 3. 109.

43. The quotation is not here verbal. Also see MB on Pā. VI. 3. 109.

44. Pā VI 4. 22.

[Answer:] This is not correct. The acceptance by the majority can be accounted for by the reason of [their] having the special merits of clarity, brevity, etc. Because of this it is impossible to prove the non-authority of others. Otherwise, because among the works on Logic, *Maṇi*[45] alone is accepted by the majority, the works like *Kusumāñjali*[46], *Kiraṇāvali*[47], the *Bhāṣya* of Pakṣila[48], etc., would be non-authoritative. In the field of grammar also for the reason that Kaiyaṭa's gloss has been accepted by many the glosses of Bhartṛhari, etc., should be non-authoritative. Similarly because among the moral codes that of Manu, among the *Purāṇas* the *Bhāgavata*, and among the *Śikṣās* that which belongs to Śaunaka are accepted by many, other works [in these fields] would be non-authoritative; and saying so you would become the foremost among those who do not follow the *Vedas*. That the works of Paninian school have special merit is acceptable to us also. What is not acceptable is only the non-authority of others. By this the argument that the grammar of Pāṇini alone is authoritative because it is the one that has been accepted in interpreting the *Mīmāṃsā*[49], etc., is also refuted. It is quite reasonable that it is accepted in the *Mīmāṃsā*, etc., because it is well known for its merits. By this there is no room for presuming non-authority for others. This is what is meant by [the statement] 'that more people prefer a thing is due to its merits'.

19. Moreover, he who argues as shown above will have to say how the correct usage of words existed before Pāṇini. It can never be said that there was no usage of correct words at that time; for [in that case], as there could be no correctness [of usages] through *ūha*, etc., there would have been confusion in the performance of all rituals;[50] all would have also gone to hell by the usage of incorrect words;[51] all would have also become barbarous.[52] It cannot be maintained that at that time people knew the correct words without a grammar; for there is the injunction of the *śruti* that 'a *brāhmaṇa* should study and understand the *Veda* including its six auxiliaries without any motive',[53] and (if there were no grammar) due to the non-study of the six auxiliaries in their

45. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya.
46. An independent work of Udayana.
47. Commentary on the *Praśas apāda-bhāṣya* by Udayana.
48. Otherwise known as Vātsyāyana.
49. Śabara in commenting on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* and Kumārila on Śabara's *Bhāṣya*, etc.
50. See: MB, vol. I, p. 1. where *ūha* is one of the purposes of the study of grammar.
51. ibid. p. 2. under *duṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ 'yas tu prayuṅkte'*.
52. ibid. म्लेच्छा मा भूमेत्यध्येयं व्याकरणम् ।
53. ibid. p. 1.

entirety all should be non-*brāhmaṇas*. Nor there is any statement to the effect that at that time only five auxiliaries were to be studied, or that the work of Pāṇini alone is the auxiliary (of the *Veda*). What the author of the *Bhāṣya* too, repeatedly says is: 'therefore grammar is to be studied',[54] not 'Paninian grammar is to be studied'. Therefore, because prior to the Paninian grammar other grammars alone were accepted by many, their authority arising from such acceptance, which is otherwise inexplicable, cannot be prevented.

20. Moreover, if we prove the authority of something for the reason of its being accepted by many, the works prior to Pāṇini would become superior for the simple fact that formerly those works alone were accepted by many and are wide-spread even now, but the work of Pāṇini is accepted by many only now because it was not available in older times.

21. [Objection :] Although the older works were previously authoritative, after the advent of the work of Pāṇini their authority faded away.
[Answer:] This cannot be so.

> How could the authoritativeness of those which were once authoritative be obliterated by the efflux of time? If it could be, even *Śruti* and *Smṛti*, etc., might loose their authority at some time.

That is why not caring for the open statement by somebody that 'the *dharma* instructed by Manu (prevails)[55] but in the *Kṛtayuga*', in the *Kaliyuga* too the words of Manu are cited as authority. So authority does not fade away by the efflux of time. There can indeed be a variation in acceptance due to the variation in merit. This is what is meant by 'how was it before Pāṇini'.

22. In this way when the lack of reason for the non-authority (of the non-Paninian works) is established, the authority of those works is to be established by [the reasoning] 'those who know much do not say without base'. [That is to say] the words of Candra and others are authoritative, because they are words having some basis, like those of Pāṇini'; 'their words have some basis because they are the words of those who know much, just like those (of Pāṇini); 'they do know much because they are the authors of the scientific treatises just like Pāṇini'.

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54. ibid. pp. 1–4: more than ten times: तस्माद्ध्येयं व्याकरणम्।
55. *Parāśara-smṛti*, I. 24.

23. Without knowing many sides of what is to be said nobody would attempt to write a scientific treatise. And even if somebody attempts, he would become a victim of redicule. Therefore, for the reasons that even those (non-Paninian) authors renowned for their scientific treatises must be knowing the extension of the science of language, and that there is no room to suspect them of mistake or deception and if there be, such a suspicion could hardly be ruled out in respect of Pāṇini also, it is evident that the other (non-Paninian) grammars are also authoritative because of their being written by trustworthy persons.

24. [Objection :] We say that the other grammars have no authority because they do not serve any purpose inasmuch as the usages of the righteous can be vindicted by [the method of] implications, etc., found in the work of Pāṇini.

[Answer :] This is also not so. For, in certain instances seeing the usage the rules are to be assumed while in certain (other) instances seeing the rules the usage is to be assumed - this much is undisputed even by those who follow Pāṇini's grammar with avowed fidelity. As such when a usage is found accepted by the righteous it is to be explained by implication, etc. But in the instance of *kathāpayati*, etc., where the rule (for the usage) is found only in other grammars[56], how could there be non-authority [of other grammars] on the ground that they have no purpose to serve. Moreover, even in the case of the usages *viśrāma*, etc., accepted by the righteous, the relevant rules are clearly found in other grammars. Therefore the assumption of implications, etc., by force, becomes cumbersome. In spite of this [fact] with a desire to display one's self-confidence and an intention to paying one's respects to the three sages, if such usages are vindicated by resort-to implications, etc., we only welcome it. But this cannot mean that the other grammars do not serve any purpose or wield any authority. Let us stop this here.

25. Further, the authority of the ancient teachers is acceptable to Pāṇini and others. For example, in the rules '*āṅi cāpaḥ*',[57] '*auṅa āpaḥ*',[58] etc., the technical names accepted by the ancient teachers are directly maintained. In [the rules] 'According to Śākaṭāyana

56. i.e., that of Śākaṭāyana.

57. Pā. VII. 3. 105. *āṅ* is the name for the instrumental singular according to the pre-Paninian grammars.

58. ibid. VII. 1. 18. *auṅ* stands for the dual number of both nominative and accusative. This *saṃjñā* is taken from the ancients.

(the sounds) *va* and *ya* may be pronounced with less stress',[59] 'According to Āpiśali [the rule is] optional when a nominal verb follows'[60], 'Bhāguri desires an elision of the *a* in the prefixes *ava* and *api*'[61], views of the ancient teachers are also directly expressed. A rule does not become optional by simply mentioning the names of the ancient teachers; only when their view is recognized as 'this is their view and this is mine', the rule could be optional. Moreover, after criticising what is said by the ancient teachers, in the instances 'this (i.e., concord of gender and number) need not be ruled because it has the authority of conventional term'[62], 'elision [need not also be ruled] because of the noncurrency of the etymological meaning'[63], in the rules like 'when meaning the kingdom [these affixes] elide'[64] Pāṇini clearly accepts the words of the ancient teachers which were once criticised. By this it is understood that even though in certain cases for the sake of the pleasure of reasoning criticisms are offered, the words of the ancient teachers are nevertheless acceptable.

26. Int his way since Pāṇini accepts even that which is criticised by himself, if elsewhere in the commentaries, etc., the view of the ancient teachers is found criticised, it is only for the pleasure of displaying self-confidence in argumentation. Let this be understood as such by the learned. Pāṇini has not, therefore, indicated the rejection [of others' words.]

Therefore he who accepts the authority of what is said by Pāṇini alone has [necessarily] to accept the authority of older texts also because they are accepted by him (Pāṇini). This is what is meant by 'Pāṇini also quotes what is said by his predecessors'.

27. Moreover, it is said that 'this tradition of grammer is without a beginning'[65]: so it is to be maintained that Pāṇini wrote his treatise after considering the previous grammars as his source. The example, 'treatise of Pāṇini'[66] is given under the rule 'enounced by him'[67] and not under '(in the meaning of) a book made on [a subject]'[68].

59. ibid. VIII. 3 18.
60. ibid. VI. 1. 92.
61. Though this is not found in MB, *Rūpāvatāra* and *Prakriyā-kaumudī* quote this: See vol I. p. 131 and vol. I, p. 317, respectively.
62. Pā. I. 2. 53.
63. ibid. I. 2. 54.
64. ibid. IV. 2. 81.
65. See *Vākyapadīya*, I. 142, 145.
66. MB. vol. I, p. 12: पाणिनिना प्रोक्तं पाणिनीयम् ।
67. Pā. IV. 3. 101. See also K.
68. ibid IV. 3. 116.

So it is understood that P ā ṇ i n i only enounced the science of grammar with a different type of technical precision and did not himself invent it Therfore, he who says that the previous treatises do not have authority because they are non-Paninian is virtually proving that the treatise of P ā ṇ i n i does not have authorlty because it does not have any source. In this way the demolishment of all grammars is brought about by the great grammarian that you are.

28. [Objection :] Because P ā ṇ i n i made his rules after considering the ancient treatises as well as the usages and removing those deserving rejection, what is not said by P ā ṇ i n i is indeed to be rejected. [Answer :] This cannot be. If what is not said by P ā ṇ i n i is to be rejected, it amounts to the rejection of what is explained by the *Vārttika* too. It cannot also be said that although the authors of the *Sūtras* and the *Vārttika* are not omniscient, there cannot be any doubt about the omniscience of the venerable author of the *Bhāṣya*, who is verily Śeṣa himself,[69], and what is not said by him is to be rejected; for even though he knows every thing, it is possible that he has not said every thing because there is no end of the things to be said.[70] Otherwise, why should he determine the *ākṛtigaṇa*, etc. This is sufficient for the present.

29. It is, therefore, to be concluded as below :

The son of Dākṣī[71] explained [the science of grammar] after considering several [previous] treatises along with the usages; those [points] which were left out by him were explained by K ā t y ā y a n a ; the sage P a t a ñ j a l i explained those that were not noticed by K ā t y ā y a n a ; and what is not said even by him is explained by B h o j a and others after seeing some of the usages and [also] the ancient treatises.

Therefore it is evident that the authority of the ancient treatises which were the source for P ā ṇ i n i's work cannot be questioned. This is what is meant by 'P ā ṇ i n i also quotes what is said by his predecessors'.

30. [Objection :] Let it be as said above in the instances where there is no disagreement, but where there is a disagreement [of other works] with what is said by P ā ṇ i n i, what is said in other treatises should become nullified.

69. Ananta, the thousand-tounged mythical serpant.

70. cf. MB. vol. I, p. 5: अनभ्युपाय एव शब्दानां प्रतिपत्तौ प्रतिपदपाठः - *Prakriyā Kaumudī*, vol. II, p. 794: आनन्त्यात् सर्वशब्दा हि न शक्यन्तेऽनुशासितुम् ।

71. cf. MB. vol. I, p. 75: सर्वे सर्वपदादेशा दाक्षीपुत्रस्य पाणिनेः ।

[Answer:] This is not correct. For, the fact that they cannot be nullified has come to stay on account of their having authority. As in the case of 'the offering of the oblations after the sun rise or before the sun rise'[72] and, 'in taking up or not taking up the *ṣoḍaśigraha*,'[73] here also an alternative alone is to be assumed. That is why in the *Smṛticandrikā*[74] and other works, at many places, where a disagrement between the statements by the authors of moral codes is found, both (views) are maintained acceptable as alternatives.

> In many places by mentioning the [names of] ancient teachers for the sake of making the rule optional,[75] Pāṇini verily indicates that in case of a difference in views both are to be accepted (as alternatives).

31. [Objection:] Because two treatises speak of the correctness and incorrectness for the same word, actually there are no two words; so it is proper [in such cases] to maintain a conflict; and as such there is no possibility of an alternative as in the case of 'the taking up or not taking up (of the *ṣoḍaśigraha*)'.
Answer:] This cannot stand. No treatise instructs [us of] the incorrectness of what is said by another treatise. We are only instructed by way of showing the direction that the words which are not accounted for by rules or usages of the righteous are incorrect. This is already said at the time of criticising the view that the (Paninian) rules are restrictive. Moreover, the taking up of or not taking up *ṣoḍaśī* is also enjoined by the two rules maintaining it to be a cause of either an *unseen* [merit] or an offence. So, to the question how in this case there could at least be an optional activity for those who resort to *śruti*, there must be an answer; and the same answer will hold good here too. Thus it is proved that even if there be an appearance of conflict, either (alternative) is to be accepted. This is what is meant by 'even in the case of a conflict an alternative is to be assumed'.

32. Further there can be no conflict between the words of Pāṇini and others. In the informative aphorisms there cannot be any restriction that 'this suffix is added only to these stems'; for there can be no restriction with regard to something which is not previously known.[76] Nor can a restriction be presumed on the ground of the maxim 'all statements are emphatic (in their meaning)', for the emphasis is even

72. *Kauṣītakī Brāhmaṇa*, II. 7. १६.
73. *Maitrāyaṇīya-saṃhitā*, IV. 7. 6.
74. The well known work of Devanabhaṭṭa.
75. Pā. VIII. 3. 19, etc.
76. cf. सिद्धे आरम्यमाणो नियमार्थः ।

possible for the exclusion of what is not previously known. Otherwise there would be no room for the two types of rules, informative and restrictive. Therefore in the case of informative rules there can be no conflict with other rules even if they contain something extra. And in the case of an aphorism which is restrictive by way of its being an exception to the general rule, there can be no conflict [with others] even if others say something extra; because there is the [accepted] maxim, 'In some places even in the realm of an exception the general rule can operate'[77].

33. It is not to be maintained that where Pāṇini says 'no' while others 'yes' there will be a conflict; for by [the maxim] 'those' [rules] which are conveyed by the method of implication or inclusion in a *gaṇa* or expression of a 'no' are not peremptory'[78], it is stated that what is conveyed by [the expression] 'no' is not peremptory; so it (what is conveyed by 'no') cannot be in conflict with others. Nor can it be said that there can be a conflict with the arguments advanced in the *Bhāṣya*, etc. For,

> The arguments are based on the technical maxims and technical maxims are obtained through implications. Those which are conveyed by implications are optional; and those which are optional cannot be conflicting.
>
> If the [correct] words were to be known through reasoning alone their correctness will be thrown into confusion. Therefore the wise prove the [correctness of] words depending upon firm usages and ancient grammars even while reasoning is employed. That is why in maintaining [the correctness of] a word by reasoning, the consideration of the speaker arises.[79] Therefore when those are enlightened in the language prove a word in two ways by their reasoning, both are to be accepted because both of them have some basis. And the absence of a conflict has already been explained.

34. [Objection:] In certain places even without an implication the reasoning is expressly conveyed as in the case of the aphorism, 'When

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77. MB on Pā. VII. 4. 82. (Vā. 2) अनभ्यासविकारेष्वपवादा उत्सर्गान् न बाधन्त इत्येषा परिभाषा कर्तव्या।

78. See *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*: ज्ञापकसिद्धं न सर्वत्र (125), नञ्घटितमनित्यम् (987), गणकार्यमनित्यम् (96). PS, *Nyāyakhaṇḍa*: समासान्तागमसंज्ञाज्ञापकगणनञ् निर्दिष्टायनित्यानि।

79. Namely, whether he is trustworthy (*āpta*) or not.

rules of equal force are in conflict with each other, the latter [in the order] is to take effect'[80]; and in such cases there will be a conflict as it (i.e., what is expressly conveyed) is not optional.
[Answer:] This is not correct; because even in the case of an express statement, it has been previously pointed out that there is no conflict betweeen the affirmative and negative points. Therefore, all grammars are equally authoritative as they are not in conflict with each other. This is what is meant by the word 'even' in (the phrase) 'even if there be a conflict' which indicates that there can be no conflict.

35. [Objection:] Now let it be that the ancient grammars are authoritative because they are the compositions of sages. But how could one speak of the authority for the words of Bhoja, Boppadeva, etc., who belong to the later times.
[Answer:] Even to this (objection) we say 'those who know much do not speak without basis'. Bhoja, etc., who definitely know much because of their interpretation of all the rules found in the *Bhāṣya*, etc., must have composed their treatises depending upon other rules and the usages of competent people; therefore, those (works) also indeed have authority just like the works of Pāṇini and others. In holding that in the grammar of the trinity of sages there is the gradation of authority in the order of sequence, the reason for such gradation should be nothing but 'knowing much more'. For, it is not proper to assume an unseen reason when a seen one is feasible. And such a 'knowing much more' is equally possible with Bhoja and others also. Therefore, they deserve indeed special respect.

36. The clause beginning with 'those who know much' has another meaning also. Those who know much will not make the baseless statement that other grammars are not authoritative. Even Vidyāraṇya, who definitely knows more when compared to these persons have not said so. Therefore only due to lack of acquintance with many treatises this opponent prattles without any base and sense of shame; so he deserves nothing but ridicule.

Through argumentations certain persons attempt to prove the ancient grammars baseless; and proclaim them unacceptable [although] the trinity of sages has not repudiated them. The fact is that many people accept this (the grammar of

80. Pā. I. 4. 2.

the three sages) because it has more merits when compared with others; that is why this person mistakes all other treatises to be false.

37. In this way, by establishing the authority of other grammars though the attempt of the opponent to establish their non-authority has been implicitely washed out, his arguments will be repudiated now by showing detailed reasons.

38. It has been said (by the opponent) that Śaṅkarācārya and others while interpreting the revealed texts have accepted Paninian grammar alone; so it alone is authoritative. The other grammars do not have authority because they are not accepted for the sake of interpreting [the revealed texts].

This is flimsy. Even Śaṅkarācārya, Murāri and others have accepted other grammars as the basis of their usages. The acceptance or non-acceptance for the sake of interpretation is due to their (i.e., the grammars) being known more widely or less; they (i.e., the acceptance or non-acceptance) do not serve in establishing authority or non-authority. The argument itself that they (i.e., the other grammars) are not accepted for the purpose of interpretation is not correct; for Vidyāraṇya while considering the word *kathāpayati*, the author of *Prasāda*[81] in many places of his commentary, Viśveśvara – the commentator on *Naiṣadha*[82] – in interpreting the word *alpamedhas*, Kṣīrasvāmī,[83] Sarvānanda[84] and the author of the *Subodhinī*[85] in interpreting the Lexicon of Amarasiṃha have accepted them (i.e., the other grammar) in the course of their commentaries. The commentator on the Vedic Lexicon[86] has accepted the aphorisms of Bhoja throughout. And in the age before Pāṇini their authority alone has to be accepted. It has been already said that there is no reason for the fading away of the authority once established.

81. Viṭṭhala, the commentator on the *Prakriyākaumudī*.

82. *Padavākyārthapañcikā*, Adyar Library, MS. No. 68474. Descriptive Catalogue, vol. V, S. No. 174. On leaf No. 128: मन्दाल्पाभ्यां च मेधाद् इति महोपाध्याय-वर्धमानस्सू(सू)त्रम् ।

83. The Commentary is called *Amarakośodghāṭana*. Edn. Poona, 1913, 1943.

84. The commentary is called *Ṭīkāsarvasvam*. The author belonged to the Vandighaṭīya family and the work was composed in 1160 A.D.

85. This is a very elaborate commentary on the *Amarakośa* by Jātaveda-dīkṣita, son of Devaṇabhaṭṭa. The author is supposed to have flourished in the latter part of the twelfth century.

86. Durgācārya, the commentator on the *Nirukta* of Yāska.

39. Then it is said (by the opponent) that the other grammars are to be rejected because of their conflict with what is said by the trinity of sages, whose rules are restrictive that 'these alone are correct words'. This [argument] has also been set aside by refuting in more than one way the restrictive nature [of Paninian rules] advanced by the opponent. The reason is also shown that if the Paninian rules are restrictive, the *vārttikas* would also become non-authoritative. The argument that where there is a conflict between two views either alone must be accepted is also shown as inconclusive in the instances of 'the taking up or not taking up of *ṣoḍaśi*' and of the alternatives put forth by two moral codes as represented in the *Smṛticandrikā*, etc. That there is no conflict because of the absence of restriction (in Paninian rules) is also affirmed.

40. [The opponents' view] that the usages of V y ā s a are based on the special grammars called *Prātiśākhyas*, is also not correct. Because it has already been pointed out that when both are equal in respect of their being non-Paninian, there is no reason to favour the special grammars and hate the general ones. In addition, it will be hardly possible in the view of the opponent to maintain the authority of the *Prātiśākhyas*, inasmuch as (according to him) the rules (of P ā ṇ i n i) on the Vedic language have already laid down the restriction that 'these [usages] alone are correct in the *Vedas*'.

41. Then it has been said that since the references to the names of ancient teachers can be explained by assuming the purpose of making the rules optional, their authority has not been accepted. This is also not true. While saying 'this is my view and this is his', if the authority of the other is not accepted, there can be no alternative at all; so it is self-contradictory. By simple mentioning of the name [of the teachers] the rule cannot become optional; and if [their] authority is not accepted, there is no question of maintaining them (i.e., the references) as indicating reverence.

42. Then it has been argued that this (i.e., references to ancient teachers) can happen as is found in the *Mīmāṃsā*, etc., where the names of unacceptable predecessors are (some times) mentioned. This is also not sound; for there the other's view is mentioned for criticising it; whereas here there is no such thing. [The argument] that though in (the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*) – *tatpramāṇam bādarāyaṇasyānapekṣatvāt*,[87] the other's view is mentioned as acceptable, while discussing the deities

87. *Jaimini-sūtra*, I. 1. 5.

having a body, etc.,[88] other's view is rejected; so here (in the case of grammar) also the same can happen is un-sound. For there also all the schools of the Vedists are found to have been accepted as different views.

43. It has also been said that the author of the *Kaumudī* and others have quoted the views of others in order to reveal the expansion of their own intellect, and not because of others' authority. This [argument] lacks coherence. By quoting something which is not authoritative, the dullness of the intellect alone could be revealed. Thus in the opponent's contention those points which go against what we have said are refuted.

Therefore, every thing is fine; because V a i n a t e y a! who by citing a multitude of others' works only establishes what I have said, is indeed, a very close friend of mine.

O! the renowned scholars of the celebrated Coḷa region! someone declared the other grammars (than that of P ā ṇ i n i) to be devoid of authority; thereupon we also said something as above. Since this (what I have said) has been enounced in the [works like] *Kaumudī* and *Dhātuvṛtti* on the basis of their (i.e., the other grammars) being equally an auxiliary to the *Veda* (as the Paninian grammar), I have written down this with the hope that this would be acceptable to you. O! the eminent [scholars] ! you may kindly scrutinize this.

O! Śrī Someśvaradīkṣita![89] the foremost among the learned! O! the erudite in both the *Mīmāṃsās*, grammar and logic! having heard of you as one of invincible nobility knowing the truth (of things), a reservoir of kindness and well composed, I entreat: Here is something written by me; you, the high-minded, may kindly accept this.

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88. ibid. X. 4. 23. Although Jaimini does not explicitely say that deities to whom oblations are offered do not have a physique, Śabara states: नन्वेवं शब्द एव देवता प्राप्नोति। अत्रोच्यते। नैतदस्माभिः परिहर्तव्यम्। न हीदमुच्यमानमस्मत्पक्षं बाधते। Also see Khaṇḍadeva on this.
cf. *Naiṣadhīya-carita*, V. 39:

विश्वरूपकलनादुपपन्नं तस्य जैमिनिमुनित्वमुदीये।
विग्रहं मखभुजामसहिष्णुर्व्यर्थतां मदशनिं स निनाय॥

89. He is yet to be identified.

You have written (it is known), the counter arguments in the *Kāmadevavijaya*[90]. We are extremely anxious to see it. It may therefore be immediately sent (to us). The idea [of this request] is that seeing the method of argumentation set forth by the clearsighted [scholars] like you, we may get our thoughts clarified at once.

When Kāmadeva[91] employed the reasoning (*also* directed the weapon)[92] its (*also* his) destruction was effected by you through effective observations (*also* glance).[93] This is indeed proper for one who owns the name *someśvara* and is omniscient.

There is the god who having armoured himself well protects the king of serpents, who was pushed aside by your erudition, by placing him as a bracelet; and the divine river who was cast away by the force of your oration, by placing her in his matted hair. In this way, O! the learned Yajñanārāyaṇa Dīkṣita! you steal away, by your intelligence, the pride of of omniscience of even that god, who affords protection to your enemies.[94]

The King who is extensively learned in Politics depends on you to take decision in the matters concerning the country; when renowned scholars assemble with some doubt, you alone stand as the judge; who, even if he be equal to the preceptor of the gods, can stand up to you?[95] O! Yajñanārāyaṇa Dīkṣita! can any other person who equals you in wisdom be found ?

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90. According to *The New Catalogus Catalogorum*, vol. III, p. 348. *Kāmadeva-vijaya* is a work on grammar written by Someśvara in reply to a work by Kāmadeva.

91. An author of that name as well as the god of love.

92. The word *hetau* is taken here as the *saptami* of *hetu* with reference to the author Kāmadeva and *hetu* with referenee to Kāmadeva (god of love).

93. Someśvara Dīkṣita retaliated the arguments of the author Kāmadeva by critical observations, while God Śiva destroyed Kāmadeva by His glance.

94. The thousand-tongued mythical serpent is supposed to be having infinite knowledge. The power of speech is always compared to the force of current of Gaṅgā. The idea seems to be that Śiva is protecting them without knowing of their defeat at Yajñanārāyaṇa's hands. The knowledge of the scholar, therefore, surpasses that of the God.

95. The root *sthā* in *ātmanepada* is used here in its various meanings. In the first and second instances, is according to Pā. I. 3. 23. *Prakāśana-stheyākhyayoś ca.* PS under ibid., states that Bhaṭṭi, etc., interpret the word *stheya* as one who depends on others for taking a decision or who himself is the judge when others seek a decision. Here the root is used in both the senses, respectively. The third sense 'to stand upto' is found in the third usage of the root in the verse.

The people in Kerala in general are very delicate and sickly, and especially so is my humble self. Everyone is lukewarm towards travelling even a distance; what about then going to another region? In spite of this, if by chance at some time health would allow me to have it, I will certainly meet the great scholar Yajñanārāyaṇa Dikṣita, the ocean of wisdom.